The Coder registry attack hijacked Cloudflare IPs to serve malicious Terraform modules from registry.coder.com, stealing developer secrets.

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A Virtualizor supply-chain attack used a 33-hour BGP hijack to deliver malicious updates, planting root backdoors on VPS hosts. Back up your data now.

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Discover the details of the TeamPCP hackers arrested in Australia for executing devastating open-source supply chain attacks using the Mini Shai-Hulud worm.

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The post TeamPCP Hackers Arrested in Joint Operation appeared first on Daily CyberSecurity.

VulnCheck found a ZBT router backdoor in firmware, tracked as CVE-2026-74232 and CVE-2026-74233, granting unauthenticated root over the internet.

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The SANDCLOCK LiteLLM supply-chain attack exposed credentials across 2,038 repositories, affecting technology, finance, healthcare, retail and more.

Resecurity (USA) estimated the most affected sectors by the “SANDCLOCK” backdoor, which was planted as a result of the code repository compromise. According to cybersecurity experts, LiteLLM / TeamPCP Supply-Chain Attack will have long-lasting consequences.

By compromising a well-known component in AI applications, adversaries will multiply the blast radius—some of the victim organizations are still unaware of the backdoor and its impact. LiteLLM is a popular open-soure AI gateway and utility library that unifies API calls for over 100 large language model providers, such as OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, and local Ollama models.

Such incidents involve substantial MTTD (Mean Time to Detect) and MTTR (Mean Time to Respond). The threat actor group “TeamPCP” compromised maintainer credentials for LiteLLM and published malicious package versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 to PyPI around March 2026 – creating a window of exposure lasting at least a few months.

Over 2,500+ organizations and hundreds of thousands of CI/CD environments suffered full-credential exposure, compromising cloud infrastructure keys, repository access tokens, SSH credentials, Kubernetes secrets, and AI provider API keys (such as OpenAI and Anthropic).

Resecurity has acquired the 150GB archive attributed to the LiteLLM supply-chain attack conducted by TeamPCP using the “SANDCLOCK” credential-stealer. Per published incident reporting — accompanying victim manifests enumerate 898 compromised GitHub owners (organisations/accounts) across 2,038 repositories. The affected owners include major global enterprises — among them Microsoft, Azure, IBM, NVIDIA, PayPal (Zettle), Deloitte, Bosch, S&P Global, Elevance Health, 84.51° (Kroger), Adeo (Leroy Merlin), Kärcher, Dräger, ID.me and 1inch.

Top 10 the most impacted sectors (by victim organization profile):

• Technology / Software
• Banking / Finance / Insurance
• Healthcare / Pharma / Medtech
• Retail / E-Commerce
• Media / Gaming / Adtech
• Manufacturing / Industrial
• Professional Services
• Cybersecurity
• Crypto
• Government

Resecurity enumerated 2,146 records by key name (values never inspected beyond structural masking). The composition is overwhelmingly GitHub CI-CD identity material, with a long tail of high-value cloud and registry credentials.

Victim manifests (owners.txt, repos.txt) enumerate 898 distinct compromised GitHub owners across 2,038 repositories. The distribution is long-tailed: 631 owners have a single affected repo, while the most-affected owner (Cencosud-Cencommerce) has 64. Critically, the owner list includes major global enterprises and regulated organisations.

Every organization affected by the LiteLLM incident should revoke or rotate GitHub App private keys, PATs, AWS/GCP/Firebase credentials, ECR/JFrog tokens, SSH keys, and signing passwords, and invalidate sessions.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, newsletter)

AsyncAPI npm packages with 2M weekly downloads were compromised, spreading malware with info-stealing, crypto-theft and RAT capabilities.

OX Security researchers disclosed on July 14 that the AsyncAPI npm organization was compromised, with malicious code injected into four packages that together account for over 2 million weekly downloads. The affected versions are @asyncapi/generator 3.3.1, @asyncapi/generator-components 0.7.1, @asyncapi/generator-helpers 1.1.1, and @asyncapi/specs 6.11.2 and 6.11.2-alpha.1. AsyncAPI is widely used by developers building event-driven APIs, which means the blast radius here touches a broad cross-section of professional development environments.

“This is a highly sophisticated, multi-stage supply chain attack. The malware functions as a hybrid info-stealer, crypto-stealer, and Remote Access Trojan (RAT).” reads the report published by OX. “It actively attempts to confuse analysts by mimicking known campaigns (like Miasma) and targets developers and repository maintainers.”

OX describes what was injected as far more than a simple credential harvester. The malware payload runs to 91,973 lines of code. Whoever wrote this was not in a hurry.

The infrastructure choices are deliberate and designed for resilience. The malware uses IPFS, a legitimate peer-to-peer file storage network, to host its payload and as a fallback command-and-control server if the primary C2 at 85[.]137[.]53[.]71 becomes unavailable.

“The malware uses ipfs.io – a legitimate peer-to-peer network to store and share data – in order to store its malicious payload. Later on it uses it as a fallback server in case the C2 server is not functional.” OX explains. “The malware also uses a wide array of backup communication nodes and beacons to keep communication alive even after the C2 fails, and to bypass network-based blocks.”

Beyond IPFS, the malware maintains communication through BitTorrent bootstrap nodes including router.bittorrent.com, router.utorrent.com, and dht.transmissionbt.com, giving it multiple fallback paths if any single channel is blocked at the network level.

The self-propagation capability is what makes this particularly dangerous for developer environments. If the malware finds valid authentication tokens for npm, PyPI, or Cargo on the compromised machine, it attempts to publish itself into packages the victim maintains on those registries. One compromised developer account becomes a new distribution vector.

The researchers found an embedded Ethereum contract address, 0x12c37A86a0Ed0beBe5d1d6a43E42f07860eAc710, in the code, however, they were not able to fully determine how it’s used operationally.

The malware checks whether it’s running inside a virtual machine, whether an endpoint detection tool is present, and whether the system’s locale is set to Russian. If any of those conditions are true, it terminates. This is standard practice for malware that doesn’t want to infect its operators’ own machines or run inside a security researcher’s sandbox.

“Although the malware has some similarities to the Shai-Hulud and Miasma campaigns, and it contains the Miasma string multiple times inside its code, this malware isn’t the same as them, nor is it attributed to the Miasma/Shai-Hulud/TeamPCP campaigns that we’ve seen in the past.” states the report.

The Miasma references inside the code appear to be deliberate misdirection rather than a genuine connection, a tactic designed to send analysts chasing the wrong attribution trail.

npm’s version 12 introduced restrictions on post-install scripts, specifically to prevent malware from executing code at install time. The attackers here didn’t need that vector.

The malicious payload was injected directly into the main JavaScript file of each affected package, making it indistinguishable from legitimate code at install time and executable the moment the package is imported in a project.

If you use any of the affected package versions, the immediate steps are to revoke all developer tokens associated with npm, PyPI, and Cargo on any machine that may have run these packages, rotate secrets, and audit recent commits and package releases in your own registries for unauthorized changes. Monitor for unexpected outbound connections to BitTorrent bootstrap nodes or IPFS gateways on developer networks, as these are the malware’s communication channels and would be unusual in a typical development environment. Check whether any packages you maintain have had unauthorized versions published while the affected versions were in use on your machines.

“npm’s v12 is out, blocking post-install scripts, but threat actors didn’t need to use them as they just embedded the malicious code inside the main JavaScript file without being blocked.” concludes the report. “This amplifies the message we extensively discussed in npm Is Fighting the Right War With the Wrong Weapons – and we don’t see this trend changing anytime soon.”

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, AsyncAPI)

LastPass said customer contact and support data were exposed after attackers used stolen Klue OAuth tokens to access its Salesforce environment and CRM records.

The post LastPass Confirms Vendor Breach Exposed Customer Contact, Support Data appeared first on TechRepublic.

Attackers backdoored ShapedPlugin Pro updates, deploying malware that steals credentials, 2FA secrets, and grants full site access.

If you installed a ShapedPlugin Pro plugin between April and June 2026 and kept it updated, your site may be compromised. Not because you did something wrong, but because the vendor’s own build and distribution pipeline was breached. Cybersecurity firm Wordfence confirmed the attack on June 12th after obtaining a backdoored copy of Real Testimonials Pro 3.2.5 directly from ShapedPlugin’s official update endpoint.

ShapedPlugin is a WordPress software company that develops premium and free plugins for WordPress and WooCommerce websites. Founded in 2015, it offers plugins for carousels, galleries, testimonials, weather widgets, accordions, product displays, team showcases, and other website functions. Its products are used by hundreds of thousands of websites worldwide.

The WordPress plugin vendor has over 400,000 active free plugin installations

“During our investigation, we discovered that attackers compromised the vendor’s build and distribution pipeline, injecting backdoor code into Pro plugin releases distributed through official licensed update channels.” reads the report published by Wordfence. “As with all supply chain compromises, this attack is particularly insidious because affected site owners followed security best practices: they purchased legitimate licenses and installed updates directly from the vendor’s official update system. Supply chain compromises are becoming significantly more common in all software, including WordPress software.”

The researchers confirmed that at least three Pro plugins were compromised: Product Slider Pro for WooCommerce, Real Testimonials Pro, and Smart Post Show Pro. Free plugins on WordPress.org were left clean, which was almost certainly deliberate.

The infection runs in two stages. The first is a loader file called LicenseLoader.php that downloads a payload from an attacker-controlled server, installs it as a fake plugin, reports the victim domain back to the attacker, and then deletes itself.

“This self-deleting behavior means the initial infection vector disappears after first execution, complicating forensic analysis for site owners who notice the infection later.” continues the report.

The dropped payload disguises itself as WooCommerce-related plugins, using names like “woocommerce-subscription” in the singular form, one letter away from the legitimate plugin name.

What that payload does once installed is extensive. It hides itself from the WordPress admin plugin list, registers a REST API backdoor that accepts arbitrary file writes, bundles Tiny File Manager and Adminer for direct GUI access to files and databases, and installs a webshell that accepts commands via URL parameters. There’s also a hardcoded login bypass: a single MD5 hash lets the attacker authenticate as any administrator without knowing their password. That’s not a subtle intrusion; that’s a full set of keys.

The malware steals credentials in a more sophisticated way than typical threats.

“What makes this variant particularly concerning is its targeted exfiltration of two-factor authentication secrets. The malware specifically searches for TOTP seeds from multiple 2FA plugins.” continues the report.

Attackers send the stolen passwords and 2FA to generate.2faplugin.org, a domain that blends in with legitimate two-factor traffic. If an attacker has your password and your TOTP seed, changing your password after discovery doesn’t help.

The forensic evidence points to a CI/CD pipeline compromise rather than someone manually tampering with ZIP files. Only four files were modified on May 21st within a two-hour window, consistent with an automated build step. The compromised package also contains git SHA references confirming it was built from a private repository. The attacker had access to deploy updates to both WordPress.org and the Pro distribution system, but only injected malware into some Pro builds — either because WordPress.org scans for malware or because paying customers are higher-value targets. Possibly both.

The C2 infrastructure is registered to AEZA GROUP LLC, tied to Russian-based entities. The exfiltration domain 2faplugin.org was updated on May 10th, about eleven days before the backdoor was injected into Pro builds. Anyone who installed any ShapedPlugin Pro product between April and June 2026 should scan immediately, check for fake plugins under wp-content/plugins/woocommerce-subscription/ or woocommerce-notification/, rotate all WordPress admin passwords, database credentials, and API keys, and, critically, revoke and regenerate 2FA secrets for every user on the site, since existing TOTP seeds should be considered stolen.

“This supply chain attack demonstrates the evolving threat landscape facing WordPress site owners. The attackers did not exploit a vulnerability in the plugin code itself: they compromised the vendor’s build and distribution infrastructure, turning legitimate licensed updates into malware delivery vehicles.” concludes the report. “The inclusion of 2FA secret exfiltration marks a concerning evolution in WordPress-targeted malware.”

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, ShapedPlugin)

Over 20 Linux packages were compromised in the Atomic Arch campaign, which abuses AUR ownership transfers to drop rootkit-like malware.

In May 2026, malicious code appeared inside packages used across NHS software projects. The software supply chain attack named Mini Shai-hulud by researchers spread through CI/CD systems, package registries, and developer tooling before anyone noticed something was wrong. It was caught quickly. Damage was limited.

The UK's National Cyber Security Centre is using that near-miss to bring into focus a more urgent case. The underlying conditions that made Mini Shai-hulud possible are not unique to that attack, and subsequent similar campaigns have gone undetected for longer and spread far more widely.

The Problem Is Structural

NCSC National Resilience Officer Jack F, is not mainly interested in a particular threat actor or a CVE but in how modern software development works — because that architecture is the vulnerability.

A single application today may rely on dozens, sometimes hundreds, of third-party packages like libraries, frameworks, SDKs, and code snippets pulled in automatically when a developer runs a single install command. Node.js, Python, and Rust are singled out as especially exposed because their minimal standard libraries push developers toward external registries for even basic functionality. Once a package is in a dependency tree, it often pulls in further packages of its own — transitive dependencies that the original developer never consciously chose.

This is not a flaw in the ecosystem's design. It is the design. The efficiency gains from reusable, trusted components are real, and the NCSC is not arguing against open source development. The argument is more specific to the combination of automation, implicit trust, and scale that turns a single compromised package into a vector capable of spreading malicious code across hundreds of organizations before any single one of them detects it.

Four Techniques Defenders Need to Know

The NCSC documents four attacker techniques active in recent campaigns. The first is maintainer account compromise — attackers steal credentials or tokens that allow them to push malicious updates to a trusted, legitimate package. This is how the Axios npm attack in March 2026 worked. The maintainer account was hijacked, a malicious dependency injected, and the backdoor distributed to an estimated 80% of cloud environments before the window closed.

Read: Axios Supply Chain Attack Exposes Developers to Hidden Malware

The second technique is abandoned package takeover where attackers claim ownership of packages whose original maintainers have let their domains lapse or transferred control elsewhere. The third is typosquatting, in which, publishing packages with names that closely mimic popular legitimate ones, waiting for a developer to make a spelling error in an install command. The fourth is self-propagation, meaning, using credentials stolen from one package compromise to access or modify additional packages, creating a cascading contamination chain across an ecosystem.

All four techniques exploit the same structural feature. Once a package enters a trusted registry, downstream consumers inherit whatever trust that registry confers, automatically, at scale, with no human checkpoint.

What Defenders Are Being Asked to Do

The NCSC's immediate guidance falls into three categories. The first is visibility. Organizations must audit recent package updates and version changes, identify newly introduced or unexpected dependencies, and maintain a software bill of materials — a documented inventory of every component a codebase relies on. Without that inventory, it is impossible to know whether a compromised package is present at all.

The second is detection. Teams should monitor CI/CD activity, network traffic, and credential use for anomalies, and run dependency scanning tools against known indicators of compromise published after supply chain incidents.

And the third is remediation posture. If a compromise is suspected, automatic dependency updates should be paused immediately, new updates and versions reviewed manually before redeployment, and any potentially exposed API keys, tokens, and credentials rotated without waiting for confirmation of active exploitation. Enforcing multi-factor authentication on developer and package registry accounts is singled out specifically — the absence of universally enforced MFA on registry accounts is identified as a structural gap that maintainer account compromises directly exploit.

The NCSC also flags developer environments themselves as a soft target. Developer devices are typically less tightly controlled than managed corporate endpoints, making credential theft from developer workstations a reliable path to registry access that bypasses enterprise security controls entirely.

As supply chain attacks on PyPI and npm packages have become a near-weekly occurrence across security news feeds, rhe NCSC's guidance refers defenders to the Software Security Code of Practice as the authoritative framework for strengthening development and supply chain management. It also notes that its SSCoP implementation guidance will be updated shortly to reflect the specific attack scenarios.

OpenAI has disclosed details of its response to the recent TanStack npm supply chain attack, confirming that two employee devices were affected during the broader malware campaign known as Mini Shai-Hulud. The company said it found no evidence that customer data, production systems, or intellectual property were compromised during the incident. The disclosure comes as software supply chain attacks continue to target widely used open-source dependencies and developer tooling. OpenAI stated that the attack involved a compromised version of the popular open-source library TanStack npm, which was used in parts of its internal environment. According to the company, the incident was identified on May 11, 2026 UTC. OpenAI said it quickly launched an investigation, isolated affected systems, revoked sessions, rotated credentials, and temporarily restricted parts of its code deployment workflows as part of its containment efforts.

TanStack npm Supply Chain Attack Hit Two Employee Devices

OpenAI said the malware activity was limited to two employee devices within its corporate environment. During the investigation, the company observed behavior consistent with publicly reported details of the Mini Shai-Hulud malware campaign, including credential theft and unauthorized access attempts involving a limited number of internal source code repositories. The company clarified that only a small amount of credential material was successfully exfiltrated and that no customer information or application code was affected. OpenAI also engaged a third-party digital forensics and incident response firm to support the investigation and remediation process. The impacted repositories included code-signing certificates used for OpenAI products across macOS, Windows, iOS, and Android platforms. As a precaution, the company is rotating those certificates and re-signing its applications with updated credentials.

macOS Users Required to Update OpenAI Apps

As part of the response to the TanStack npm supply chain attack, OpenAI is requiring all macOS users to update their applications before June 12, 2026. The company warned that older macOS versions signed with previous certificates may stop functioning after that date because Apple’s security protections will block applications signed with the outdated credentials once the certificates are fully revoked. Affected macOS applications include:

• ChatGPT Desktop
• Codex App
• Codex CLI
• Atlas

OpenAI said users can safely update through built-in application update mechanisms or official download pages. The company also warned users not to install apps from links shared through emails, messages, advertisements, or third-party download websites. The company emphasized that it has not detected any malicious software signed using OpenAI certificates. It also confirmed that existing software installations were reviewed and no unauthorized modifications were identified.

No Impact to Customer Passwords or API Keys

In its FAQ, OpenAI stated that customer passwords, API keys, and user data were not exposed during the incident. The company also said it found no evidence that attackers used compromised credentials for follow-on access or further malicious activity. Windows and iOS users are not required to take immediate action, though OpenAI noted that all applications are being re-signed with new certificates as part of the broader remediation effort. The company explained that it delayed full certificate revocation until June 12 to avoid disrupting legitimate users. OpenAI said it has already worked with platform providers to block any new notarization attempts using the impacted certificates, reducing the likelihood of fake applications being distributed as legitimate OpenAI software.

OpenAI Highlights Growing Risk of Software Supply Chain Attacks

The company said the TanStack npm supply chain attack reflects the growing cybersecurity risks tied to modern software ecosystems, where organizations rely heavily on shared open-source libraries, package managers, and CI/CD infrastructure. OpenAI noted that it had already been deploying additional security controls before the incident, including stricter package management protections, enhanced validation of third-party components, and stronger safeguards around sensitive CI/CD credentials. However, the company acknowledged that the two affected employee devices had not yet received the updated security configurations that could have prevented the malicious package from being downloaded. The incident adds to increasing industry concerns around software supply chain security, especially as threat actors continue targeting trusted development tools and widely used open-source packages to gain access to enterprise environments.

The fallout from the Axios npm supply chain attack continues to widen, with OpenAI issuing a detailed response outlining its exposure and remediation steps. The Axios npm supply chain attack, reported by The Cyber Express on April 1, has since been linked to North Korea’s Lazarus Group, significantly expanding the scope and impact of the incident. Attribution was confirmed by Google Threat Intelligence Group, which identified the activity under UNC1069, a financially motivated group active since at least 2018.

OpenAI Confirms Limited Exposure to Axios npm Supply Chain Attack

In its official statement, OpenAI said, “We recently identified a security issue involving a third-party developer tool, Axios, that was part of a widely reported, broader industry incident⁠.” The company clarified that while it was affected by the broader Axios npm supply chain attack, there is no evidence of compromise to user data or internal systems. “We found no evidence that OpenAI user data was accessed, that our systems or intellectual property was compromised, or that our software was altered,” the statement added. The exposure occurred on March 31, 2026, when a GitHub Actions workflow used in OpenAI’s macOS app-signing process executed a malicious version of Axios (v1.14.1). This workflow had access to sensitive code-signing certificates used for validating OpenAI applications like ChatGPT Desktop, Codex, Codex CLI, and Atlas.

Certificate Rotation and macOS App Updates

As a direct response to the Axios npm supply chain attack, OpenAI has initiated a full rotation of its macOS code-signing certificates. While internal analysis suggests the certificate was likely not exfiltrated, the company is treating it as potentially compromised. To mitigate any residual risk, OpenAI is requiring users to update their macOS applications. Older versions of affected apps will lose support and functionality after May 8, 2026. Updated versions will carry new certificates to ensure authenticity. This move is designed to prevent threat actors from distributing malicious software disguised as legitimate OpenAI applications, a known risk in supply chain attacks involving code-signing materials.

Investigation and Security Measures

OpenAI engaged a third-party digital forensics and incident response firm to investigate the impact of the Axios npm supply chain attack. The company also coordinated with Apple to block any new notarization attempts using the old certificate. Additional steps taken include:

• Publishing new builds of all affected macOS applications
• Reviewing all past software notarizations for anomalies
• Ensuring no unauthorized modifications were made to distributed software

The company confirmed that no malicious applications signed with its certificate have been identified so far.

Root Cause: GitHub Workflow Misconfiguration

The root cause of OpenAI’s exposure to the Axios npm supply chain attack was traced to a misconfiguration in its GitHub Actions workflow. Specifically, the workflow relied on a floating tag instead of a fixed commit hash and lacked a minimum release age for dependencies, both of which increased the risk of pulling compromised packages. This highlights a broader industry issue where development pipelines remain vulnerable to upstream compromises, especially in open-source ecosystems.

No Impact on User Data or Other Platforms

OpenAI emphasized that the incident is limited strictly to macOS applications. There is no impact on iOS, Android, Windows, Linux, or web-based services. The company also reassured users:

• No user data or API keys were compromised
• No passwords need to be changed
• No malware signed as OpenAI has been detected

What Happens Next

OpenAI will fully revoke the old certificate on May 8, 2026, after a 30-day transition window. This approach is intended to minimize disruption while ensuring users have adequate time to update their applications. The company noted that any software signed with the old certificate will be blocked by macOS security protections after revocation, further reducing the risk of misuse.

Growing Impact of Axios npm Supply Chain Attack

The Axios npm supply chain attack highlight the escalating risks tied to third-party software dependencies. With attribution pointing to a state-sponsored group, the incident reflects how supply chain attacks are increasingly being leveraged for financial and strategic objectives. As organizations continue to rely heavily on open-source libraries, the incident serves as a reminder of the need for stricter dependency management, secure development practices, and continuous monitoring of software pipelines.

Overview Recently, NSFOCUS Technology CERT detected that the GitHub community disclosed that there was a credential stealing program in the new version of LiteLLM. Analysis confirmed that it had suffered supply chain poisoning by the TeamPCP group on PyPI. It stole the publishing permission credentials by hacking into the security scanning tool Trivy used in […]

The post AI Infrastructure LiteLLM Supply Chain Poisoning Alert appeared first on NSFOCUS, Inc., a global network and cyber security leader, protects enterprises and carriers from advanced cyber attacks..

The post AI Infrastructure LiteLLM Supply Chain Poisoning Alert appeared first on Security Boulevard.