Attackers bypass endpoint security by posing as IT staff, stealing Microsoft 365 sessions, draining SaaS data and demanding extortion.
Forget installing malware because today’s extortionists just pick up the phone instead of writing code. A widespread threat cluster tracked as PREY-0058 bypasses endpoint security entirely by targeting Microsoft 365 and SaaS environments through pure social engineering.
Attackers pose as internal IT help desk staff via phone calls and direct executives tow
Attackers bypass endpoint security by posing as IT staff, stealing Microsoft 365 sessions, draining SaaS data and demanding extortion.
Forget installing malware because today’s extortionists just pick up the phone instead of writing code. A widespread threat cluster tracked as PREY-0058 bypasses endpoint security entirely by targeting Microsoft 365 and SaaS environments through pure social engineering.
Attackers pose as internal IT help desk staff via phone calls and direct executives toward rogue authentication portals.
“The threat actors impersonate internal IT or helpdesk personnel by phone and direct them to an authentication-themed URL, often formatted as <victim organization>.<lure domain>.” reads the report published by Artic Wolf. “These attacks most frequently target Directors, Vice Presidents, and other executive staff.”
Once victims land on these pages, adversary-in-the-middle panels intercept credentials and multi-factor approvals in real time.
Stolen session tokens are then replayed using residential proxy networks that match the victim’s exact geographic location.
“Stolen sessions are replayed from residential proxy infrastructure, most notably NodeMaven, often from IP addresses that resolve to the same geo-location and network (ASN) as the victim.” states Artic Wolf. “Initial sign-in activity involves applications such as “My Signins”, “My Profile”, “My Apps”, which reveal account details and the applications available to the victim.”
This clever trick blinds standard impossible travel alerts and leaves defenders scratching their heads.
Intruders waste no time once they slip past the front door, immediately shifting focus to massive data harvesting.
“After initial access, the threat actors perform discovery techniques against SharePoint and Entra ID.” continues the report. “SharePoint discovery includes SearchQueryPerformed events with contentclass:STS_Site, contentclass:STS_Web, and wildcard searches using indexdocid for pagination.”
They map out repositories and drain sensitive files from OneDrive, Exchange, and Box before dropping a heavy extortion demand.
To detect these attacks, monitor Microsoft 365 sign-ins coming from residential proxies or hosting networks such as NodeMaven. Suspicious activity is more likely when several common Microsoft account pages are accessed at the start of a session, especially OfficeHome, My Signins, My Profile, My Apps and Microsoft Account Controls.
Alerts should also consider changes from a user’s normal sign-in pattern, such as a different location, ISP, browser, operating system or user agent.
In SharePoint, look for unusual SearchQueryPerformed events that map or enumerate sites and files. In Exchange, watch for large numbers of MailItemsAccessed events in a short time, especially when they come from hosting or proxy IPs. Also monitor heavy SharePoint and OneDrive file access or downloads from one user, particularly when scripting tools such as Python requests or Microsoft Graph are used. Finally, watch for new phishing domains that imitate your organization and target passkey or MFA registration.
To reduce the risk, require managed devices for Microsoft 365 and block or challenge access from proxy and hosting networks. Use phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 keys or device-bound passkeys, which can stop AiTM attacks. Limit users’ access to sensitive SharePoint data, enable Continuous Access Evaluation, and train employees and help-desk teams to verify unexpected IT calls through a trusted channel.
Artic Wolf also released Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) for these attacks.
Condé Nast user data from 32.8 million accounts is reportedly for sale, raising risks of targeted phishing, fraud and scams.
A database said to contain 32.8 million Condé Nast user records is being offered for $15,000 on a Russian-language cybercrime forum. Ransomnews reviewed a 5,000-record sample and concluded that it is consistent with genuine Condé Nast account data collected between September and late October 2025, including records that have not appeared publicly before. Ransomnews’ or
Condé Nast user data from 32.8 million accounts is reportedly for sale, raising risks of targeted phishing, fraud and scams.
A database said to contain 32.8 million Condé Nast user records is being offered for $15,000 on a Russian-language cybercrime forum. Ransomnews reviewed a 5,000-record sample and concluded that it is consistent with genuine Condé Nast account data collected between September and late October 2025, including records that have not appeared publicly before. Ransomnews’ original report provides the underlying analysis.
The alleged dataset covers users across Condé Nast’s publishing portfolio, which includes Vogue, The New Yorker, GQ, Glamour, WIRED, Vanity Fair and other titles. Condé Nast has not publicly confirmed the breach or commented on the new sale listing.
The seller claims the database contains 32,815,767 unique email addresses. It also allegedly includes names, postal addresses, gender, dates of birth and phone numbers for portions of the population, but no passwords, password hashes, usernames or payment-card data.
“A database of 32,815,767 Condé Nast user records went on sale on a Russian-language hacker forum on 7 September 2026 for $15,000, offered as the full set behind December’s WIRED leak.” Ransomnews states. “Ransomnews tested the 5,000-row sample: it is genuine Condé Nast account data, captured in September and October 2025, and the 30.5 million non-WIRED records have not surfaced publicly before. Condé Nast has never commented on the breach.”
Ransomnews found that 31.6% of records allegedly include both first and last names, 22.3% include a postal address, 17.5% include gender, 12.6% include a date of birth and 2.9% include a phone number. The data is valuable because it can be filtered and combined with other information, not because every record contains every field.
The listing claims to include the full dataset behind the December 2025 leak involving WIRED, one of Condé Nast’s best-known publications. The seller says that a separate version excluding WIRED contains 30,455,594 records, which implies a WIRED subset of roughly 2.36 million records.
That figure closely matches the 2,366,576 WIRED records made public in December 2025. SecurityWeek previously reported that the actor behind that leak, using the name “Lovely,” claimed to have stolen more than 40 million Condé Nast records and threatened to release data linked to other publications.
Here’s a simpler and more natural version:
The numbers connect the new listing to the earlier WIRED breach, but they don’t prove that the seller is the original attacker. The seller could be the same person, a partner, or someone who got the data later.
The sample does not look like a recycled copy of the public WIRED leak. It contains names and street addresses at higher rates than the earlier WIRED dataset, has a different field structure and shows a demographic distribution that fits a broader collection of Condé Nast consumer titles, including publications with predominantly female readerships.
Ransomnews did not test the records against live Condé Nast accounts, which would have created further privacy risks. Instead, it used internal consistency checks to determine whether the sample behaved like a real long-running consumer database.
The 5,000-record sample closely matched the seller’s claims, with field-completion rates differing by only 1.2 percentage points. Among records with full names, 61.9% had an email address that matched the name or its initials. When names were randomly mixed between records, that figure fell to just 0.3%.
The data also passed basic time and location checks. None of the 227 records using Apple Relay, iCloud, Outlook, Me.com or Proton addresses appeared to predate those services. Also, 96.4% of U.S. ZIP codes matched the listed state, while 93.5% matched the listed city.
Messy data can be useful evidence. Fields such as “Select your state,” numeric dropdown values, inconsistent country labels, lower-case names and dates of birth set to 1 January are the kind of ordinary web-form errors that accumulate in a database built over decades. Fabricated data is usually cleaner. Real data is often embarrassingly human.
Account-creation dates in the sample run from February 1999 to 23 October 2025. Ransomnews notes that new-account entries thin sharply from September 2025 onward, which suggests the extraction took place over several weeks between September and late October.
That timing fits the earlier incident. The public WIRED leak contained records dated through September 2025, while the person calling themselves Lovely contacted DataBreaches.net in November and the WIRED material appeared online in December.
SecurityWeek’s earlier analysis said the attacker’s technical claims were consistent with insecure direct object reference, or IDOR, and broken access-control issues. In that kind of failure, an application lets one user view or alter another user’s data because it checks identifiers but fails to verify authorisation properly.
The seller’s account is new, has little visible reputation and offers escrow, according to Ransomnews. That profile fits a seller seeking a single buyer rather than public attention, especially when the dataset is priced at less than one-twentieth of a cent per record.
A public dump produces headlines. A private sale can produce a more focused problem: a buyer can use the data for phishing, lead generation, fraud, credential-stuffing preparation or correlation with other leaked datasets without ever publishing the full file.
The absence of passwords does not make the data harmless. A person who subscribed to Vogue, booked a gift subscription for GQ or registered for The New Yorker may receive a message that accurately uses their name, address and publication relationship. That is enough to make a fake renewal, refund or billing request look far more credible than ordinary spam.
Readers should treat unexpected messages about subscription renewals, billing problems, delivery issues, gifts or account verification with caution. Instead of using an email link, open the publisher’s website directly through a known address and check the account there.
A password reset is not the first priority based on this dataset alone, because no passwords or password hashes were found in the sample. However, anyone who reused the same email address across many services should be alert to follow-on phishing and should use a password manager and multi-factor authentication on important accounts.
Postal addresses were present in more than one-fifth of the claimed records. That means fraud may also arrive as physical mail, not only by email or SMS. A letter that references a real magazine title or subscription is not proof that it is genuine.
The more uncomfortable lesson is about breach economics. An attacker can release a small, recognisable subset to demonstrate that the data is real, then hold the larger collection back until a buyer appears. The public sees a leak. The criminal market sees inventory.
StyleSmuggler Magento zero-day is under active attack, letting unauthenticated attackers execute code and install backdoors on stores that may already be patched.
A new zero-day flaw, dubbed StyleSmuggler, in Magento and Adobe Commerce is under active attack, giving unauthenticated attackers a path to run code on vulnerable online stores. Sansec researchers say it affects current Magento Open Source releases, including 2.4.7, 2.4.8 and 2.4.9. According to the experts, exploitation began on S
StyleSmuggler Magento zero-day is under active attack, letting unauthenticated attackers execute code and install backdoors on stores that may already be patched.
A new zero-day flaw, dubbed StyleSmuggler, in Magento and Adobe Commerce is under active attack, giving unauthenticated attackers a path to run code on vulnerable online stores. Sansec researchers say it affects current Magento Open Source releases, including 2.4.7, 2.4.8 and 2.4.9. According to the experts, exploitation began on September 4.
“Sansec discovered StyleSmuggler, an unpatched Magento and Adobe Commerce zero-day that gives unauthenticated attackers remote code execution. All current versions are affected, including 2.4.9.” reads the report published by Sansec. “Attacks started September 4th. Sansec is rolling out emergency mitigation.”
This is not a routine patch-cycle problem. Sansec reproduced the full attack chain on clean installations and observed a first victim running Magento 2.4.6-p15 with July and August 2026 patches already applied and a clean patch-status result. In plain terms, a store could be fully updated according to its normal process and still be exposed.
“StyleSmuggler injects malicious code into Magento’s template system.” states Sansec. “By using the styles properties, it can evade existing safeguards. It works in two stages:
Inject (poison) PHP code, for example by generating a failure report.
Let Magento execute the poisoned code via a failed payment email“
The attack is especially dangerous because it does not require a victim to open an attachment, click a link or even receive a successful email. Magento can execute the injected code while it renders its standard “Payment Transaction Failed Reminder” notification, and the chain can still work if email delivery itself fails.
That makes unusual spikes in failed-payment reminders a useful detection clue, although not conclusive proof of compromise. Legitimate payment failures happen. A sudden burst of them combined with strange system activity is a different conversation.
StyleSmuggler works by placing PHP code into Magento’s templating path and later causing the platform to evaluate it. The first stage creates or poisons a record, while the second stage turns a routine email-rendering process into remote code execution.
The attack reportedly uses GraphQL-related handling and the styles property to evade safeguards that would normally reject dangerous input. Sansec says moving sessions to Redis or a database does not stop the attack, because operators have already adapted their methods when one delivery route fails.
“Moving sessions to Redis or the database does not stop the attack. One merchant reported an attempt that failed against session storage and, eight seconds later, a second attempt that succeeded by using a file uploaded through Magento’s custom options instead.” continues the report. “Both came from the same operator.”
That detail matters because it shows an active operator, not a static proof-of-concept circulating online. Defenders should assume attackers are testing several paths, watching failures and changing tactics quickly.
Once the exploit succeeds, Sansec observed a lightweight Rust backdoor that connects to attacker-controlled infrastructure and waits for commands. At the time of the report, Sansec had not seen evidence that operators had yet used the implant for follow-on actions, but a backdoor that is installed and waiting is not an idle technical curiosity.
The malware initially hid behind a process name resembling [kworker/u:8:0], then appeared as fc-cache on September 6 and as chronyd on September 7.
These names are designed to blend into Linux environments, where administrators may expect to see kernel workers, font-cache utilities and Network Time Protocol daemons.
The fc-cache variant copies itself into a font-cache directory, writes a PID lock file and uses cron to restart twice an hour. The chronyd version can persist through cron as well, but Sansec also observed a build that relaunched itself without relying on a visible cron entry. An empty crontab is not proof that a host is clean.
The command channel is disguised as time synchronisation traffic. The implant sends 48-byte UDP packets to port 123, the standard NTP port, and uses domains that resemble time servers.
“Command and control is disguised as time sync. Every 60 seconds it resolves ntp.timesync.to and sends 48-byte UDP packets to port 123 that look like NTP server replies.” continues the report.
Only the first four bytes look like a normal NTP message; the remaining data can carry the agent ID, hostname, username, operating-system version, memory and disk use, uptime, root status and implant version.
That is a smart concealment choice. Many networks allow NTP traffic without close inspection because reliable time synchronisation is a normal operational requirement. Calling your malware chronyd and making it speak something that resembles NTP is not subtle genius. It is just clever enough to pass a lazy allowlist.
Sansec also found signs of a second, apparently unrelated attacker operating against stores compromised through StyleSmuggler. This actor deployed a compact PHP dropper that placed a web shell inside the product-image cache, using hash-like directory names to make the extra PHP file less obvious.
The web shell returns a normal-looking 404 response unless a request contains the correct X-Cache-Token header. With the header present, it can execute PHP supplied through a POST parameter. That design helps the attacker keep the shell invisible during casual checks and automated scans.
“Before writing that file, the dropper calls out to 457cfa2fb7p5.daf892t5qau4og8pi4cghbc6fhm1dim3u.oast.site, a subdomain of a public service that developers and testers use to confirm that injected code ran.” states the report. “This actor came in through StyleSmuggler. We recovered the dropper from a Store: request header, and its PHP tags are still JSON-escaped from the record Magento logged it into.”
The lesson is not merely to remove the obvious background process. Stores need a full compromise assessment, including a review of PHP files under pub/media, cron spool files, unexpected processes, altered templates, report records, web-server logs and outbound connections.
Adobe was working on a patch as of September 7, according to Sansec, but no release date had been confirmed. A scheduled Adobe security release was due on September 8, although it was not known whether it would address StyleSmuggler.
Until an official fix is available and applied, merchants should consider temporarily disabling GraphQL if they do not have a compensating control capable of blocking this exploit. This can affect storefront and integration functions, so it should be treated as a risk decision rather than a casual configuration change.
Operators should also hunt for processes named [kworker/u:8:0], fc-cache and chronyd that run from unusual paths such as temporary directories, user cache directories or hidden folders. A legitimate chronyd process does not normally emit nine NTP server-mode packets in rapid succession every minute.
Security teams should inspect outbound traffic to suspicious NTP-like domains and UDP port 123 destinations, particularly 185.157.160.251, which Sansec linked to the observed domains on September 7. They should also search authentication and system logs for repeated crontab command not allowed messages generated by the web-service user, such as www-data.
If compromise indicators appear, treat the system as compromised, not merely vulnerable. Isolate the host, preserve logs and forensic evidence, rotate Magento administrator credentials, API tokens, database credentials, payment-provider secrets and cloud keys, then search for secondary backdoors before restoring normal operations.
The Sansec StyleSmuggler report includes current indicators of compromise, malware hashes, C2 infrastructure, suspicious process names and file paths. Its guidance will likely change as the campaign develops, because the attackers have already changed payload names and persistence methods within days.
Berlin refused a 30 Bitcoin ransom, leading hackers to leak 6TB of sensitive state administration and national defense data on the dark web.
When a ransomware gang dumps nearly six terabytes of state administration files onto the dark web, ignoring them does not make the problem go away. The Rhysida ransomware group recently carried out this exact threat against Berlin after local authorities refused to pay a thirty Bitcoin ransom.
At the end of August, Berlin’s state government confirmed
Berlin refused a 30 Bitcoin ransom, leading hackers to leak 6TB of sensitive state administration and national defense data on the dark web.
When a ransomware gang dumps nearly six terabytes of state administration files onto the dark web, ignoring them does not make the problem go away. The Rhysida ransomware group recently carried out this exact threat against Berlin after local authorities refused to pay a thirty Bitcoin ransom.
At the end of August, Berlin’s state government confirmed it was dealing with an extortion attempt following an August cyberattack on the city-state’s administrative network, and officials have already refused the requested ransom. The ransomware group Rhysida claimed responsibility on its leak site August 28, posting an entry titled simply “Berlin, Germany” and claiming 5.79 terabytes of data across roughly 1.44 million files, with personal information on 12,076 individuals allegedly included.
Rhysida claimed it stole 5.79 TB of data, covering around 1.44 million files. The alleged dataset includes:
Personal data: 12,076 individuals, 16,389 email addresses, 11,963 phone numbers and 148 IBANs.
Sensitive records: more than 5,000 personnel files, more than 5,000 administrative-offence files, payroll data and leadership information.
Credentials: plaintext passwords and credentials for systems including GebäudAtlas, the ePayment PAYONE database and Z_ADMIN accounts.
Government and legal material: disciplinary proceedings, court cases, supervisory documents, NDA records and Bundesrat committee protocols.
Classified information: data related to classified-material handling and documents allegedly containing state secrets.
Critical infrastructure: vulnerability analyses concerning Berlin’s water supply.
Identity documents: passports and ID cards from personnel records.
Other material: contracts, financial documents, HR records, infrastructure files, health data, password stores and SQL/PST archives.
The group also claimed that the material could involve violations of GDPR, German classified-information rules, criminal law and KRITIS/BSIG requirements. These are Rhysida’s claims and have not been independently verified.
The scale of the breach is staggering. Investigators are now looking at roughly 1.4 million files containing personal details of civil servants, internal infrastructure records, and critical government data.
The fallout goes far beyond routine data theft. Investigative journalist Lars Winkelsdorf pointed out the gravity of the situation on social media.
Die absolute Vollkatastrophe ist eingetreten
Dieses Datenleck ist schlimmer als alle bisherigen Terroranschläge zusammen 1/xhttps://t.co/epU4mCYgew
“In addition to LKA documents related to investigations, the files also include plans concerning national defense—ranging from the federal government’s secret communication channels in the event of an apocalypse to defense-related companies and emergency plans developed by government agencies,” Winkelsdorf wrote.
Exposing crisis response plans and secret communication channels turns a financial shakedown into a national security headache.
Worse still, the leaked material includes files concerning chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.
“Among the published files is a folder titled “AG CBRN-Rahmenplanung.” CBRN stands for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats,” notes the Euronews report
Having that kind of operational data floating around public forums gives hostile actors a blueprint for disaster.
Refusing to pay ransoms is the right policy, but it rarely stops the bleeding once the network is compromised. Governments keep treating cybersecurity like an IT expense rather than an existential line of defense.
Until boards start treating network segmentation with the same seriousness as physical security, we will keep watching expensive countdown timers tick down to zero.
Berlin’s state government announced the launch of a crisis response after the threat actors published the stolen data.
“A central crisis unit will oversee the review, verification and assessment of the leaked data and support efforts to inform affected citizens and businesses, said the city.” Reuters reports.
MikroTik RouterOS SSH zero-day (MikroTrick chain) under active exploitation since Sept 2. Patch to 7.24.2, 7.23.5, or 6.49.21 immediately and check logs.
Anyone running a MikroTik router with SSH exposed to the internet should treat it as compromised until proven otherwise. The popular cybersecurity expert Costin Raiu published a detailed technical breakdown of the active exploitation on September 5, 2026, the same day CERT Polska issued its advisory titled “Critical vulnerabilities in Mikro
MikroTik RouterOS SSH zero-day (MikroTrick chain) under active exploitation since Sept 2. Patch to 7.24.2, 7.23.5, or 6.49.21 immediately and check logs.
“If you have a MikroTik router on the internet with SSH open, it may already be compromised” Raiu wrote on Medium.
The attack chain being exploited is called MikroTrick and combines two of six vulnerabilities CERT Polska discovered and disclosed: CVE-2026-67276 (CVSS score of 9.2), an SSH authentication bypass, and CVE-2026-86060, an SSH session privilege escalation.
“The CERT Polska team has identified and coordinated the disclosure of six vulnerabilities in MikroTik RouterOS. Combining two of them allows an attacker to take full control of the device without authentication if the device supports remote access using the SSH protocol. To make this chain easier to identify, we have given it a common name, MikroTrick.” states CERT Polska. “In recent days we have been observing attacks against RouterOS devices accessible from the internet. “
CVE-2026-67276 flaw stems from how RouterOS verifies RSA public keys. If an attacker knows a valid username and the public part of the user’s RSA key, they can create a fake key and log in without the private key.
When combined with the privilege-escalation flaw, the attack can give an attacker full administrator access to any internet-exposed RouterOS device with SSH enabled.
“MikroTik has released fixes in versions 7.25beta3, 7.24.2, 7.23.4, and 6.49.21 on September 3, however, it would appear that exploitation began as early as September 2, making it a 0day.” Raiu added. “This seems to suggest someone got hold of the news the patches were dropping and began exploiting it at scale.”
A Polish security forum contained logs showing September 2 exploitation attempts, and CERT Polska confirmed successful attacks including the creation of an “ops” account dating to at least September 2.
Most of the attacks observed so far originated from 82.192.72[.]4, a Leaseweb IP that was hosting a busybox binary (a MIPS build from 2010, identical to the official BusyBox 1.16.1 precompiled binary), alongside three other files: ftpsrv.py, launch.sh, and serve.py. A second IP, 103.102.31[.]18, has also been associated with the campaign. Three of the four hosted files have no VirusTotal detections as of writing.
MikroTik routers are popular because they can run for years with little attention. But that also makes SSH vulnerabilities more dangerous. Devices that haven’t received updates in years may not get patched before attackers start exploiting a new flaw.
Defenders can detect attacks by looking for specific log entries. Failed login attempts show the username -2, which isn’t a valid account and shouldn’t appear in normal logs. A successful attack appears in /system history as ssh:-2@<IP>, followed by an action such as creating a user, adding an SSH key, changing firewall rules, or enabling a proxy or tunnel.
“When one is attached to a configuration action—especially the creation or modification of users, SSH keys, scripts, schedulers, services, firewall rules, proxies, tunnels, or packet-sniffing settings—treat it as confirmed compromise unless it came from an authorized security test.” concluded Raiu. “Do not assume the device is safe merely because no -2 login failure appears: logs may have rolled over or cleaned.”
The creation of an account named “ops” is an additional confirmed indicator of compromise in the observed attacks.
Raiu tested the reproducibility of the exploit using four different AI tools. Astra refused on safety grounds and suggested he apply for cyber verification. The other three (Sol, Daybreak Blue, and GLM-5.3) were willing to help but none could complete a working implementation. That gap gives defenders an estimated one to two days before a working proof of concept appears publicly on GitHub, which is better than nothing but not by much given that exploitation is already happening at scale from a single IP.
CERT Polska noted something unusual: MikroTik sent push notifications through its official mobile app to alert users about the vulnerabilities, a first for the company. Patched versions are 7.25beta3, 7.24.2, 7.23.4, 7.23.5 (released September 4), and 6.49.21. Devices using MikroTik’s default firewall configuration and not directly exposing SSH to the public internet are likely protected, but any device with SSH reachable from untrusted networks should be patched immediately and inspected for the indicators above.
The full list of IOCs from Raiu’s analysis: IPs 82.192.72[.]4 and 103.102.31[.]18; file hashes 6e95f70fdbabb57881b3f5b2c8465d4b17ba901100704efb1278bb3386e6729d (ftpsrv.py), 972b474b896f9fac3cd6b5b8476b410b8f39fbedee8a3b0c745d6e3b328d7dcd (launch.sh), and 6dca83338d60467b65b7789d4d59754e40a7aaa36f40ea2da57538367ac9b89e (serve.py).
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PaperCut Flaws Exploited in Attacks on U.S. and European SchoolsBroadcom Patches Critical VMware Workstation and Fusion VM-Escape VulnerabilitiesU.S. CISA adds Google Chromium V8 flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogCrooks Behind Ma
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Attackers are exploiting two new PaperCut flaws to steal credentials and gain privileged access in education-sector attacks across the U.S. and Europe.
Attackers are exploiting two recelty disclosed PaperCut flaws, CVE-2026-81578 and CVE-2026-82078, in attacks targeting schools and other education organizations in the U.S. and Europe, as reported by TheHackerNews.
Arctic Wolf researchers observed threat actors chaining an authentication bypass with remote code execution to run commands, p
Attackers are exploiting two new PaperCut flaws to steal credentials and gain privileged access in education-sector attacks across the U.S. and Europe.
Attackers are exploiting two recelty disclosed PaperCut flaws, CVE-2026-81578 and CVE-2026-82078, in attacks targeting schools and other education organizations in the U.S. and Europe, as reported by TheHackerNews.
Arctic Wolf researchers observed threat actors chaining an authentication bypass with remote code execution to run commands, perform reconnaissance and create privileged accounts. The activity shows how quickly attackers can turn newly disclosed vulnerabilities into real-world attacks, putting sensitive credentials and systems at risk.
“Arctic Wolf observed exploitation of PaperCut servers affected by CVE-2026-81578 and CVE-2026-82078 leading to command execution, reconnaissance, and attempts to create privileged accounts.” reads the advisory. “Observed post-exploitation activity included delivery of Windows registry hive collection tools, Metasploit/Meterpreter-related Java payloads, and commands used to identify hosts, users, processes, and sensitive configuration data.”
PaperCut, an enterprise print-management platform, has a history of exploitation, including attacks that delivered LockBit ransomware. PaperCut disclosed active exploitation of the latest flaws on August 27, 2026. CISA added both to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on August 31.
Attackers used PaperCut flaws to run basic system checks, create a privileged account named Administrator17, and collect system and user data.
They downloaded credential-harvesting tools with certutil and used Meterpreter Java payloads to establish remote sessions. The attackers also searched PaperCut configuration files for passwords, secrets, LDAP settings and tokens.
Researchers observed lsa_collect.exe extracting registry keys to recover the Windows BootKey, which could give attackers access to the SAM database and stored credentials.
Defenders should review PaperCut server.log files for known exploitation indicators and look for unusual five-character .class, .cmd, or .out files. Monitor pc-app.exe for command shells such as cmd.exe and powershell.exe, and investigate commands like whoami, tasklist, ver, and uname.
Also check for credential-harvesting tools, unexpected privileged accounts such as Administrator17, suspicious requests to /custom/pcp_*.txt, and large downloads using python-requests.
Finally, keep PaperCut management interfaces off the public internet and install the vendor’s security fixes.
Manchester Airports Group (MAG) data allegedly leaked by FulcrumSec exposes emails and phone numbers of 8.8 million people.
Manchester Airports Group, which operates Manchester, London Stansted and East Midlands airports, has confirmed a data breach involving customer information held in a third-party database. The company says airport operations, passenger safety and aviation security were not affected, but the incident has exposed data that can make fraud far more convincing.
The data
Manchester Airports Group (MAG) data allegedly leaked by FulcrumSec exposes emails and phone numbers of 8.8 million people.
Manchester Airports Group, which operates Manchester, London Stansted and East Midlands airports, has confirmed a data breach involving customer information held in a third-party database. The company says airport operations, passenger safety and aviation security were not affected, but the incident has exposed data that can make fraud far more convincing.
The data related to parking, lounge and Fast Track bookings, as well as airport Wi-Fi sign-ups. MAG said attackers took email addresses, phone numbers, vehicle registration details and postcodes, while payment-card data was not accessed.
The group disclosed the incident on 27 August and said it had contained the risk, engaged specialist advisers and notified relevant authorities.
The extortion group FulcrumSec claimed responsibility for the intrusion and leaked the data after MAG had refused its ransom demand.
“Today we are releasing the Manchester Airports Group dataset: every customer, event, configuration that serves Manchester Airport, London Stansted and East Midlands Airport. Half a terabyte, and every byte of it is pure PII. However, we have decided to withhold the most dangerous part of the breach : the nearly 200,000 passengers whose entire upcoming travel schedules were exposed by MAG’s negligence, which, when linked with their full PII and vehicle information, creates an ideal opportunity for burglars, stalkers, and worse.” FulcrumSec wrote on its data leak site. “Unfortunately for them, MAG made zero effort to protect all their data they’d been collecting. The way we gained access was so simple it is tragi-comical: Iterable admin keys in the frontend JavaScript of each of its three airports’ websites: manchesterairport.co.uk, stanstedairport.com, and eastmidlandsairport.com. Each site had its own key hardcoded into it that provided access to millions of passengers who had passed through that airport. That means for this breach to have occurred at the scale it did, MAG had to make a catastrophic security mistake not once, not twice, but THREE times.”
FulcrumSec claims it accessed MAG’s systems using administrator keys exposed in the JavaScript of its three airport websites. MAG hasn’t confirmed this, and SecurityWeek hasn’t independently verified it, so the claim remains unproven. Still, the case highlights a basic security rule: keep secrets off client-side code, rotate them regularly, limit access and scan code, repositories, logs and configurations for accidental exposure.
The group then published roughly 550 GB of uncompressed data it says came from the airport operator’s systems.
“These exposed keys gave us access to the following:
8,672,291 customer profiles with email, name, mobile, home town, postal region, and the residential IP address the account last connected from
1,169,302,811 events, of which 1,160,120,195 are email-channel events: 611,629,550 sends, 463,286,223 opens, 36,878,965 clicks, plus every subscribe, unsubscribe, bounce and complaint
2,482,763 purchases — every booking every customer of its parking, lounge, and fast-track products has ever made. An analysed subset of 1,154,675 transactions, from 877,754 identified purchasers, totals £83,413,317.89
461,433 SMS messages rendered with a passenger’s booking date, car park and vehicle registration spelled out in plain text
108,077 unique UK vehicle registration plates tied to the owner’s email, mobile, airport, car park and dated booking
The complete platform configuration: every campaign, every journey, every list, every segment and every template, all as live JSON” FulcrumSec added.
The announcement claims that a leaked MAG database exposes 190,849 future bookings, including 142,755 linked to vehicle registrations, potentially revealing when homes will be empty.
It also claims the data includes thousands of government, judicial, military, police, NHS and defence-industry employees, creating significant security risks. The attackers say they removed the most sensitive travel details before publishing, while accusing MAG of downplaying the breach.
Databreach notification service Have I Been Pwned processed the available dataset and added the incident to its breach database. The service reports that approximately 8.8 million email addresses and phone numbers were compromised, alongside names, IP addresses, browser user-agent details, geographic information, purchases and vehicle registration plates.
That is not just a list of email addresses. It is a working fraud kit: a criminal can link a person to an airport, a booking type, a car, a location and a contact number. They don’t need to guess much after that.
What affected people should do
Anyone who has used MAG’s parking, lounge, Fast Track or airport Wi-Fi services should assume that phishing attempts may become more tailored. They should be cautious with messages claiming to concern a booking, refund, parking penalty, account problem or payment request.
Users should change passwords if they reused one associated with these services elsewhere, especially on email accounts. They should also enable multi-factor authentication, review account-recovery methods and avoid clicking links in unexpected messages.
A legitimate organisation will not ask for a password, a banking PIN or a one-time authentication code by email, SMS or phone. If a message refers to a booking, open the relevant airport or provider site manually rather than following the link it contains.
FBI probes suspected breach at IDScan.net after dark web service Nexus offered 153M+ US and Canadian driver’s license scans.
A dark web identity theft service called Nexus appeared on September 1, 2026, offering searchable access to more than 153 million scanned driver’s licenses belonging to people in the United States and Canada.
The FBI’s New Orleans field office opened a formal investigation the same day. Brian Krebs at KrebsOnSecurity, who broke the story, traced the source to idsca
FBI probes suspected breach at IDScan.net after dark web service Nexus offered 153M+ US and Canadian driver’s license scans.
A dark web identity theft service called Nexus appeared on September 1, 2026, offering searchable access to more than 153 million scanned driver’s licenses belonging to people in the United States and Canada.
The FBI’s New Orleans field office opened a formal investigation the same day. Brian Krebs at KrebsOnSecurity, who broke the story, traced the source to idscan.net, a New Orleans-based identity verification company whose clients include Hertz, Target, FedEx, Motorola Solutions, Caesars Entertainment, and the financial services firm Jack Henry.
“On Monday, Aug. 31, a source alerted KrebsOnSecurity to a service advertised by a new user on the Russian cybercrime forum Exploit, offering access to digital scans of identity documents on more than 170 million people in North America. The source brought it to my attention because the proprietor of this identity theft service offered my Virginia drivers license as a free sample in their initial sales thread on Exploit.” wrote Krebs. “The service, dubbed Nexus, claims to have more than 153 million drivers licenses for people in the United States and Canada, as well as more than 10 million identification cards; more than three million travel documents and/or international IDs; and at least 579,000 medical cards.”
The record total was also increasing by roughly 400,000 per day at the time of publication, which the operators attributed to ongoing active exfiltration from a live breach they claim has been running for over a year.
Krebs found his own driver’s license in the database after a source alerted him to the service. The operators had posted his Virginia license as a free sample on the Russian cybercrime forum Exploit. Each record contains six images of the license, showing the front and back in visible, infrared, and ultraviolet light, with a timestamp. Krebs’ timestamp matched a June 2025 flight and car rental.
He then checked nine friends and relatives, and everyone who found their license confirmed traveling or renting a car around the same date. His license and his mother’s, who rented a Hertz car with him that day, had timestamps just seconds apart.
Security researcher Zach Edwards, whose license also appeared in Nexus, narrowed the source further. His timestamp matched a trip to Las Vegas for DEF CON in August. He hadn’t rented a car, but he had shown his license at a marijuana dispensary: Planet13, a multi-state chain. In 2022, idscan.net published a press release announcing an exclusive identity verification partnership with Planet13’s dispensaries nationally. The company now serves more than 1,000 marijuana dispensaries in 19 states, and its own documentation confirms that its technology scans IDs with both infrared and ultraviolet light, precisely the format of the images appearing in Nexus.
Idscan.net performs more than 21 million verifications per month at more than 20,000 locations globally. Its client list spans car rentals, retailers, hotels, financial services, and dispensaries, which explains both the volume and the geographic spread of the records. The dataset also includes marijuana dispensary cards and records marked with the notation “CAC,” which may refer to Common Access Cards, the government-issued credentials used to enter federal buildings and secure facilities. If confirmed, that would significantly expand the security implications beyond consumer identity theft.
The database reportedly contained the driver’s licenses of U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and the FBI’s assistant director, but not FBI Director Kash Patel’s.
Idscan.net said Krebs’ findings would help its internal investigation but gave no further details. The company later said it was working with law enforcement and forensic experts. Soon after the story became public, the Nexus service went offline.
Identity verification systems that require driver’s licenses are spreading sensitive data across an expanding network of third-party vendors, and oversight mechanisms haven’t kept pace. Every bar, hotel, car rental counter, dispensary, and age-verification system that scans an ID is creating a copy of that image in a system whose security posture the cardholder has no way to assess.
The idscan.net incident, if confirmed at the reported scale, would be among the largest exposures of government-issued identity document images ever recorded.
Krebs reports that Nexus shut down after his article, while the FBI opened an investigation after learning that stolen IDs may include licenses belonging to FBI agents.
412,000 The Town 2025 festival buyer records are being sold for $10,000, with Brazil’s data openly marketed for bank fraud, loans and SIM registration.
A seller on a Russian-language data-trading forum listed what they’re calling a Ticketmaster database on September 2, claiming over 412,000 Latin American purchase records with a heavy concentration of Brazilian data. Ransomnews’s analysis confirms the sample is genuine ticket-buyer data from The Town 2025, the São Paulo music festival, thoug
412,000 The Town 2025 festival buyer records are being sold for $10,000, with Brazil’s data openly marketed for bank fraud, loans and SIM registration.
A seller on a Russian-language data-trading forum listed what they’re calling a Ticketmaster database on September 2, claiming over 412,000 Latin American purchase records with a heavy concentration of Brazilian data. Ransomnews’s analysis confirms the sample is genuine ticket-buyer data from The Town 2025, the São Paulo music festival, though who actually lost the data and how remains unconfirmed.
“The listing is headed “SELLING NEW TICKETMASTER DATABASE” and describes a global ticketing platform, Latin America region, with an internal ticketing database as the source and a breach date of 28 August 2026. It advertises 412,192 rows across 34 columns.” reported Ransomnews. “The country breakdown is dominated by Brazil at 251,557 records, or 61%, with Argentina at 219, Chile 155, Colombia 144, Peru 123 and Paraguay 72, plus nine more countries not itemised.”
The seller is asking $10,000 for the full database, or $80 for every 1,000 records, with escrow available. The 251,557 Brazilian records make up about 61% of the database, meaning the seller is effectively asking around four cents per person.
The data includes names, email addresses, CPF numbers, phone numbers, neighborhoods, ticket types, and payment details. Together, these details provide a detailed profile that could be used for identity theft and fraud.
“The seller’s own notes are the part that should concern Brazilian readers most. Alongside the sales copy, the listing states that the CPF numbers work “for Brazilian bank fraud, loan apps and SIM registration”.” continues the report.”That is not our characterisation of the risk. It is the seller describing the intended use of the file.”
Ransomnews ran the kind of checks that usually expose fake listings within minutes, and this one kept passing. Purchase IDs across the sample rise in strict chronological order, exactly what an auto-incrementing database key produces and something close to statistically impossible to fake by chance. Every CPF number in the sample passes Brazil’s official check-digit validation, phone area codes correctly match the state listed on each row rather than defaulting to a single city, and neighborhood names map precisely onto their stated cities, the kind of granular accuracy a random data generator simply doesn’t produce.
The ticket prices provide another strong sign that the database is genuine. Full-price tickets cost exactly 975 reais, while discounted tickets cost 487.50 reais, matching Brazil’s legal student discount. The database also lists Pix and Elo as payment methods, both widely used in Brazil.
Even the incomplete records look realistic. Complimentary tickets issued by the festival’s back office contain no name or CPF, only the ticket type and date. These kinds of inconsistencies are common in real databases but would be unusual in fabricated data.
However, there is an important detail that challenges the claim of a direct Ticketmaster breach. Every record in the sample has exactly the same processing timestamp: October 1, 2025 at 23:05:41, about two weeks after the festival ended.
A live database dump would normally contain different timestamps. The identical timestamp instead suggests that the data may have been exported in a single batch after the event and then shared with a promoter, sponsor, payment provider, or another partner. Ransomnews therefore warns that blaming Ticketmaster directly would go beyond what the available evidence currently shows.
That distinction matters more than it might seem, because it points at an industry-wide blind spot rather than one company’s failure. Brazilian ticketing requires CPF collection to enforce discount eligibility rules, which means live-events companies routinely end up holding a national identity number, a verified phone, and a home neighborhood for hundreds of thousands of people, data with the sensitivity of a bank record sitting inside an industry with nothing like a bank’s security requirements. The moment that data gets exported into a spreadsheet to reconcile ticket sales with a partner, which happens constantly and rarely makes headlines, it becomes dramatically easier to lose.
“If you bought tickets to The Town 2025, treat your CPF as exposed.” concludes the report. “A CPF cannot be reissued the way a password can, and the seller is explicitly marketing these numbers for credit and telecoms fraud.”
If you bought tickets to The Town 2025, the practical response here isn’t panic, it’s specific vigilance. A CPF can’t be reissued the way a password gets reset, so treat it as permanently exposed and check your credit record through Brazil’s Central Bank registry or services like Serasa for accounts you didn’t open. Watch closely for SIM swap attempts given the seller’s explicit mention of telecom fraud, and be skeptical of any inbound call or message referencing your actual festival purchase, since whoever holds this file knows exactly which days you attended and how you paid, more than enough detail to make a scam call sound completely legitimate.
Aesto Health suffered a breach exposing personal and health data of more than 9.5 million people after attackers accessed its AWS infrastructure.
Aesto Health, a U.S. healthcare technology company, disclosed a data breach that exposed personal and health information belonging to more than 9.5 million people. The company discovered the incident on December 18, 2025, after attackers gained access to part of its Amazon Web Services infrastructure.
Aesto Health is a U.S. healthcare technolog
Aesto Health suffered a breach exposing personal and health data of more than 9.5 million people after attackers accessed its AWS infrastructure.
Aesto Health, a U.S. healthcare technology company, disclosed a data breach that exposed personal and health information belonging to more than 9.5 million people. The company discovered the incident on December 18, 2025, after attackers gained access to part of its Amazon Web Services infrastructure.
Aesto Health is a U.S. healthcare technology company based in Birmingham, Alabama. It helps healthcare providers manage and protect electronic health records and other legacy medical data. Its services include secure data migration, electronic health record (EHR) exchanges and long-term data archiving. Aesto works with medical practices and healthcare organizations that need to move, store or access patient information securely.
“On or about December 18, 2025, Aesto experienced a network security incident that impacted a limited portion of our Amazon Web Services infrastructure.” reads the Notice of Data Security Incident. “After an extensive forensic investigation and manual document review, on May 26, 2026, we confirmed that between on or about December 2, 2025, and December 18, 2025, certain protected health information belonging to patients of various Covered Entity clients stored within Aesto’s network may have been accessed and/or acquired by an unauthorized actor.”
The company launched an investigation into the incident with external leading cybersecurity experts.
The network security incident affected part of its Amazon Web Services infrastructure between December 2 and 18, 2025. On May 26, 2026, Aesto confirmed that an unauthorized actor may have accessed or acquired protected health information stored in its network. Exposed data may include names, birth dates, medical and insurance information, driver’s license and government ID numbers, financial account details, taxpayer IDs and, for a limited number of people, Social Security numbers.
Aesto says it found no evidence of identity theft or financial fraud linked to the breach. Starting June 26, 2026, it notified affected healthcare clients whose patients’ data may have been accessed.
The company announced it has already implemented measures to strengthen security and set up a dedicated helpline for questions.
The healthcare firm also notified the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), reporting that the incident impacted 9540683 individuals.
Five Venezuelan nationals pleaded guilty after failed ATM jackpotting attempts in Kansas. The FBI recorded 700+ cases in 2025, causing $20M in losses.
Five Venezuelan nationals have pleaded guilty after trying to steal cash from ATMs in Kansas using the popular ATM jackpotting technique. The U.S. Department of Justice announced the case on August 31, following an FBI investigation that ended with the suspects’ arrests just days after the attempted thefts.
The case started in December 2025
Five Venezuelan nationals pleaded guilty after failed ATM jackpotting attempts in Kansas. The FBI recorded 700+ cases in 2025, causing $20M in losses.
Five Venezuelan nationals have pleaded guilty after trying to steal cash from ATMs in Kansas using the popular ATM jackpotting technique. The U.S. Department of Justice announced the case on August 31, following an FBI investigation that ended with the suspects’ arrests just days after the attempted thefts.
The case started in December 2025, when the five defendants traveled from Indiana to Kansas and targeted ATMs in Wamego and Manhattan. According to court documents cited by the DOJ, their plan was to install malware directly onto the machines and then remotely trigger the infected ATMs to dispense cash, which the group would collect afterward.
“The conspirators were unsuccessful in installing the malware on the ATM in Wamego, but their attempts at installing the malware triggered the alarm causing law enforcement to respond, and the culprits didn’t return to the site. In Manhattan, the group was equally unsuccessful in getting the ATM to dispense money. Both attempted thefts were captured by surveillance cameras, and the perpetrators were arrested a few days later.”
“According to court documents, Luis Alberto Velasquez-Artigas, 27, Royder Adrian Figuera-Perez, 29, Javier Mejia, Jr, 27, Gabriel Alexjandro Corales-Garcia, 33, and Italo Lizandro Corrales-Carrillo, 26, all pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bank larceny.” reads DoJ.
The operation failed at both locations. In Wamego, attempts to install the malware triggered the ATM’s alarm, bringing law enforcement to the site and forcing the group to leave without completing the attack; in Manhattan, the criminals again failed to make the ATM dispense money. Surveillance cameras captured both attempts, and investigators arrested the suspects a few days later.
The DOJ identifies the five defendants as Luis Alberto Velasquez-Artigas, 27; Royder Adrian Figuera-Perez, 29; Javier Mejia Jr., 27; Gabriel Alexjandro Corales-Garcia, 33; and Italo Lizandro Corrales-Carrillo, 26. All pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bank larceny. Velasquez-Artigas has already received a nine-month prison sentence, while the other four defendants are awaiting sentencing.
The important point for financial institutions is that jackpotting doesn’t depend on a customer using a stolen card or entering fraudulent credentials. Instead, criminals attack the ATM itself, using malware to take control of its cash-dispensing function. The FBI describes this as an emerging nationwide problem and says these attacks can allow criminals to steal cash without any legitimate transaction taking place.
The numbers help explain why federal authorities are paying attention. In a February 2026 FLASH, the FBI reported 1,900 ATM jackpotting incidents since 2020, including more than 700 in 2025 alone, with losses exceeding $20 million during that year.
The Kansas case also shows that jackpotting is not simply a software problem. The criminals needed physical access to the ATM to install the malware, but their plan then relied on remote activation to make the machine release the cash. That combination of physical intrusion and remote control makes jackpotting a hybrid security problem for banks.
The DOJ says the group specifically targeted ATMs they believed were more vulnerable to malware. That’s a relevant detail because it suggests some attackers may assess ATM technology before choosing their targets, rather than simply trying the technique against random machines.
That also explains why the U.S. Attorney’s Office is urging banks and other financial institutions to take preventive action. The advice is not limited to investigating theft after the fact. Authorities are asking institutions to invest in technology and security updates designed to prevent jackpotting attempts from succeeding in the first place.
For banks, the case is a reminder that ATM security now sits at the intersection of physical security, cybersecurity and fraud prevention. Protecting the customer account isn’t enough when the criminal’s objective is to compromise the machine and make it hand over the cash itself.
The FBI has made clear that it plans to continue working with financial institutions and law-enforcement partners to identify these schemes and strengthen defenses. The Kansas case shows that the attackers don’t need a successful cash-out to attract federal attention. In this case, the alarm went off before the ATM did its part.
“Jackpotting bandits are sweeping the nation. This particular group’s strategy was to specifically target ATMs they thought were by design more vulnerable to malware,” said U.S. Attorney Ryan A. Kriegshauser. “Fortunately, there is technology to help thwart jackpotting. We at the U.S. Attorney’s Office encourage banks and other financial institutions to invest in these updates, and we’re happy to answer questions about how to do so.”
Infostealers can steal active Claude sessions, bypass 2FA and drain paid usage. Anthropic is revoking access and refunding unauthorized charges.
Anthropic confirmed that several infostealer malware can hijack an active Claude login session and let attackers burn through your usage without ever touching your password.
“Our investigation is ongoing. Our findings to date suggest that a computer you use with Claude is likely infected with infostealer malware, and may have been for some time.
Infostealers can steal active Claude sessions, bypass 2FA and drain paid usage. Anthropic is revoking access and refunding unauthorized charges.
Anthropic confirmed that several infostealer malware can hijack an active Claude login session and let attackers burn through your usage without ever touching your password.
“Our investigation is ongoing. Our findings to date suggest that a computer you use with Claude is likely infected with infostealer malware, and may have been for some time. Phones and tablets do not appear to have been involved.” reads the notification sent to the impacted users.
“We have no reason to believe that this malware is related to Claude, installed through Claude, or related to anything you did with Claude. It’s general-purpose malware that typically arrives with an unofficial download or a malicious app, and it quietly copies saved passwords, login cookies in browsers, and credentials for other apps running locally. Your Claude session was likely one of the many things it collected. It appears that a bad actor has now started picking the Claude sessions out of what it collected and using them.”
Recently, Anthropic started signing some Claude users out and removing their saved payment cards. The reason? Infostealer malware on their computers stole active Claude sessions and gave attackers access to their accounts.
“We recently signed you out of Claude and removed the payment method saved on your account, so you’ll need to log back in and re-add your card.” continues the report. “We’re sorry for the disruption. Here’s what happened and what we’ve done about it.”
Anthropic detected the suspicious activity and identified multiple infostealer families affecting Windows and macOS. Infostealers bypass the login process by stealing authenticated browser sessions, allowing attackers to evade passwords, MFA and SSO and access paid Claude accounts. Revoking sessions or blocking fraudulent payments is not enough: if the malware remains on the device, it can capture the user’s next login and give attackers access again.
Anthropic is also refunding users for any charges it identifies as unauthorized.
BREAKING: Anthropic is signing Claude users out and deleting their saved card because infostealer malware on their machines handed a bad actor live Claude login sessions. Anthropic says its systems detected the activity, and the notification names six stealer families across… pic.twitter.com/0nX53PaeiH
— International Cyber Digest (@IntCyberDigest) August 29, 2026
“”Our systems detected this activity on your account, and we’ve therefore removed your card on file and signed out the sessions involved to help block further unauthorized access.” continues the report. “If your usage limits looked like they refilled and then drained while you weren’t using Claude, this was likely the cause.””
Anthropic identified Vidar, LummaC2, StealC, RedLine and Acreed on Windows, plus Atomic Stealer on a small number of Macs. The company revoked affected Claude sessions, forcing users to log in again, and removed saved payment methods to prevent unauthorized charges.
Existing plans will continue until the current billing period ends. After that, users will need to add their payment method again. Anthropic may also sign them out again if it detects suspicious activity.
If you use Claude and haven’t checked your usage history recently, that’s worth doing today rather than next week. Anthropic’s advice is the standard but genuinely necessary response: run a full malware scan before logging back in, change your account password with two-factor authentication enabled, and treat any pirated download or unofficial app installer with the same suspicion you’d give a sketchy email attachment.
An AI subscription being quietly drained isn’t the scariest thing an infostealer can do to you, but it’s a pretty reliable sign that something considerably worse, like your actual banking credentials, might already be sitting in the same haul.
Extortion group FulcrumSec claims they stole 86GB of Manchester Airports Group data after finding API credentials exposed in client-side JavaScript.
Manchester Airports Group (MAG) disclosed a data breach on August 27 affecting customers of Manchester, London Stansted, and East Midlands airports. Two days later, BleepingComputer reports the extortion group FulcrumSec claimed responsibility, saying it stole roughly 86GB of data, considerably more detailed than what MAG’s original disclosure s
Extortion group FulcrumSec claims they stole 86GB of Manchester Airports Group data after finding API credentials exposed in client-side JavaScript.
Manchester Airports Group (MAG) disclosed a data breach on August 27 affecting customers of Manchester, London Stansted, and East Midlands airports. Two days later, BleepingComputer reports the extortion group FulcrumSec claimed responsibility, saying it stole roughly 86GB of data, considerably more detailed than what MAG’s original disclosure suggested.
MAG’s own statement describes a relatively limited set of exposed data. It says the breach affected car park, lounge, Fast Track bookings, and airport WiFi registrations, exposing email addresses, phone numbers, vehicle registrations, and postcodes.
MAG disclosed that the data breach impacted 8.7 million customers, however, the company says most of those customers had only their email addresses exposed.
FulcrumSec tells a different story. The group shared samples with BleepingComputer that included a 21.5GB export of Manchester customer data, with personal identifiers, historical booking details, and marketing information. BleepingComputer checked one record against a real traveler’s purchase history and found matching Fast Track bookings, arrival times, terminal information, and payment amounts.
The alleged way into the system is particularly concerning. FulcrumSec says it found airport-specific Iterable API credentials inside client-side JavaScript. That code runs in users’ browsers, so anyone inspecting the website with developer tools could potentially see those credentials.
“The group claims it obtained access using airport-specific Iterable API credentials exposed in client-side JavaScript and that the stolen material includes nearly 200,000 records related to upcoming travel during the remainder of 2026.” states the report. These records allegedly contain dates, times and booking information linked to personally identifiable information. FulcrumSec says it intends to publish the stolen data and a technical account of the intrusion. If the claim is accurate, attackers did not need a highly sophisticated technique. They simply found sensitive API credentials exposed in code that the website sent directly to customers’ browsers.”
The most concerning specific claim is nearly 200,000 records tied to upcoming travel through the rest of 2026, complete with dates, times, and booking details linked to identifiable individuals. BleepingComputer couldn’t independently verify that number or the full scope of what was actually taken, and MAG declined to directly address FulcrumSec’s specific claims when asked, instead pointing to its existing statement that affected customers with upcoming bookings had already been contacted. MAG is confident that we have taken effective measures to protect our customers and we have contacted all those affected, a spokesperson said, without engaging with the 86GB figure or the exposed-credentials claim directly.
FulcrumSec plans to publish the stolen data but may redact upcoming travel records because of the risk of real-world harm. UK postcodes can identify very small groups of addresses, and combined with vehicle registrations, parking dates and booking details, the data could enable highly convincing phishing messages targeting people with upcoming trips.
UK postcodes make this exposure sharper than the equivalent breach might be in the US. Unlike American ZIP codes covering broad delivery areas, a full UK postcode typically identifies a small cluster of neighboring addresses, sometimes a single property, according to the Office for National Statistics. Combined with vehicle registrations, parking dates, and specific booking references, that’s more than enough raw material for a phishing message referencing a real upcoming trip that would be very hard to distinguish from a genuine MAG communication.
Security researchers commenting on the broader incident have flagged a supply-chain angle worth watching. Airport operations increasingly run through third-party platforms for booking, parking, and loyalty services rather than systems the airport itself directly controls, and Iterable, the marketing platform whose API credentials FulcrumSec claims to have abused, is exactly that kind of outsourced dependency. This also isn’t aviation’s first bad year: a September 2025 ransomware attack on Collins Aerospace‘s check-in software had already grounded systems at Heathrow, Brussels, and Berlin, meaning UK and European aviation infrastructure has now taken two significant hits inside twelve months.
MAG says no payment card or banking data was exposed, however, travelers who recently booked parking, lounge access or Fast Track should assume more travel data may be exposed and treat messages citing real booking details with caution.
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Hack One Robot, Reach the Next: Unitree G1 Security FlawsRhysida Ransomware Group Targets Berlin Government Ahead of VotePhilippine Nuclear and Naval Targets Hit by Suspected Chinese OperatorLove Electric Breach: 877,000 Driver Records Offered fo
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Berlin ‘s government faces a Rhysida ransomware attack weeks before elections, with officials refusing to pay despite a claimed 5.79 TB data theft.
Berlin’s state government confirmed this week it’s dealing with an extortion attempt following an August cyberattack on the city-state’s administrative network, and officials have already refused the requested ransom. The ransomware group Rhysida claimed responsibility on its leak site August 28, posting an entry titled simply “Berlin, Germany” a
Berlin ‘s government faces a Rhysida ransomware attack weeks before elections, with officials refusing to pay despite a claimed 5.79 TB data theft.
Berlin’s state government confirmed this week it’s dealing with an extortion attempt following an August cyberattack on the city-state’s administrative network, and officials have already refused the requested ransom. The ransomware group Rhysida claimed responsibility on its leak site August 28, posting an entry titled simply “Berlin, Germany” and claiming 5.79 terabytes of data across roughly 1.44 million files, with personal information on 12,076 individuals allegedly included.
Rhysida claims it stole 5.79 TB of data, covering around 1.44 million files. The alleged dataset includes:
Personal data: 12,076 individuals, 16,389 email addresses, 11,963 phone numbers and 148 IBANs.
Sensitive records: more than 5,000 personnel files, more than 5,000 administrative-offence files, payroll data and leadership information.
Credentials: plaintext passwords and credentials for systems including GebäudAtlas, the ePayment PAYONE database and Z_ADMIN accounts.
Government and legal material: disciplinary proceedings, court cases, supervisory documents, NDA records and Bundesrat committee protocols.
Classified information: data related to classified-material handling and documents allegedly containing state secrets.
Critical infrastructure: vulnerability analyses concerning Berlin’s water supply.
Identity documents: passports and ID cards from personnel records.
Other material: contracts, financial documents, HR records, infrastructure files, health data, password stores and SQL/PST archives.
The group also claims that the material could involve violations of GDPR, German classified-information rules, criminal law and KRITIS/BSIG requirements. These are Rhysida’s claims and have not been independently verified.
The timing makes this attack especially sensitive. Berlin will elect its state parliament on September 20, less than a month after the breach, so an attack on government systems just before the vote was bound to raise questions. Interior Senator Iris Spranger said the election remains secure and that, so far, the attackers haven’t taken any election-related data. Security officials support that assessment.
Broadcaster RBB first reported on Thursday that Berlin had received ransom demands.
“The state of Berlin will not submit to extortion,” Berlin Mayor Kai Wegner and Berlin’s interior senator, Iris Spranger, said in a joint statement on Friday, before the ransomware group claimed the attack on their Tor data leak site.
That position follows long-standing advice from US federal agencies, which warn that paying a ransom doesn’t guarantee data recovery and can encourage more attacks. Saying no to the ransom is one thing; dealing with the consequences if the attackers publish the stolen data is another.
Berlin first disclosed the compromise on August 17, isolating the Senate Department for Mobility, Transport, Climate Protection and Environment along with a second department from the network. Forensic investigators later found the actual data exfiltration happened earlier than the public disclosure, sometime between August 7 and August 12, with the affected department having flagged an initial outflow internally on August 7, a full week before the network got cut off. That gap between first internal detection and actual network isolation is the kind of detail that tends to get scrutinized hardest once the immediate crisis passes.
Rhysida isn’t a new name to anyone tracking ransomware against government targets. The group has claimed roughly 280 victims since emerging in 2023, according to tracking services cited by Reuters, including nine in Germany alone and headline targets like the British Library and Chile’s army. Roughly half its victims sit in the US, with the UK, Canada, and Italy rounding out the next tier, a spread that suggests Rhysida isn’t picking targets based on geography so much as opportunity.
A joint advisory from CISA, the FBI, and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center, first published in November 2023, lays out exactly how Rhysida typically gets in: compromised VPN credentials at organizations without multi-factor authentication, exploitation of the Zerologon vulnerability that Microsoft patched back in 2020, and old-fashioned phishing. None of those entry points are exotic or new, which is precisely the point; Rhysida doesn’t need novel techniques when so many organizations still haven’t closed gaps that have been publicly known for years.
Berlin reconnected all Senate departments to the network on August 23, but forensic teams are still checking the systems. The state’s data protection commissioner and Germany’s federal cybersecurity agency, the BSI, are following the investigation.
As of publication, neither Berlin’s data protection office nor the Senate Chancellery had given specific advice to the roughly 12,000 people whose data Rhysida claims to have stolen. If you’re among them and haven’t received any official message yet, don’t assume that means you’re safe. Investigators are still working to establish exactly what the attackers accessed and took.
Love Electric’s alleged data breach exposes sensitive driver data and highlights the identity risks created by third-party salary sacrifice providers.
A seller on an English-language data-breach forum claimed on August 26 that they had obtained the driver database of Love Electric, a UK broker that runs electric-vehicle salary sacrifice schemes. The seller, operating under the name “seraphims”, offered 877,000 records for $600 in cryptocurrency, with the price negotiable.
That headline nu
Love Electric’s alleged data breach exposes sensitive driver data and highlights the identity risks created by third-party salary sacrifice providers.
A seller on an English-language data-breach forum claimed on August 26 that they had obtained the driver database of Love Electric, a UK broker that runs electric-vehicle salary sacrifice schemes. The seller, operating under the name “seraphims”, offered 877,000 records for $600 in cryptocurrency, with the price negotiable.
That headline number needs a qualification. Ransomnews researchers examined a 999-row sample published with the listing and found strong evidence that the sample came from a genuine production database, but the claimed 877,000 records remain unverified. Love Electric had been contacted for comment at the time of publication.
“The 999 rows split into 731 primary drivers and 268 additional named drivers. There are exactly 731 distinct quote IDs, and every quote has exactly one primary driver, 731 out of 731. All 268 additional drivers reference a quote that exists in the file, with no orphans.” reads the Ransomnews’s report. “The consent flag governing National Insurance processing is empty for precisely the 268 additional drivers and populated for every one of the 731 primary drivers. National Insurance numbers appear on primary drivers only. Those are constraints enforced by whatever application wrote the data, and they hold across all 999 rows without exception.”
That matters because fabricated breach databases often fall apart when researchers examine the relationships between records. Here, the relationships hold: additional drivers point to existing quotes, the National Insurance processing flag appears where the underlying application logic would expect it, and National Insurance numbers appear only on primary drivers.
Love Electric Financial Services Limited is an Edinburgh-based company that provides EV salary sacrifice administration, credit broking and related services to employers across the UK. Companies House identifies it as an active Scottish company, registered under number SC374952, while Love Electric’s own documentation confirms that it operates as a salary sacrifice administrator and FCA-regulated credit broker.
The business model explains why its systems can contain information that many people would normally associate with payroll departments. Salary sacrifice arrangements require the broker to identify employees, process the scheme and support insurance and tax-related requirements, so the underlying records can include National Insurance numbers and driving licence information. Love Electric’s privacy policy also says it processes personal information under UK data protection law.
“The seller published a free sample as a 999-row CSV with 24 columns, named in a way that indicates an export of a dbo.drivers table from a Microsoft SQL Server database.” continues the report. “The columns are: id, quote_id, user_id, title, first_name, last_name, email, phone_number, date_of_birth, address, address2, city, country, postcode, national_insurance_number, driving_licence_number, driving_licence_country, allow_processing_national_insurance, primary, created_at, updated_at, deleted_at, weekly_hours and occupation_id.”
The fields included names, email addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, addresses, postcodes, National Insurance numbers, driving licence numbers, quote IDs and consent-related fields.
The data wasn’t uniformly populated, which is another reason the sample looks like a real production export rather than a synthetic dataset. Around 71% of the rows lacked a name, address or city, 74% had no phone number, and 85% had no National Insurance number, while 147 records contained a National Insurance number and 287 contained a driving licence number.
The geography also made sense. Postcodes clustered around Edinburgh and central Scotland, with records extending into England, while dates of birth ranged from 1946 to 1999 and concentrated around people born in the 1970s and 1980s.
Ransomnews then tested the driving licence numbers against the structure used by UK licences. Of the 108 full-length licence numbers in the sample, 98.1% had a surname block matching the surname in the corresponding record, 97.2% had an initial matching the first name, and 78.7% contained a date-of-birth encoding that matched the stored date of birth.
The imperfections were just as interesting. Licence numbers appeared in many different lengths, only 53% of the National Insurance numbers present matched the expected HMRC format, and phone numbers appeared in three different formats. That kind of mess is exactly what you’d expect from users entering information into a live form, abandoning fields or making mistakes.
“A UK driving licence number is not random. Characters one to five are the holder’s surname padded with the digit 9, characters six to eleven encode the date of birth with 50 added to the month for female holders, and character twelve is the first-name initial. Of the 108 full-length licence numbers in the sample, 98.1% have a surname block matching the record’s own surname field and 97.2% have an initial matching the first-name field. 78.7% carry an encoded date of birth matching the date_of_birth column.” state the researchers. “The roughly one in five that disagree are consistent with people mistyping a sixteen-character string into a web form, which is exactly the error rate real self-reported data carries and synthetic data does not.”
The email addresses provided another useful check. Most belonged to corporate domains associated with identifiable UK employers, Love Electric itself or a European software consultancy, rather than being dominated by Gmail and other consumer providers. That fits the way workplace salary sacrifice schemes operate because employees generally enter through their employer.
The database structure also looked normal. It included a soft-delete field, integer foreign keys for quotes and occupations, regional values for Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and even a Jane Doe test record that appears to have survived from the system’s setup. Real databases leave fingerprints like these. Synthetic ones tend to be suspiciously tidy.
The seller’s own history is less convincing than the database evidence. The “seraphims” account was created on July 22, 2026 and had published nine data listings by August 26, roughly two per week, but several of those listings were described by the seller as scrapes rather than breaches.
The Love Electric listing had attracted no replies and only 52 views when Ransomnews checked it. The account’s reputation score of 30 came from a single positive vote posted on August 17 with the comment “keep scrapping”, which says more about the seller’s scraping activity than about a track record of selling verified breach data.
That doesn’t make the Love Electric sample fake. The technical evidence points in the opposite direction. It does mean we should separate two questions: whether the sample appears genuine, and whether the seller really controls 877,000 records.
The second claim is much harder to establish. Ransomnews saw only 0.11% of the alleged dataset, and the sample shows that database rows don’t map directly to individual people. The 999 rows corresponded to 731 quotes and only 58 distinct surname-and-date-of-birth combinations, with one person appearing 48 times.
There’s another clue in the filename. The db2_ prefix suggests that the table may belong to one database among several, so the seller’s 877,000 figure could refer to a larger collection rather than this particular driver table. At this point, treating 877,000 as a confirmed number would go beyond the evidence.
The timeline also deserves caution. The seller claimed an August 2026 attack involving a zero-day in a third-party system, but every sample row carries a created_at timestamp within a six-second window on August 14, 2022. That pattern looks like a bulk migration into a newer platform rather than 999 people signing up within six seconds.
It tells us that the database contains legacy records. It doesn’t tell us when someone took them, how they obtained them or whether the seller’s claimed zero-day played any role.
That last point matters for incident response. “Third-party zero-day” is a claim made by the seller, not an established fact, and attackers have plenty of reasons to make an access story sound more sophisticated than it was. Ransomnews says it has not verified that route.
For the people potentially affected, the more immediate issue is the nature of the exposed information. A password can be replaced. A National Insurance number and a driving licence number can’t simply be rotated because someone has posted them for sale.
That creates an obvious phishing risk. Someone who has a person’s name, date of birth, address, employer and National Insurance number can construct a much more convincing message pretending to be HMRC, a payroll team, an employer or a vehicle leasing provider.
Drivers who used Love Electric should therefore treat unexpected messages about their vehicle scheme, payroll or tax affairs with suspicion. They should verify the sender through a phone number or website they already trust rather than using contact details contained in the message.
Love Electric’s current public material says it works with more than 1,500 companies, which gives some sense of the scale of the service’s employer-facing footprint.
That makes supplier security worth treating as an operational issue rather than a procurement checkbox. If a third-party provider holds National Insurance numbers, driving licence numbers, employment information and contact data, its security controls deserve the same level of scrutiny as any other system handling high-value identity information.
The seller’s alleged third-party entry point is therefore worth investigating, but it shouldn’t become the centre of the story before someone verifies it. The useful evidence is already sitting in the sample: a production-style schema, consistent relationships, realistic user errors and identifiers that line up with real-world records.
The other important detail is the price. $600 for a database containing National Insurance and driving licence numbers isn’t a serious valuation of the data. It’s a price designed to make a quick sale.
And if the seller really has more than the published sample, multiple buyers could obtain the same information. That’s where the risk gets worse: the exposure doesn’t end with the first person who downloads it.
Ransomnews says it did not access or probe Love Electric’s systems, purchase the full dataset, or validate the exposed identifiers against live services. It analysed the free sample, removed identifying information from its publication and notified Love Electric before publication, offering to share the listing and sample with the company’s incident-response team.
Australian police charged two men linked to TeamPCP over malware hidden in open-source code that stole 500,000+ credentials from 1,000+ organizations.
Australian police have charged two men from Western Australia over a global cybercrime operation that allegedly hid malicious code in open-source software and used it to steal data from thousands of organisations.
“Two West Australian men have been charged following a joint investigation between the AFP and Western Australia Police Force (W
Australian police charged two men linked to TeamPCP over malware hidden in open-source code that stole 500,000+ credentials from 1,000+ organizations.
Australian police have charged two men from Western Australia over a global cybercrime operation that allegedly hid malicious code in open-source software and used it to steal data from thousands of organisations.
“Two West Australian men have been charged following a joint investigation between the AFP and Western Australia Police Force (WAPF), working in parallel with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), into a sophisticated cybercrime syndicate that allegedly created malicious open-source software to rob thousands of global businesses.” states AFP. “The AFP charged the men yesterday (26 August, 2026) with a combined total of 14 offences after executing search warrants in Perth with WAPF, and the assistance of the FBI.”
The Australian Federal Police, the Western Australia Police Force and the FBI executed search warrants in Perth on 26 August 2026 and arrested a 21-year-old from Cottesloe and a 23-year-old from Mandurah. They face a combined total of 14 charges covering unauthorised data modification, possession and supply of data for computer offences, and dealing with proceeds of crime.
Police say the pair were principal participants in a syndicate known as TeamPCP, which allegedly inserted malicious code into software hosted on public repositories and then let other developers pull it in without knowing. Infected components ended up in systems across government, academia and the private sector, giving the group a way to steal credentials and other sensitive material at scale.
“Parallel investigations started in April, 2026, after the AFP and FBI received information from multiple cyber threat assessment companies regarding a syndicate that allegedly inserted malicious code into software available on an open-source repository, which was then unwittingly used by other developers.” continues AFP. “Police will allege infected software was then distributed into computer systems at other organisations across government, academia and the private sector. The software allegedly enabled the syndicate to infiltrate those organisations to steal or harvest sensitive data, including user credentials and authentication materials.”
The numbers are not small. Investigators estimate the malicious code potentially compromised more than 1,000 organisations worldwide, enabling the theft of over 500,000 credentials and the exfiltration of at least 300 gigabytes of data. Remediation costs so far run into the hundreds of millions of dollars.
TeamPCP is behind multiple supply chain attacks, in the past, they targeted PyPI packages and NPM repositories, and most recently the “Mini Shai-Hulud” campaign also caught two OpenAI employees. The pattern is consistent: go after the tools developers trust, poison the supply chain, and let the downstream damage multiply.
The confirmed list of modified tools includes Trivy, a widely used container vulnerability scanner; KICS, a static analysis tool for infrastructure-as-code; LiteLLM, a popular library for routing requests across AI model APIs; and the Telnyx Python SDK.
These aren’t niche utilities. They’re commonly integrated into enterprise CI/CD pipelines, cloud infrastructure workflows, and security scanning processes. Hitting them means hitting a large number of organizations simultaneously through a single poisoned update.
The group also deployed four distinct malware families. CanisterWorm harvested cloud access tokens, credentials, and API keys for AWS, GCP, and Azure. SANDCLOCK extracted AWS credentials, Kubernetes ServiceAccount tokens, local environment variables, and cryptocurrency wallet data. Mini Shai-Hulud was a self-replicating worm designed to spread across both npm and PyPI registries. Miasma was a variant of Mini Shai-Hulud that propagated across those same open-source registries while harvesting credentials and poisoning configuration files.
The worm component is the part that deserves particular attention. Mini Shai-Hulud and its Miasma variant didn’t just infect the initial target and stop. They spread across open-source package registries autonomously, harvesting credentials and poisoning configuration files as they went. The FBI confirmed two GitHub repository names used for exfiltration: tpcp-docs and docs-tpcp. If either of those repository names appears in your GitHub organization, the worm created it using stolen credentials.
TeamPCP’s method was straightforward and effective: inject malicious code into legitimate software packages, push the trojanized versions through normal distribution channels, and wait for CI/CD pipelines to pull them in automatically. The modified tools installed credential-stealing malware and persistent backdoors without any visible sign that anything had changed.
“These men are allegedly members of the cybercriminal group TeamPCP, whose malicious code potentially compromised more than a thousand organizations worldwide,” Assistant Director Leatherman said.
“We are proud to work with the Australian Federal Police and the Western Australia Police Force to impose cost on criminal actors and combat the growing threat of software supply-chain attacks.”
The charges show how serious the alleged operation was. The 21-year-old faces several charges, including changing data without authorization, possessing and supplying data for computer crimes, failing to comply with a production order, and handling at least A$100,000 in criminal proceeds. The 23-year-old faces similar hacking charges, with maximum penalties ranging from three to 20 years.
Police seized electronic devices and other items from properties in Cottesloe, Hamilton Hill and Mandurah. Investigators are now examining a large amount of data and have not ruled out further arrests or charges.
Entrar
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