Bellingcat has geolocated footage showing Shahed-136 type kamikaze drones in operation in Mali.

Defence Blog and France 24 previously published reports that these drones were being deployed on the battlefield in northern Mali. But Bellingcat and Jeune Afrique subsequently verified two recent strikes using geolocation, satellite imagery and expert analysis to provide some of the clearest open-source evidence to date documenting their deployment.

The two strikes took place in the villages of Inafarak on July 12 and Talahandak on July 17. While the available evidence does not allow the exact variant to be identified, experts told Bellingcat it is quite likely the drones were manufactured in Russia given the deployment of the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps group and the broader pattern of Russian military support to Mali.

Leo Jarry, a drone expert with Tungsten Strategies, told Bellingcat: “If the drones are Russian manufactured, they represent a visible demonstration of Russian support for Mali.”

Reports that Russian drones had been used in Mali first emerged in May, when Defence Blog published photographs of drone wreckage from strikes near the town of Savare.

Earlier this month, France 24 also identified debris from several Russian drone systems in Mali, pointing to an expanding Russian drone presence in the country. Until now, however, there has been no verified footage showing how Shahed-136 type drones in flight and hitting targets. 

Mali has been mired in conflict since a rebellion erupted in the country’s north in 2012. In recent years, Russian forces, first through the Wagner Group and now through its successor, Africa Corps, have supported the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) in operations against Tuareg rebel groups and jihadist organisations

Inafarak –  July 12, 2026

On  July 12, footage showing the aftermath of a drone strike in the village of Inafarak was published on X.

Bellingcat geolocated the footage to the town, which is close to the border with Algeria (21.32330, 0.72980) using satellite imagery. We confirmed the location by comparing a post-strike satellite image captured on July 15 with imagery from 2024. The comparison shows several buildings that were standing in 2024 had been destroyed by July, 15, 2026. This damage was consistent with that visible in the geolocated footage. The strike appears to have hit a commercial facility, with a damaged truck and numerous damaged fuel drums visible.

One of the videos shows the remains of an engine which appears consistent with an MD-550, a distinctive four-cylinder two-stroke engine which is found on the Shahed-136 family of drones. We showed the image of the engine to two weapons researchers – Trevor Ball, an independent weapons expert and former Bellingcat investigator, and Leo Jarry, a drone expert with Tungsten Strategies – who said the engine is consistent with the Shahed-136 family of drones.

The component also closely matches reference imagery of MD-550 engines published by the Open Source Munitions Portal (OSMP), an expert-reviewed database of documented weapons remnants, and on the war & sanctions component database.

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The footage we found on X was  also republished by the Wagner- and Africa Corps-affiliated Telegram channel “White Uncles in Africa”, which regularly shares racist memes and graphic posts  and which Bellingcat has previously reported on.

The channel captioned the videos: “Now the Azawadi ‘khokhols’ will be seeing Gerans all the time.” The use of “Geran” refers to a Russian-manufactured version of the Shahed-136. The post also uses the derogatory Russian slur “khokhol” for Ukrainians and applies it to people from Azawad, the name used by Tuareg separatists for northern Mali.

Talahandak –  July 17, 2026

On  July 17, graphic footage showing the aftermath of another Shahed-136 type drone strike was posted on X, showing one casualty as well as a burning truck. An additional video of the burning vehicle shows what appear to be bottles of cooking oil spilling from the truck indicating it may have been a commercial truck.

Bellingcat geolocated these videos to the village of Talahandak (20.26369, 1.80095), which is also close to the border with Algeria but around 100 miles southeast of Inafarak, by matching the surrounding buildings to satellite imagery.

Shortly afterwards, a Wagner-affiliated X account claimed that the drone responsible for the strike had been shot down by rebels before hitting the truck. The post showed one video where a Shahed-type drone could be seen in flight.

We were able to geolocate where the footage that captured the drone’s final moments before impact was filmed to another area of Talahandak, nearly a kilometer away (20.266907, 1.792656) from the video that showed the impact site.

A distinctive smoke plume can be seen rising from the sight of impact in several other videos posted online shortly after the strike. 

Bellingcat geolocated each of these videos and matched the plume of smoke adding further confirmation that the footage showing the drone in flight is authentic. 

The video shows the drone descending directly towards the location where the person and truck were hit, and there appears to be no interception before impact.

A New Weapon Raises New Risks

The Shahed-136 is a series of long-range one-way attack drones originally developed in Iran and now also manufactured in Russia. Unlike the drones typically used by Mali’s Armed Forces- the  Bayraktar TB2 , which launch relatively small precision-guided munitions before returning to base, one-way attack drones are designed to explode on impact, allowing them to attack over longer distances given they do not require recovery.

Leo Jarry, a drone expert with Tungsten Strategies, told Bellingcat that the drone provides Africa Corps and FAMa with an “expendable, cost-effective” long-range strike capability, allowing them to engage targets in Mali’s far north beyond the effective reach of the Bayraktar TB2. “The fact that these systems are relatively cheap and expendable changes the risk calculation for operators,” Jarry said. “They can be used more freely, potentially forcing insurgents in northern Mali to adapt their behaviour to a new aerial threat.”

However, Jarry said the system is inherently less precise than the Bayraktar TB2 because it cannot verify its targets during flight. Instead, it relies on separate surveillance assets to identify and track targets before launch. “In Mali, where armed groups are highly mobile and frequently operate among civilian populations, any gap between target identification and impact creates a risk of striking the wrong target.” Combined with the drone’s larger warhead, this increases the potential for civilian harm when employed in or near populated areas.

From Ukraine to Sahel

In Ukraine, Russian forces have used Shahed-136 type drones extensively in long-range strike campaigns that have repeatedly targeted civilian infrastructure, causing civilian casualties. Their appearance in Mali raises the possibility that the operational practices associated with these weapons are also being exported to this conflict. 

The deployment  also follows Bellingcat’s and Jeune Afrique’s recent investigation documenting the use of banned Russian cluster munitions in Mali.

Malian forces and Africa Corps currently face mounting pressure in northern Mali following a series of rebel offensives. Fighting has intensified in recent months, with rebels capturing several military bases and reportedly inflicting heavy losses on both FAMa and Africa Corps. 

Jarry told Bellingcat that the relatively low cost and expendable nature of these new drones make them well suited to retaliatory strikes following attacks by rebels.

Bellingcat’s Carlos Gonzales contributed to this report as well as the following members of Bellingcat’s volunteer community: Nicole Kiess, Afton Briones, Riccardo Giannardi and Ziyu Wan.

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The post Shahed-Type Drones Filmed During Mali Village Attacks appeared first on bellingcat.

This investigation is a collaboration between Bellingcat and Jeune Afrique. You can read Jeune Afrique’s article in French here.

Unexploded Russian-made cluster munition bomblets, as well as damage consistent with bomblet impacts, have been found in a village in northern Mali – despite the West African country being a state party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) which prohibits their use. 

The deployment of cluster munitions in northern Mali was first reported by Radio France International last week, citing local sources yet without showing images of the munitions or strikes in the reporting. However, social media footage posted on May 17, and since analysed by Bellingcat and our publishing partner, Jeune Afrique, shows unexploded Russian manufactured ShOAB-0.5 submunitions (bomblets).

Bellingcat geolocated a video showing the unexploded ShOAB-0.5 bomblets in the village of Tadjmart (18.977305, 0.86072), located approximately 55-kilometers (34-miles) south of the larger town of Aguelhok in northern Mali. This matches the location of airstrikes announced by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) on May 17. FAMa claimed it had identified armed groups in the area.

Russia’s paramilitary Africa Corps group, which is controlled by the Russian government and which replaced the Wagner mercenary group in the country, has been supporting Malian military operations.

Mali’s civil war has been ongoing since 2012. But the conflict has spiked in recent weeks as Tuareg separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and militants from the al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) seized control of parts of the country in coordinated attacks against Malian and Africa Corps forces.

Les mercenaires continuent de larguer des bombes sur des maisons et certains diront pourquoi se révolter contre ces genres des pratiques inhumaines ne respectant aucun Droit. https://t.co/5jynKwUgeW pic.twitter.com/nB3ym4yooc

— Mohamed Lilly (@MedLilly1) May 17, 2026

The footage geolocated by Bellingcat shows the unexploded submunitions near buildings, alongside multiple small craters, consistent with submunition explosions.

The buildings and landmarks visible in the footage allowed us to geolocate where it was taken.

Additional footage geolocated by Bellingcat to nearby coordinates 18.97954, 0.85989 shows destroyed and burning buildings several hundred meters away, although this damage is not consistent with cluster munition use. The damage appears more significant than that which would be caused by submunition impacts.

Cluster munitions are explosive weapons which open mid-air to release large numbers of submunitions. They are prohibited from being used by signatories of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) because they are indiscriminate, saturate a wide area and can leave behind highly volatile unexploded bomblets which can kill civilians long after deployment. 

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While Mali is a signatory to the CCM, Russia is not a state party to the agreement. 

Brian Finucane, a senior adviser with the US Program at the International Crisis Group, told Bellingcat that as a party to the CCM, Mali is “subject to its prohibitions and requirements. These include not only prohibitions on the use of cluster munitions, but also obligations to clear and destroy such munitions on its territory.”

ShOAB-0.5 submunitions are carried by the Russian RBK-500 cluster munition dispenser. A single RBK-500 dispenser can deploy about 565 ShOAB-0.5 submunitions. There is as yet no footage posted online showing a spent dispenser linked to this incident.Footage did circulate online on May 16 showing the remnants of an RBK-500. It was claimed to have been used in a separate cluster munition strike in the Timbuktu region of Mali. However, this footage was not geolocatable, given it only shows a close up of the dispenser at night, nor was it possible to tell when the footage was taken.

A second video appears to show the same dispenser, but shows the side with visible Russian markings denoting the model: “РБК-500; ШОАБ-0.5; ТГ-30”. This identifies the dispenser, RBK-500, the submunition inside, ShOAB-0.5, and the explosive filler, TG-30.

RBK-500 dispensers are deployed by Russian-made aircraft including several MiG and Su models. According to the 2024 IISS Military Balance report, Mali does not have any known operational Russian fixed-wing attack aircraft. Two Russian Su-25 aircraft delivered to Mali – one in 2022 and another in 2023 – are reported to have crashed and been out of service since late 2023.

An Su-24M model has since appeared in satellite imagery captured at Modibo Keita International Airport in Bamako. The imagery was first published by France 24 in April 2025, although it was unclear if this aircraft was, or has been, operated by Africa Corps or Malian forces.

Bellingcat contacted the Malian military and Russian Ministry of Defence requesting comment, and asking which force was responsible for deploying cluster munitions. We did not receive a substantive response by publication time beyond the initial statement made by the FAMa which detailed it was responsible for the May 17 strike.

A video posted on May 17, by an account linked to Azawad rebels in Northern Mali, shows a person handling components of a ShOAB-0.5 submunition, seemingly unaware of the danger. However, as the video shows only a close up of the submunition, it has not been possible to geolocate the video or confirm when it was taken.

Les Azawadiens ne fabriquent pas les armes au contraire ils les démontent ! pic.twitter.com/0tqOb6ut9G

— Oumayya AG Ambeiry (@AgOumayya) May 17, 2026

The FLA condemned the use of cluster munitions in a statement published on May 18. 

Bellingcat has previously reported on the use of cluster munitions in Syria and Ukraine and the danger they pose to civilians.

Youri van der Weide contributed to this report.

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The post Banned Russian Submunitions Found After Mali’s Military Announces Airstrikes appeared first on bellingcat.

Bellingcat has identified several high-profile incidents where authorities in the United Arab Emirates have downplayed damage, mischaracterised interceptions and in some instances not acknowledged successful Iranian drone strikes on the country.

A review of official statements shows that the public account does not always align with what can be observed through open sources. This comes as the UAE faces sustained aerial attacks on civilian and economic infrastructure, challenging its image as a secure global hub for business and tourism. Hours after the United States and Israel launched coordinated attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, the Islamic Republic responded by launching an attack against US-allies in the region including the UAE. 

In the wake of the attacks, the UAE’s attorney general warned that publication of images or videos of strikes was illegal. People were also encouraged to report anyone sharing photos or videos of the strikes to authorities. 

The country’s attorney general has ordered the arrest of 35 people and said they would face an expedited trial for “publishing video clips on social media platforms containing misleading, fabricated content and content that harmed defence measures and glorified acts of military aggression against UAE.” Separately police in Abu Dhabi reported they had arrested just over 100 people on suspicion of filming incidents related to Iran’s attacks on the UAE and sharing misleading information online.

Bellingcat contacted the Dubai Media Office, the Fujairah Media Office as well as the UAE’s Ministry of Defence to understand how statements are put out and how distinctions are made between successful drone strikes and damage caused by debris. We did not receive a response by the time of publication.

“Spreading Rumours is a Crime”

During the first days of the conflict several videos were posted on social media, primarily on X, TikTok and Telegram showing footage of Iranian attacks and interceptions across the UAE. 

Around the same time the Dubai Media Office, the X account of the Government of Dubai’s press office, warned followers that legal action would be taken against those sharing “unverified material”.

 The X account of the Dubai Media Office has more than 2.3 million followers making it one of the largest state-run accounts in the country. 

“The public and media are urged to rely solely on official sources for accurate information and refrain from sharing unverified material,” the account posted.

Dubai Police issued similar warnings on social media, stating that sharing content that contradicts official announcements could lead to imprisonment of at least two years and fines of no less than 200,000 dirhams (approximately $55,000).

Despite authorities urging the public to rely on official sources only, Bellingcat found that some of the videos posted online as well as satellite imagery from the region contradicts a number of official accounts of high-profile attacks. For this piece we have only included links to videos that have already been widely published in mainstream news outlets, posted by professional journalists, or have been widely viewed on social media.

Successful Interceptions?

On March 3, a video filmed from a vessel appears to show a drone striking the port of Fujairah, one of the UAE’s most strategically important energy hubs. The port handles roughly 1.7 million barrels of oil per day and is among the world’s largest.

The drone appears to approach its target intact, with no visible sign of interception, Sam Lair, a researcher at James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told Bellingcat. 

Moments after it descends behind storage tanks, an explosion is heard and a large plume of smoke rises from the site.

On the same day, the Fujairah Media Office stated that a fire resulted from debris following a successful interception, adding that the fire had been brought under control. Satellite images captured on March 4 and 5 show thick black smoke rising from the site. NASA FIRMS data also detected fires on March 3, March 4 and March 5. By March 7, satellite imagery shows at least three storage tanks fully destroyed (25.184565, 56.345481).

Detained in Dubai, a group that provides legal advice to people detained in the UAE, said that a Vietnamese national who filmed the strike on Fujairah port had been detained by authorities after posting the footage online. 

Authorities made a similar report on March 1, stating that a fire at one of the berths of Jebel Ali Port was caused by debris from an aerial interception. Satellite imagery from the same day shows fires at two separate locations – approximately 3 km apart – within the port. One appears to be a central facility associated with fuel handling operations, connected via pipelines to surrounding storage tanks (25.00704, 55.07499). The other is a large structure (24.97953, 55.05204) in the military area of the port, which is one of the US Navy’s busiest ports in the Middle East. The New York Times previously identified an Iranian strike as the cause of the fire at the site. 

Burj Al Arab: A “Limited” Fire

Damage at Dubai’s Burj Al Arab Hotel was attributed by the Dubai Media Office to “shrapnel” from an intercepted drone and described as a “limited” fire. However, footage shows the fire extended to approximately 30 metres in height, covering approximately eight floors of the building, suggesting a far more significant incident than officially described.  

Lair told Bellingcat that the damage appeared more consistent with a direct impact. He added that if the damage had resulted from an interception it would have occurred irresponsibly close to the building.

Fairmont The Palm: Omission of Cause

On Feb. 28, the Fairmont hotel in Dubai’s Palm Jumeirah area was struck by a drone, as shown in footage verified by Bellingcat.

However the Dubai Media office did not confirm a strike took place, instead they stated  only that an “incident occurred in a building in the Palm Jumeirah area,” and urged the public not to share footage.

One video of the fire was shared by a Dubai-based Bloomberg journalist. In the replies to the journalist’s post, multiple users tagged the Dubai Police, a pattern seen across posts documenting the strikes, in an apparent effort to flag violations of the cyber-crime laws to authorities.  

The aftermath of the strike was also captured by a content-creator who has since left the UAE. 

Radha Stirling, founder of Detained in Dubai, told Bellingcat at least five people have been confirmed by the British embassy to have been charged and detained under the UAE’s cybercrime law in connection with documenting this strike. According to Stirling, authorities have sought access to individuals’ phones following incidents to determine whether they filmed or shared footage.

“Even just taking a photo is illegal, it’s illegal to share content that the government deems negative, even in a private message,” Stirling said.

Dubai International Airport: An Unacknowledged Strike

On March 7, the Dubai Media Office announced the temporary suspension of operations at Dubai International Airport, stating only that a situation was being handled under safety protocols. 

Footage that emerged online around the same time, and was verified by Bellingcat, shows a drone strike next to an airport terminal building (25.24165, 55.37498).

Stirling told Bellingcat that she has been in contact with a cabin crew member who was detained after sending an image to colleagues of Dubai airport after an explosion. 

Warda Complex: A Direct Hit

On March 1, a drone struck a residential apartment on the 19th floor of the Warda complex in Dubai (25.004320, 55.293164). Two videos filmed from different angles show the drone hitting the building directly, with no visible sign of interception. In one clip, filmed inside the apartment, a British resident says: “We’ve just been hit by a drone… I didn’t even finish my cup of tea.”

The footage shows relatively limited damage and no explosion, indicating the drone did not detonate. However, the incident appears to show a direct hit by an Iranian drone.

In contrast, statements published the same day by the Dubai Media Office describe air defence activity and attribute sounds heard across the emirate to successful interception operations. Bellingcat was unable to find any acknowledgement of a direct hit in UAE media.

These cases point to a gap between official accounts and observable evidence, raising questions about how incidents are being presented to the public.

Influencers and Narrative Control

At the same time, pro-government messaging has proliferated online. A number of near-identical videos posted by influencers promoting the UAE’s safety and leadership appeared, often using the format: “You live in Dubai, aren’t you scared?” followed by images of UAE leaders and the response: “No, because I know who protects us.” 

Analysis by the BBC found that some of these videos were uploaded within seconds of each other, suggesting coordinated activity.

Stirling told Bellingcat that influencers in the UAE, who require licences to operate, are often paid to promote official narratives. “They are seen as an asset,” she said, describing them as “almost an extension of the government.”

As of April 1, UAE media reported that a total of 12 people had been killed and 190 injured by strikes since the beginning of the war.  

“People are dying. It’s not as safe as the government is reporting. It’s not as safe as influencers are reporting. It’s like a dream narrative that you wish was true.” Stirling said.

Bellingcat also identified a number of incidents in which authorities reported deaths or injuries caused by “debris” following “successful interceptions”. In these cases, however, we were unable to identify supporting photo, video, or other independently verifiable evidence to corroborate the official account.

Notably, fewer videos of such incidents appear to have emerged online in recent weeks, likely as public awareness of detentions under the cyber-criminality law has increased.

Jonathan Dagher, head of the Middle East desk at Reporters Without Borders told Bellingcat that the UAE government was using the Iran war to further restrict independent reporting in the country. 

“When the conflict began, the government stepped up this repression, explicitly prohibiting the public (including journalists) from publishing photos or information related to the strikes, and encouraging the public to report on such incidents.”  

He added that legitimate concerns about national security should not infringe on the public’s right to information. 

“Broad and loosely worded bans on covering events, in the name of security, violate this right and expose journalists to arrest and violence.”

Bellingcat contacted the Dubai Media Office, the Fujairah Media Office as well as the UAE’s Ministry of Defence to understand how statements are put out and how distinctions are made between successful drone strikes and damage caused by debris. We did not receive a response by the time of publication.

Lana Nusseibeh, a representative of the UAE’s Foreign Ministry previously told the BBC: 

“In order for everyone to feel safe it’s important at this time that the information is credible and the sources are reliable. That is the basis of the legislation that has come into play in this State, which is obviously a tense time.” 

She added that her advice for residents, citizens, tourists and journalists in the UAE was to: “Follow the guidelines. The guidelines are there for your safety and for your protection.” 

Merel Zoet contributed to this report.

Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.

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Munition remnants pictured at the site of a strike that killed at least 17 people in the town of Tiné, Chad, last week appear to match a weapon previously used by Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the war with Sudanese government forces – despite RSF denials of involvement in the incident.

Photographs showed what appeared to be a match for the rear control section of a Chinese-made GB25A or GB50A bomb, which can be dropped by Chinese-made drones. Amnesty International previously identified a GB50A used by the RSF that it said had “almost certainly” been re-exported to the group by the UAE. 

The first photographs of the remnants were posted by Chad’s by ATPE CHAD publication, which reported a public prosecutor had visited the site of impact.

A separate set of photographs showing even clearer visuals of the remnants was subsequently shared by the N’Djamena-based broadcaster MRTV. It’s Facebook page showed Chadian soldiers standing beside the remnants.

Images were also posted by posted on Facebook by the Department of Public Safety and Immigration in Chad.

By using the time displayed on a watch worn by an official in one of the pictures it was possible to estimate that the images were likely taken in the late afternoon. By comparing this with solar data, the shadows visible in the photos and other visual details, it was then possible to infer the approximate layout of nearby buildings and the distribution of trees where the remnants were found.

With this information, and using satellite imagery, we then geolocated the photos to the northwest of the Bir Tine neighbourhood, just 650 metres from the border with the Western Darfur region of Sudan that is largely controlled by the RSF.

Remnants from the control sections of other GB25A or GB50A bombs have previously been found after RSF attacks in Sudan, including attacks on Kassala Airport and Coral Marina Hotel in Port Sudan (as seen in the images below).

BBC News reported that the RSF is suspected of carrying out the attack.

However, the RSF has denied any involvement and blamed Sudan’s army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The SAF has in turn said the RSF was responsible. Chad’s president on Thursday ordered the military to retaliate against future attacks from Sudan. 

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RSF spokesperson Al-Fateh Qurashi told Bellingcat via WhatsApp: “Our forces are not responsible for any targeting of neighboring Chad, and we have no connection to this targeting.” Qurashi instead blamed forces aligned with the Sudanese government over the strike. 

Imran Abdullah, an adviser to the RSF commander, told Bellingcat via WhatsApp that satellite imagery tracked the drone and that it belonged to the forces aligned with the Sudanese government. However, Abdullah refused to share the imagery he referred to saying: “It can be published if an independent international commission of inquiry is in place.”

The SAF are not known to use any Chinese-made drones or bombs, like the GB25A or GB50A. The SAF has been observed using Turkish and Iranian made drones and munitions such as the MAM-L bomb. 

Bellingcat sought comment on the use of these weapons from the Chinese manufacturer, Norinco, as well as the UAE given Amnesty’s previous reports about how a GB50A was used by the RSF after “almost certainly” being re-exported to Sudan. Neither responded prior to publication.

The conflict has previously spilled over the border into Chad. Reuters reported last month the country closed its border with Sudan after five Chadian soldiers were killed following clashes in Tiné between the RSF and militia fighters loyal to the Sudanese government.

Ziyu Wan and Riccardo Giannardi contributed from Bellingcat’s volunteer community.

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You can read an Arabic version of this investigation on Radio Dabanga’s site here.

Child soldiers linked to Sudan’s warring factions have gained viral fame on TikTok, with their videos attracting millions of views.

A Bellingcat investigation has found that the young boys – widely referred to as “lion cubs” – have become celebrated figures of the rival groups that have been fighting for control of the country since 2023.

Many of the videos we reviewed show the children in military uniforms posing with fighters and senior officials from both sides of the conflict – the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). They are seen celebrating battlefield victories, delivering motivational speeches, and making violent threats. In some footage the children are armed.

Child soldier experts told Bellingcat that the visibility and popularity of this content, which portrays fighting as normal, celebrated and aspirational, could lead to the recruitment of more young people in the conflict.

Bellingcat flagged 12 TikTok accounts that had each posted viral content of child soldiers through the platform’s internal reporting mechanism. After more than 48 hours without action, we emailed TikTok to request comment, providing links to the reported content. This was done to give TikTok a further opportunity to review and remove the accounts, in order to minimise the risk of amplification by reporting on it. 

Following our inquiry, TikTok removed seven of the reported accounts. The remaining active accounts continue to host more than a dozen videos featuring child soldier content, which, according to TikTok’s own guidelines, breaches its content policies. (Update: Following the publication of this article, TikTok has removed all remaining active accounts.)

Under the Paris Principles, to which Sudan is a state party, a child soldier is defined as a person under the age of 18 “who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity”, whether or not they are directly involved in hostilities. 

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Bellingcat focused on two prominent “lion cubs” from opposing sides of the civil war to reveal how this content circulates across social media and gains traction – mostly on TikTok – despite platform rules that restrict content involving the exploitation and militarisation of children.

In some cases, the children film themselves near combat scenes, including in at least one instance with the bodies of recently deceased people. In others, they are filmed in choreographed appearances with high-profile commanders and political figures. The children are honoured as heroes by armed groups and their supporters, and their content is re-shared across hundreds of TikTok accounts, some of which have millions of followers.

Bellingcat is not including the names of the TikTok accounts or unblurred images of the children featured in the content due to their age. We also do not link to any of the accounts or posts to avoid amplification.

‘People Say I Will Die’: RSF Child Soldier

Bellingcat geolocated multiple TikTok videos showing an RSF “lion cub” – who appears to be a young teenager – celebrating the capture of the 22nd infantry division SAF base in Babanusa, a city in West Kordofan, in early December 2025. 

The videos, posted by pro-RSF TikTok accounts and viewed millions of times, show the child’s movements on the ground in the aftermath of the takeover. In the weeks that followed, the child’s TikTok account gained tens of thousands of followers and recent posts amassed hundreds of thousands of views. 

In a TikTok video posted to the child’s account on Jan. 1, 2026, in response to social media comments, the child says: “I see people on the [social] media saying that I will die. The person who dies is as if he has paid his debt” This video received more than 1,6 million views before TikTok removed the account following Bellingcat’s inquiry.

2 December 2025 – Copyright Pléiades Neo © Airbus DS 2025

Map Coordinates:

The RSF captured the SAF’s 22nd Infantry Division base in Babanusa on Dec. 1, 2025 following a prolonged siege, taking control of the last remaining SAF stronghold in West Kordofan.

A video posted by a pro-RSF TikTok account in early December, geolocated by Bellingcat, places the child at the North entrance of the SAF base, holding an assault rifle and celebrating alongside adult RSF fighters.

A second TikTok video shows him approximately 100 metres away, running toward the base’s main entrance amid audible gunfire, chanting “Allahu Akbar” and claiming the takeover of the SAF’s 22nd Infantry Division.

A crowd gathered outside the main entrance is also visible in the satellite image, consistent with RSF activity in the immediate aftermath of the takeover.

In a third, particularly graphic TikTok video geolocated by Bellingcat, the child films himself among what appears to be a group of close to ten dead bodies spread out on the ground inside of the SAF base.

Bellingcat identified objects consistent in size and placement with the grouping of bodies visible in the video on a high-resolution satellite image from Dec. 2. 2025.

Graphic imagery of bodies covered by Bellingcat. Number labels provided to show how we matched the positions of the bodies visible in the video to the satellite image.

The second TikTok video in which the child is running had been viewed more than two million times before it was removed. Its audio has since been reused in 200 additional videos on the platform, significantly amplifying its reach across pro-RSF networks. 

A shorter version of the same audio appeared in more than 70 additional videos. These included dozens of AI-generated clips, characterised by an animated style and visible inaccuracies in uniform badges and flags. Many of these TikToks depicted the child alongside senior RSF figures, such as the group’s leader, known as Hemedti, and an officer known as Abu Lulu. On Feb. 19, 2026, Abu Lulu was placed under sanctions by the US Treasury Department for his actions during the RSF’s takeover of Al Fashir, as analysed by Bellingcat.

The RSF “lion cub” appears in another TikTok video posted the day of Babanusa’s takeover, alongside what appear to be captured SAF soldiers whom he mocks as he leads chants praising the RSF. This post received hundreds of supportive comments, many of which appear to come from RSF fighters.

Footage posted on Dec. 5. shows the child being celebrated by RSF fighters as he sits on the shoulder of RSF commander Salih Al-Foti. Two popular pro-RSF TikTok accounts, with a combined 1,4 million followers, reposted the video with the caption: “Commander Colonel Salih Al-Foti honours the hero Al-Shibli [the lion cub]”. 

In the video, Al-Foti praises the bravery of the “lion cub”, a term the commander uses three times as he describes  how the child was on the battlefield during the first entry of the 22nd infantry division SAF base. “I see that the whole world is talking about this lion cub,” Al-Foti says in the video. He also states that the RSF does not recruit children or ask individuals of such a young age to fight, claiming instead that minors sometimes appear among RSF forces without prior knowledge or approval, acting voluntarily and fighting alongside adult fighters.

Al-Foti’s commanding role during the takeover of Babanusa is confirmed in an official RSF video in which he discusses the operation. Salih Al-Foti was previously named in a 2023 report by the UN Joint Human Rights Office in Sudan. The document cites testimonies accusing RSF forces under his command of intentionally killing civilians in Nyala based on tribal or ethnic affiliation. Following the RSF takeover of Babanusa, Al-Foti was promoted to the rank of Major General according to social media reports. The RSF “lion cub” congratulated him in a TikTok video posted on Jan. 10, 2026.

In response to Bellingcat’s findings, El Basha Tebeig, a media representative and advisor to RSF leadership, stated that the Rapid Support Forces maintains a dedicated human rights unit within its military structure and is committed to international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions, which prohibit the use of children in armed conflict. He said the RSF commander had issued standing orders prohibiting the participation of anyone under the age of 18 in military operations. 

Tebeig told Bellingcat that the incident at the 22nd Division base in Babanusa, in which a young child appeared in videos following the capture of the base, was unrelated to the RSF. When asked why the child sat on the shoulders of RSF commander Salih Al-Foti, Tebeig responded: “The child was present with his father to celebrate the liberation of the 22nd Division in Babanusa, and it is quite normal for children and women to attend such celebrations to participate in the festive atmosphere.” He also said that allegations concerning the use of child soldiers formed part of efforts by hostile political actors to damage the RSF’s reputation, and reiterated that the RSF remains committed to not using children in armed conflict.

‘Kill Every Traitor and Coward’: SAF Child Soldier

Bellingcat also identified the social media accounts of a viral SAF child soldier with more than 700,000 TikTok followers. The account name includes the term Shibli (شبلي), meaning “lion cub,” and its bio describes it as the “official account” of the child, alongside a note inviting advertising inquiries. This child appears to be younger than the RSF “lion cub”.

Unlike the RSF-linked child, the videos posted to this account show no activity near a frontline and appear to be carefully staged. The boy’s videos, which have amassed millions of views, repeatedly feature him in the SAF uniform (with SAF insignia on his beret, Sudanese flags and SAF camouflage) alongside armed soldiers and senior military figures, often in ceremonial or public settings.

In one TikTok video viewed nearly nine million times before it was taken down, the child recites a poem mocking RSF leader Hemedti. In another video, which received four million views, he delivers a speech in which he affirms Sudan’s unity from a raised platform surrounded by soldiers.

The “lion cub” also appears alongside senior figures in the Sudanese government. In one TikTok video, viewed more than seven million times, he is seen with Khaled Al-Aiser, Sudan’s information minister, declaring: “Our age does not allow us to take part in the war or to be mobilised alongside the army. Yet we wish to go to the front lines, carrying the DShK and the Goryunov machine guns, and driving a battle tank … We are small children, but in anger we are like a volcano: we erupt and kill every traitor and coward.”

Another TikTok video shows him with Minni Minawi, the leader of the largest faction of the Sudanese Liberation Army and the current governor of Darfur, whom he praises in a poem. The child also appears alongside Major General Abu Agla Keikel, a former RSF commander who defected to the SAF and now leads a force known as Sudan Shield, which has been accused of human rights violations, while reciting poetry in support of the group.

The visibility of child soldiers on both sides of the conflict has become a point of comparison and competition online. Several TikTok accounts, including a pro-RSF one with nearly one million followers, have posted videos inviting users to vote in the comments on which of the two viral child soldiers they support.

The two children are Sudanese, but who is braver?

video text

0 0 0 0

TikTok User The hero of Babnusa is well-known.

TikTok User The first one is a field man, and the second one is a media man, but there’s no comparison at all. Shibli’s readiness is unmatched! الاول زول ميدان والتاني زول ميديا بس مافي مقارنة اصلا شبلي الجاهزية كفو كفو كفو كفو كفو

TikTok User Al-Shibly Number 2 is just a performer. If you fired a Kalashnikov near him, he’d probably bolt. الشبلي رقم 2ده حكامه ساي لو ضربت جمبو كلاش ساي احتمال يفز

TikTok User 1

TikTok User Readiness cub

TikTok User 2222

TikTok User One cub is ready for action and the battlefield, while the other is all talk. شبل الجاهزية زول ميدان والتاني بتاع جعجعة

TikTok User Number 1, glory to you, Al-Shibli readiness

TikTok User Number 1, a champion, I swear!

TikTok User Shibli is ready

TikTok User The well-known needs no introduction, Shibli, readiness is key

Bellingcat reached out to the SAF for comment through multiple channels but had received no response by the time of publication.

Child Soldiers on Facebook

The Facebook pages of both the SAF and RSF-affiliated child soldiers are less active and popular, with each having about 7,000 followers. However, in contrast to the children’s own TikTok accounts, the content posted on the Facebook pages of the children themselves shows them carrying weapons. 

In one video posted to the Facebook page of the SAF “lion cub”, he is shown holding an assault rifle while reciting a poem threatening the RSF, saying that “slaughtering with a knife is sufficient, without the need for bullets”. Another video, from April 2025, shows the child standing beside a destroyed tank in Khartoum International Airport (15.60108, 32.54597), declaring the city liberated. 

Meanwhile, a Facebook story posted to the page of the RSF “lion cub” in December 2025 shows him posing with a light machine gun and wrapped with ammunition belts.

Although Bellingcat found evidence of child soldier content visible on other social media platforms, we focused on TikTok and Facebook due to the higher level of user engagement surrounding the individual “lion cubs”.

How ‘Lion Cub’ Content Encourages Recruitment

Experts told Bellingcat that videos showing child soldiers in conflict helped to encourage recruitment, with armed groups using visibility and praise to draw other young people in.

Michael Wessells, professor of Clinical Population and Family Health at Columbia University, is a psychosocial and child protection practitioner who advises UN agencies on child soldiers and the psychological impacts of war on children. He said the public celebration of the children in these videos can directly encourage recruitment.

“What seems to be going on is the recruitment of children by honoring children who are willing to fight,” Wessells said. “They are given names such as ‘lion cubs’ that honor their strength and warrior nature, while bringing them into the fold at an early age.”

Wessells warned that online praise and virality can strengthen violent identities and normalise participation in armed conflict, particularly among adolescents seeking recognition, belonging, and purpose. He said the online presence of child soldiers had increased their reach and influence as recruitment tools. 

Mia Bloom, professor of Communication and Middle East Studies at Georgia State University, and a leading expert on the exploitation and recruitment of children by armed groups, said the public elevation of child soldiers also turns them into powerful role models, used to motivate both adults and youth to join armed groups.

“They’ve become famous, almost equivalent to Disney child stars in the US, where everybody knows their name,” Bloom told Bellingcat. “The message becomes: look how famous he got by doing that – maybe if I join the movement, I can also be famous.”

Bloom warned that this kind of visibility can trigger a well-documented copycat effect among young audiences. When children go viral for their association with armed groups, she said, it helps legitimise participation in violence and presents it as normal, celebrated, and aspirational.

On youth-oriented platforms such as TikTok, the viral child soldiers give armed groups what Bloom described as an “attractive face” for younger audiences, signalling that participation can bring status, recognition, and fame. In this way, the elevation of child soldiers as online celebrities risks encouraging other young people to emulate them, transforming children into powerful recruitment symbols.

Dr Gina Vale, who has published research on the Islamic State’s recruitment and use of child soldier “cubs” in propaganda, added that the prominent depiction of armed children at combat scenes makes for very effective propaganda. Vale explained that the images of militarised children are designed to be shocking and emotive, while conveying the power and control of an armed group over future generations.

Children Increasingly Drawn into Sudan’s Civil War

Bellingcat’s findings come amid longstanding concerns about the recruitment of child soldiers in Sudan’s civil war. In 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, Siobhán Mullally, warned that unaccompanied and impoverished children were being targeted by the RSF, as worsening food shortages, displacement, and the collapse of basic services left them vulnerable to recruitment, including into combat roles. 

The UN Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan reported in October 2024 that the RSF had “systematically recruited and used children in hostilities”, including in combat roles and in activities such as manning checkpoints and recording and disseminating abuses on social media.

With regard to the SAF, the Fact-Finding Mission said it had received credible reports of children joining youth groups under the banner of “popular mobilization” following leadership calls to counter RSF advances. The mission reported that videos circulated online showed youth and children under 18 being trained by SAF officers, and that children were observed manning checkpoints in SAF-controlled areas. It said further investigation was required to determine whether children had been formally recruited and used by the SAF.

In January 2026, Volker Türk, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said he was: “deeply alarmed by the increasing militarisation of society by all parties to the conflict, including through the arming of civilians and recruitment and use of children” following a five-day mission to Sudan. Witnesses interviewed by Reuters also described 23 incidents in which at least 56 children were abducted by the RSF and allied militias in attacks dating back to 2023.

Social Media Platforms ‘Falling Short’

TikTok’s Community Guidelines say the platform is intended to “bring people together, not promote conflict,” and that it does not allow content involving “threats, glorifying violence, or promoting crimes that could harm people”. TikTok’s Youth Safety policies further states: “We don’t allow content that could harm young people—physically, emotionally, or developmentally.” 

Marwa Fatafta, a tech policy expert at digital rights organisation Access Now, told Bellingcat that the content identified in this investigation violates multiple TikTok policies. She pointed out that TikTok’s human rights commitments include the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which require states to take all feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected by armed conflict. 

Fatafta added that content involving child soldiers is prohibited under TikTok’s Human trafficking and Smuggling policy. She noted that it may also violate platform rules on violence and criminal behavior, given that the use of child soldiers can constitute a war crime under international law.

Facebook’s Human Exploitation policy also prohibits content that facilitates or exploits people through forms of human trafficking, including the recruitment of child soldiers. However, Fatafta told Bellingcat that Meta’s enforcement falls short of its stated commitments, saying: “Meta’s approach to moderating content coming from armed conflicts remains severely inadequate, ad-hoc and non-transparent.”

Sarah T. Roberts, Director of the Center for Critical Internet Inquiry at UCLA, said that while companies face intense scrutiny over child sexual exploitation material, especially from EU and US regulators, content involving child soldiers does not carry the same regulatory consequences and is therefore more likely to be deprioritised. 

“If they can’t see the value, the tendency within these firms is to want to reduce the costs,” Professor Roberts said. Roberts added that social media companies tend to focus on areas where regulatory pressure is strongest, saying: “Are they going to cut content moderation around child sexual exploitation, or will they let things go under the wire in parts of the world that don’t frankly matter to them?”

Sheldon Yett, UNICEF representative to Sudan, told Bellingcat: “Regardless of if a child is portrayed in uniform or otherwise, the recruitment of anyone under 18 is a grave violation of child rights. Social media platforms have an obligation to ensure effective content moderation to prevent platforms from being used to facilitate such exploitation. As this war grinds on into the third year, children in Sudan are particularly vulnerable, and social media platforms must do more to keep children safe.”

Responses to Bellingcat’s Findings

Bellingcat reported 12 TikTok accounts, as well as two viral audios featuring the RSF child soldier that had been used in more than 270 additional videos, through TikTok’s internal reporting mechanism. The reports were submitted under the category “Exploitation and abuse of people under 18,” which explicitly prohibits content that shows or promotes the recruitment of child soldiers.

The reported content included accounts of the child soldiers themselves, as well as ten additional RSF- and SAF-aligned accounts with large followings that had shared or amplified videos depicting the children.

After more than 48 hours had passed without action, Bellingcat contacted TikTok by email to request comment, providing direct links to the accounts and audios that had been reported.

Following our inquiry, TikTok removed seven of the 12 accounts flagged, including the pages of the child soldiers and both of the viral audios. In the remaining five cases, TikTok removed only the specific posts referenced in our correspondence, leaving the accounts active. At the time of publication, four of those accounts continued to host content depicting the child soldiers identified in this investigation. One video of the SAF “lion cub” has more than 3,5 million views and a separate account is still hosting nine videos of the RSF “lion cub” that have collectively been viewed hundreds of thousands of times. 

In response to Bellingcat’s findings, a TikTok spokesperson said: “We’ve removed content and accounts that violated our strict rules against facilitating and depicting human trafficking, including child soldiers. Of the content we removed for breaking these Community Guidelines, 98,2% was taken down before it was reported to us.” 

Bellingcat also reported three Facebook accounts through the internal reporting mechanisms, including accounts belonging to the two identified child soldiers and an account belonging to an RSF fighter with more than 10,000 followers that had posted multiple videos featuring the RSF “lion cub”. After more than 48 hours had passed without action, Bellingcat contacted Meta directly to request comment, sharing our findings and providing links to the reported accounts, which were subsequently removed.

In response, Meta said it had removed the content for violating its policies, stating: “We do not allow content, activity or interactions that recruit people for, facilitate or exploit people through the recruitment of child soldiers.” The company also pointed to a 2025 safety messaging campaign in Sudan aimed at raising awareness among young users about the risks of child soldier recruitment.

At the time of publication, one week after reaching out to TikTok and Facebook, more than a dozen posts featuring the “lion cubs” remained accessible across both platforms simply by searching for the boys’ names.

Update: This article has been updated to include TikTok’s removal of all remaining active accounts and to add a link to Radio Dabanga’s Arabic version.

This investigation was carried out in close cooperation with Radio Dabanga.

Merel Zoet, Galen Reich and Carlos Gonzales contributed to this report.

Riccardo Giannardi, a member of Bellingcat’s Volunteer Community, contributed research to this piece.

Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here and Mastodon here.

The post Viral Child Soldiers on TikTok: The ‘Disney Stars’ of Sudan’s Civil War appeared first on bellingcat.

Attacks by a jihadist group on fuel convoys bound for Bamako, the capital of Mali, have destroyed more than 130 tankers since September, a Bellingcat investigation has found. 

The systematic attacks by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) have brought Bamako and other regions of the West African nation to a standstill as the Al Qaeda-affiliated militia uses economic warfare to pressure the military government.

Landlocked Mali depends on fuel imports transported via tankers by road from neighbouring Senegal and Ivory Coast. Disrupting these convoys strikes directly at the country’s “economic core”, the independent global conflict monitor ACLED said.

Mali has struggled to contain Islamist insurgent groups since a rebellion in the country’s north in 2012. Large swathes of the country remain outside government control despite the junta’s pledges to root out jihadists. Since 2021, Bamako has relied heavily on a Russian security partnership, first with Wagner and now its Africa Corps successor created by the Russian Ministry of Defense, after cutting ties with French and UN peacekeeping missions.

JNIM, an Islamist coalition affiliated with Al Qaeda, has been designated as a terrorist organisation by several countries including the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. Mostly active in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, it has become one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups.

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Bellingcat has used open source methods to track the JNIM blockade across key supply routes in Mali, verifying evidence of six separate attacks across three regions between mid-September and early November which destroyed more than 130 fuel tankers.

Héni Nsaibia, senior West Africa analyst at ACLED, said the campaign marked an escalation of JNIM’s economic warfare tactics, which are aimed at weakening the military regime by undermining its legitimacy. 

While the blockade has not caused a high death toll, Nsaibia said the economic and social repercussions were severe, with fuel shortages disrupting trade and transport across much of the country. It is “a humiliation for the military regime in Bamako, which has been unable to secure the country’s main trade and supply routes,” the analyst told Bellingcat.

A Communications War

Monitoring conflict in West Africa’s Sahel region is especially difficult due to limited digital connectivity, restricted access for journalists, and state controls on reporting. Yet the blockade has generated a large volume of verifiable online material, making it possible to track using open source methods. 

JNIM hosts its main media channel on ChirpWire, an encrypted social media application. The group set out its long-term ambitions on the platform on Nov. 20, Jacob Boswall, a senior journalist at BBC Monitoring who analyses jihadist propaganda in the Sahel, told Bellingcat. JNIM urged Malians, and Bamako residents in particular, to rise up and establish an Islamist government based on Sharia.

The group’s “communications are now predominantly in video format – a shift from the previous written statements,” Boswall said. Since September, videos posted to JNIM channels and circulated on social media show a series of attacks on fuel convoys in southern Mali. These posts, Nsaibia said, were intended to “directly undermine the centre of power, where the regime’s credibility is most at stake.”

In a televised address the night before Independence Day on Sep. 22, the country’s military leader, Colonel Assimi Goïta, urged people to “resist disinformation campaigns orchestrated by armed terrorist groups”. Nsaibia told Bellingcat that the launch of a new media channel highlighting operations by JNIM in the country’s south shows “a deliberate calibration of the group’s public messaging” toward southern audiences, including the junta’s core support base.

Mapping the Siege

MapLibre | Protomaps | Planet Labs © OpenStreetMap contributors

Bellingcat verified half a dozen JNIM attacks on fuel convoys in Mali, finding open source evidence of more than 130 burnt-out tankers on four separate routes, illustrating the scale of the campaign. It must be noted that it was not possible to match all the torched vehicles visible in the satellite imagery with vehicles seen in footage posted online.

Follow a detailed timeline of the attacks by scrolling through this map, you can interact with it by clicking incident dates or by zooming and dragging.

Three attacks occurred northwest of Bamako against convoys arriving from Senegal, with two taking place less than 70 km from the capital.

The other three attacks took place southeast of Bamako, and targeted convoys travelling up from Ivory Coast.

On Sept. 14, fighters ambushed a fuel convoy traveling from Senegal in the region of Kayes. Videos recorded by fighters and people at the scene show dozens of burning and destroyed tankers. One video shows a tanker engulfed in flames and exploding, and insurgents firing machine guns at vehicles which spray fuel through multiple bullet holes.

A Malian military light tactical vehicle (ACMAT ALTV) also appears to have been hit, with one visible casualty (graphic footage blurred).

Bellingcat identified the general location of the site using NASA FIRMS, an open source tool which uses remote-sensing to detect fire activity. We matched the locations of tankers visible in the insurgent-filmed footage to those on a Sep. 19 satellite image, confirming the exact location of the ambush was 14.55455, -9.98426.

In a video released the day of the attack, JNIM commander Al Bambari congratulated the fighters involved. The Malian Armed Forces said the convoy “came under a terrorist attack, to which they responded vigorously”.

Planet Labs satellite imagery captured five days after the attack shows more than 50 tankers at the site, over 30 of which appear blackened by burn marks.

On Sep. 19, a fuel convoy was attacked between the villages of Neguela and Soribougou in the Koulikoro region, according to reports on social media. By comparing medium-resolution satellite imagery from Sept. 16 and Sept. 27, we identified new burn marks on the road at 12.90289, -8.56459, less than 70 km northwest of Bamako.

Bellingcat verified the precise location by matching high-resolution satellite imagery captured on Nov. 22 with the configuration of nine burnt-out tankers seen in footage posted online in the aftermath of the attack.

On Oct. 17, JNIM claimed via ChirpWire to have ambushed a fuel convoy between the towns of Kolondieba and Kidiana in the Sikasso region. NASA FIRMS data corroborated this claim, showing heat signatures along this road consistent with fire activity.

Bellingcat verified the location of the attack through satellite imagery captured on Oct. 21, which shows 50 burnt tankers. Verified footage, geolocated to 10.82640, -6.67186, filmed by what appear to be fighters on motorcycles, shows a long line of burnt-out tankers, matching the satellite evidence.

On Oct. 21, another attack occurred near Sikasso. Although NASA FIRMS data did not detect a fire, Bellingcat geolocated footage (left) showing multiple destroyed tankers and what appears to be a dead body next to a weapon (graphic footage was blurred.) The location was verified by matching the distinctive three-towered structure seen in one of the videos (right) to 11.17092, -5.62559.

Satellite imagery from Oct. 25 shows more than 40 tankers destroyed at the site, matching those seen in the footage.

On Oct. 28, JNIM claimed a second ambush between the villages of Neguela and Soribougou, less than 70 km northwest of Bamako.

This was corroborated by NASA FIRMS data, which indicated fire activity in the area. A comparison of medium-resolution satellite imagery captured hours before the attack and on the day after the attack confirmed the location as: 12.90847, -8.60058, with smoke plumes rising from the site on Sep. 29.

On Oct. 30, Telegram channels linked to Russia’s Africa Corps circulated aerial footage showing fuel convoys traveling under military escort, supported by helicopters. One of these clips has been geolocated to the southern route toward Bamako. Other footage disseminated by state-aligned media has shown convoys arriving in the capital under heavy military protection, indicating that the junta is succeeding at getting some fuel through.

On Nov. 6, JNIM claimed an attack on fuel tankers between the cities of Zégoua and Sikasso in a statement posted to ChirpWire. Footage posted later to the group’s newly created media channel claimed to show the attack. NASA FIRMS did not detect fire activity in this region, but Bellingcat verified the location by matching the roadside structures seen in footage showing the aftermath of the attack to Google satellite imagery, geolocating it to: 11.12997, -5.60889.

A comparison of medium resolution imagery taken on Nov. 6 (prior to the attack) and Nov. 13 shows a large burn mark at this location, which is consistent with at least nine destroyed tankers seen in the footage and the reported timing of the attack.

Disruption of Daily Life

The fuel blockade has paralysed Mali. Food prices have soared, universities have suspended classes, and the US and the UK embassies have withdrawn non-essential staff. Social media videos verified by Bellingcat show people in Bamako queuing for fuel in lines stretching hundreds of meters and, in some cases, pushing their vehicles after pumps ran dry. A video verified from Oct. 23 shows a single fuel tanker in Bamako being followed by a large number of vehicles. The video’s caption suggests the motorists were hoping to obtain petrol.

The blockade’s broader effects can also be observed from space. NASA’s Black Marble nighttime imagery shows a noticeable dimming of Bamako’s lights when comparing May 29 and Oct. 25 – dates chosen outside of Mali’s rainy season to ensure clear skies for a reliable comparison. Mali relies on a “roughly equal mix of diesel and hydraulic sources”, meaning reduced fuel flows can cause diminished electricity availability and consumption, which is consistent with the dimming seen from space.

NASA Black Marble imagery from May 29 and Oct. 25 shows a difference between Bamako’s lights.

This investigation shows how open source information can help track a conflict that is often not possible with traditional reporting. Bellingcat has previously documented JNIM’s targeting of convoys in neighbouring Burkina Faso. By monitoring online content, geolocating footage and carrying out satellite analysis, it is possible to piece together a detailed view of a crisis that has left much of Mali in the dark.

Youri van der Weide and Miguel Ramalho contributed to this report.

Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here and Mastodon here.

The post Mali Under Siege: Tracking the Fuel Blockade Crippling Bamako appeared first on bellingcat.