At the start of the year, a certain Trojan caught our eye due to its incredibly long infection chain. In most cases, it kicks off with a web search for “Proxifier”. Proxifiers are speciaized software designed to tunnel traffic for programs that do not natively support proxy servers. They are a go-to for making sure these apps are functional within secured development environments.
By coincidence, Proxifier is also a name for a proprietary proxifier developed by VentoByte, which is distributed un
At the start of the year, a certain Trojan caught our eye due to its incredibly long infection chain. In most cases, it kicks off with a web search for “Proxifier”. Proxifiers are speciaized software designed to tunnel traffic for programs that do not natively support proxy servers. They are a go-to for making sure these apps are functional within secured development environments.
By coincidence, Proxifier is also a name for a proprietary proxifier developed by VentoByte, which is distributed under a paid license.
If you search for Proxifier (or a proxifier), one of the top results in popular search engines is a link to a GitHub repository. That’s exactly where the source of the primary infection lives.
The GitHub project itself contains the source code for a rudimentary proxy service. However, if you head over to the Releases section, you’ll find an archive containing an executable file and a text document. That executable is actually a malicious wrapper bundled around the legitimate Proxifier installer, while the text file helpfully offers activation keys for the software.
Once launched, the Trojan’s first order of business is to add an exception to Microsoft Defender for all files with a TMP extension, as well as for the directory where the executable is sitting. The way the Trojan pulls this off is actually pretty exotic.
First, it creates a tiny stub file – only about 1.5 KB in size – in the temp directory under the name “Proxifier<???>.tmp” and runs it. This stub doesn’t actually do anything on its own; it serves as a donor process. Later, a .NET application named “api_updater.exe” is injected into it to handle the Microsoft Defender exclusions. To get this done, api_updater.exe decrypts and runs a PowerShell script using the PSObject class. PSObject lets the script run directly inside the current process without popping up a command console or launching the interpreter.
As soon as the required exclusions are set, the trojanized proxifier.exe extracts and launches the real Proxifier installer. Meanwhile, it quietly continues the infection in the background: it creates another donor process and injects a module named proxifierupdater.exe. This module acts as yet another injector. It launches the system utility conhost.exe and injects it with another .NET app, internally named “bin.exe”, which runs a PowerShell script using the same method as before.
The script is obfuscated and parts of it are encoded, but it really only performs four specific actions:
Add the “powershell” and “conhost” processes to Microsoft Defender exclusions.
Create a registry key at HKLM\SOFTWARE\System::Config and store another Base64-encoded PowerShell script inside it.
Set up a scheduled task to launch PowerShell with another script as an argument. The script’s task is to read the content of the created registry key, decode it, and transfer control to the resulting script.
Ping an IP Logger service at https[:]//maper[.]info/2X5tF5 to let the attackers know the infection was successful.
This wraps up the primary stage of the infection. As you can see, the Trojan attempts to use fileless (or bodiless) malware techniques. By executing malicious code directly in allocated memory, it leaves almost no footprint on the hard drive.
The next stage is launched along with the task created in the scheduler. This is what it looks like:
The task launches the PowerShell interpreter, passing the script from the arguments as input. As we already mentioned, it reads the contents of the previously created Config registry key, then decodes and executes it. This is yet another PowerShell script whose job is to download the next script from hardcoded addresses and execute it. These addresses belong to Pastebin-type services, and the content located there is encoded in several different ways at once.
Decoded and deobfuscated script from the Config registry key
The script from Pastebin continues the download chain. This time, the payload is located on GitHub.
Decoded script from Pastebin
It’s a massive script, clocking in at around 500 KB. Interestingly, the bulk of the file is just one long Base64 string. After decoding it and doing some deobfuscation, we end up with a script whose purpose is quite clear. It extracts shellcode from a Base64 string, launches the fontdrvhost.exe utility, injects the shellcode into it, and hands over control.
The shellcode, in turn, unpacks and sets up the code for the final payload. This is classic ClipBanker-like malware, and there’s nothing particularly fancy about it. It’s written in C++, compiled with MinGW, doesn’t bother with system persistence, and doesn’t even connect to the network. Its entire job is to constantly monitor the clipboard for strings that look like crypto wallet addresses belonging to various blockchain-based networks (Cardano, Algorand, Ethereum, Bitcoin, NEM, Stellar, BNB, Cosmos, Dash, Monero, Dogecoin, MultiversX, Arweave, Filecoin, Litecoin, Neo, Osmosis, Solana, THOR, Nano, Qtum, Waves, TRON, Ripple, Tezos, and ZelCash), and then swap them with the attackers’ own addresses.
The complete execution chain, from the moment the malicious installer starts until the ClipBanker code is running, looks like this:
Victims
Since the beginning of 2025, more than 2000 users of Kaspersky solutions have encountered this threat, most of them located in India and Vietnam. Interestingly, 70% of these detections came from the Kaspersky Virus Removal Tool, a free utility used to clean devices that are already infected. This underscores the importance of the preemptive protection: it is often cheaper and easier to prevent the infection than to face consequences of a successful attack.
Conclusion
This campaign is yet another perfect example of the old adage: “buy cheap, pay twice”. Trying to save a buck on software, combined with a lack of caution when hunting for free solutions, can lead to an infection and the subsequent theft of funds – in this case, cryptocurrency. The attackers are aggressively promoting their sites in search results and using fileless techniques alongside a marathon infection chain to stay under the radar. Such attacks are difficult to detect and stop in time.
To stay safe and avoid losing your money, use reliable security solutions that are able to prevent your device form being infected. Download software only from official sources. If for some reason you can’t use a reputable paid solution, we highly recommend thoroughly vetting the sites you use to download software.
In 2025, the financial cyberthreat landscape continued to evolve. While traditional PC banking malware declined in relative prevalence, this shift was offset by the rapid growth of credential theft by infostealers. Attackers increasingly relied on aggregation and reuse of stolen data, rather than developing entirely new malware capabilities.
To describe the financial threat landscape in 2025, we analyzed anonymized data on malicious activities detected on the devices of Kaspersky security produc
In 2025, the financial cyberthreat landscape continued to evolve. While traditional PC banking malware declined in relative prevalence, this shift was offset by the rapid growth of credential theft by infostealers. Attackers increasingly relied on aggregation and reuse of stolen data, rather than developing entirely new malware capabilities.
To describe the financial threat landscape in 2025, we analyzed anonymized data on malicious activities detected on the devices of Kaspersky security product users and consensually provided to us through the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), along with publicly available data and data on the dark web.
We analyzed the data for
financial phishing,
banking malware,
infostealers and the dark web.
Key findings
Phishing
Phishing activity in 2025 shifted toward e-commerce (14.17%) and digital services (16.15%), with attackers increasingly tailoring campaigns to regional trends and user behavior, making social engineering more targeted despite reduced focus on traditional banking lures.
Banking malware
Financial PC malware declined in prevalence but remained a persistent threat, with established families continuing to operate, while attackers increasingly prioritize credential access and indirect fraud over deploying complex banking Trojans. To the contrary, mobile banking malware continues growing, as we wrote in detail in our mobile malware report.
Infostealers and the dark web
Infostealers became a central driver of financial cybercrime, fueling a growing dark web economy where stolen credentials, payment data, and full identity profiles are traded at scale, enabling widespread and destructive fraud operations.
Financial phishing
In 2025, online fraudsters continued to lure users to phishing and scam pages that mimicked the websites of popular brands and financial organizations. Attackers leveraged increasingly convincing social engineering techniques and brand impersonation to exploit user trust. Rather than relying solely on volume, campaigns showed greater targeting and contextual adaptation, reflecting a maturation of phishing operations.
The distribution of top phishing categories in 2025 shows a clear shift toward digital platforms that aggregate multiple user activities, with web services (16.15%), online games (14.58%), and online stores (14.17%) leading globally. Compared to 2024, the rise of online games and the decline of social networks and banks indicate that attackers are increasingly targeting environments where users are more likely to take a risk or engage impulsively. Categories such as instant messaging apps and global internet portals remain significant phishing targets, reflecting their role as communication and access hubs that can be exploited for credential harvesting.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices, 2025 (download)
Regional patterns further reinforce the adaptive nature of phishing campaigns, showing that attackers closely align category targeting with local digital habits. For example, online stores dominate heavily in the Middle East.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in the Middle East, 2025 (download)
Online games and instant messaging platforms feature more prominently in the CIS, suggesting a focus on younger or highly connected user bases.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in the CIS, 2025 (download)
APAC demonstrates almost equal shares of online games and banks which signifies a combined approach targeting different users.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in APAC, 2025 (download)
In Africa, a stronger emphasis on banks reflects the continued importance of traditional financial services. Most likely, this is due to the lower security level of the financial institutions in the region.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in Africa, 2025 (download)
Whereas in LATAM, delivery companies appearing in the top categories indicate attackers exploiting the growth of e-commerce logistics.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in Latin America, 2025 (download)
Europe presents a more balanced distribution across categories, pointing to diversified attack strategies.
TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in Europe, 2025 (download)
Attackers actively localize their tactics to maximize relevance and effectiveness.
The distribution of financial phishing pages by category in 2025 reveals strong regional asymmetries that reflect both user behavior and attacker prioritization.
Globally, online stores dominated (48.45%), followed by banks (26.05%) and payment systems (25.50%). The decline in bank phishing may suggest that these services are becoming increasingly difficult to successfully impersonate, so fraudsters are turning to easier ways to access users’ finances.
However, this balance shifts significantly at the regional level.
In the Middle East, phishing is overwhelmingly concentrated on e-commerce (85.8%), indicating a heavy reliance on online retail lures, whereas in Africa, bank-related phishing leads (53.75%), which may indicate that user account security there is still insufficient. LATAM shows a more balanced distribution but with a higher share of online store targeting (46.30%), while APAC and Europe display a more even spread across all three categories, pointing to diversified attack strategies. These variations suggest that attackers are not operating uniformly but are instead adapting campaigns to regional digital habits, payment ecosystems, and trust patterns – maximizing effectiveness by aligning phishing content with the most commonly used financial services in each market.
Distribution of financial phishing pages by category and region, 2025 (download)
Online shopping scams
The distribution of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages in 2025 highlights a clear shift toward globally recognized digital service and e-commerce brands, with attackers prioritizing platforms that have large, active user bases and frequent payment interactions.
Netflix (28.42%) solidified its ranking as the most impersonated brand, followed by Apple (20.55%), Spotify (18.09%), and Amazon (17.85%). This reflects a move away from traditional retail-only targets toward subscription-based and ecosystem-driven services.
TOP 10 online shopping brands mimicked by phishing and scam pages, 2025 (download)
Regionally, this trend varies: Netflix dominates heavily in the Middle East, Apple leads in APAC, while Spotify ranks first across Europe, LATAM, and Africa. Although most of the top platforms are highly popular across different regions, we may suggest that the attackers tailor brand impersonation to regional popularity and user engagement.
Payment system phishing
Phishing campaigns are impersonating multiple payment ecosystems to maximize coverage. While PayPal was the most mimicked in 2024 with 37.53%, its share dropped to 14.10% in 2025. Mastercard, on the contrary, attracted cybercriminals’ attention, its share increasing from 30.54% to 33.45%, while Visa accounted for a significant 20.06% (last year, it wasn’t in the TOP 5), reinforcing the growing focus on widely used banking card networks. The continued presence of American Express (3.87%) and the increasing number of pages mimicking PayPay (11.72%) further highlight attacker experimentation and regional adaptation.
TOP 5 payment systems mimicked by phishing and scam pages, 2025 (download)
Financial malware
In 2025, the decline in users affected by financial PC malware continued. On the one hand, people continue to rely on mobile devices to manage their finances. On the other hand, some of the most prominent malware families that were initially designed as bankers had not used this functionality for years, so we excluded them from these statistics.
Changes in the number of unique users attacked by banking malware, by month, 2023–2025 (download)
Windows systems remained the primary platform targeted by attackers with financial malware. According to Kaspersky Security Bulletin, overall detections included 1,338,357 banking Trojan attacks globally from November 2024 to October 2025, though this number is also declining due to increasing focus on mobile vectors. Desktop threats continued to be distributed via traditional delivery methods like malicious emails, compromised websites, and droppers.
In 2025, Brazilian-origin families such as Grandoreiro (part of the Tetrade group) stood out for their constant activity and global reach. Despite a major law enforcement disruption in early 2024, Grandoreiro remained active in 2025, re-emerging with updated variants and continuing to operate. Other notable actors included Coyote and emerging families like Maverick, which abused WhatsApp for distribution while maintaining fileless techniques and overlaps with established Brazilian banking malware to steal credentials and enable fraudulent transactions on desktop banking platforms. Besides traditional bankers, other Brazilian malware families are worth mentioning, which specifically target relatively new and highly popular regional payment systems. One of the most prominent threats among these is GoPix Trojan focusing on the users of Brazilian Pix payment system. It is also capable of targeting local Boleto payment method, as well as stealing cryptocurrency.
There was also a surge in incidents in 2025 in which fraudsters targeted organizations through electronic document management (EDM) systems, for example, by substituting invoice details to trick victims into transferring funds. The Pure Trojan was most frequently encountered in such attacks. Attackers typically distribute it through targeted emails, using abbreviations of document names, software titles, or other accounting-related keywords in the headers of attached files. Globally in the corporate segment, Pure was detected 896 633 times over 2025, with over 64 thousand users attacked.
Contrary to PC banking malware, mobile banker attacks grew by 1.5 times in 2025 compared to the previous reporting period, which is consistent with their growth in 2024. They also saw a sharp surge in the number of unique installation packages. More statistics and trends on mobile banking malware can be found in our yearly mobile threat report.
Complementing traditional financial malware, infostealers played a significant role in enabling financial crime both on PCs and mobile devices by harvesting credentials, cookies, and autofill data from browsers and applications, which attackers then used for account takeovers or direct banking fraud. Kaspersky analyses pointed to a surge in infostealer detections (up by 59% globally on PCs), fueling credential-based attacks.
Financial cyberthreats on the dark web
The Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence (DFI) team closely monitors infostealer activity on both PC and mobile devices to analyze emerging trends and assess the evolving tactics of cybercriminals.
Fraudsters especially target financial data such as payment cards, cryptocurrency wallets, login credentials and cookies for banking services, as well as documents stored on the victim’s device. The stolen data is collected in log files and shared on dark web resources, where they are bought, sold, or distributed freely and then used for financial fraud.
With access to financial data, fraudsters can gain control of users’ bank accounts and payment cards, and withdraw funds. Compromised accounts and cards are also frequently used in subsequent activities, turning the victims into intermediaries in a fraud scheme.
Compromised accounts
Kaspersky DFI found that in 2025, over one million online banking accounts (these are not Kaspersky product users) served by the world’s 100 largest banks fell victim to infostealers: their credentials were being freely shared on the dark web.
The countries with the highest median number of compromised accounts per bank were India, Spain, and Brazil.
The chart below shows the median number of compromised accounts per bank for the TOP 10 countries.
TOP 10 countries with the highest compromised account median (download)
Compromised payment cards
Seventy-four percent of payment cards that were compromised by infostealer malware, published on dark web resources and identified by the Digital Footprint Intelligence team in 2025, remained valid as of March 2026. This means that attackers could still use the cards that had been stolen months or even years prior.
It should be noted that the number of bank accounts and payment cards known to have been compromised by infostealers in 2025 will continue to rise, because fraudsters do not publish the log files immediately after the compromise but only after a delay of months or even years.
Data breaches
Regardless of the industry in which the target company operates, data breaches often expose users’ financial data, including payment card information, bank account details, transaction histories and other financial information. As a consequence, the compromised databases are sold and distributed on underground resources.
It should be noted that the threat is not limited to the exposure of financial information alone. Various identity documents and even seemingly public data, such as names, phone numbers and email addresses, can become a risk when they are published on the dark web. Such data attracts fraudsters’ attention and can be used in social engineering attacks to gain access to the user’s financial assets.
An example of a post offering a database
Sale of bank accounts and payment cards
The dark web often features services provided by stores that specialize in selling bank accounts and payment cards. Fraudsters typically obtain data for sale from a variety of sources, including infostealer logs and leaked databases, which are first repackaged and then combined.
Examples of a post (top) and a site (bottom) offering payment cards
Often, sellers offer complete victim profiles, referred to by fraudsters as “fullz”. These include not only bank accounts or payment cards but also identification documents, dates of birth, residential addresses, and other personal details. A full‑information package is usually more expensive than a payment card or a bank account alone.
Examples of a post (top) and a site (bottom) offering bank accounts
Compiled databases
Fraudsters exploit various sources, including previously leaked databases, to compile new, thematic ones. Finance- and, in particular, cryptocurrency-related databases, are among the most popular. Compilations aimed at specific user groups, such as the elderly or wealthy people, are also of interest to cybercriminals.
Usually, thematic databases contain personal information about users, such as names, phone numbers, and email addresses. Fraudsters can use this data to launch social engineering attacks.
An example of a message offering compiled databases
Creation of phishing websites
Phishing websites have become a powerful tool for the financial enrichment of fraudsters. Cybercriminals create fraudulent sites that masquerade as legitimate resources of companies operating in various industries. Gambling and retail sites remain among the most popular targets.
In order to obtain personal and financial information from unsuspecting users, adversaries seek out ways to create such phishing websites. Ready-made layouts and website copies are sold on the dark web and advertised as profitable tools. Moreover, fraudsters offer phishing website creation services.
Examples of posts offering creation of phishing websites
Conclusion
The decline of traditional PC banking malware is not an indicator of reduced risk; rather, it highlights a redistribution of attacker effort toward more efficient methods targeting mobile devices, credential theft, and social engineering. Infostealers, in particular, are a force multiplier, enabling widespread compromise at scale.
Looking ahead to 2026, the financial threat landscape is expected to become even more data-driven and automated. Organizations must adapt by focusing on identity protection, real-time monitoring, and cross-channel threat intelligence, while users must remain vigilant against increasingly sophisticated and personalized attack techniques.
While tracking the activities of the Tomiris threat actor, we identified new malicious operations that began in early 2025. These attacks targeted foreign ministries, intergovernmental organizations, and government entities, demonstrating a focus on high-value political and diplomatic infrastructure. In several cases, we traced the threat actor’s actions from initial infection to the deployment of post-exploitation frameworks.
These attacks highlight a notable shift in Tomiris’s tactics, namely
While tracking the activities of the Tomiris threat actor, we identified new malicious operations that began in early 2025. These attacks targeted foreign ministries, intergovernmental organizations, and government entities, demonstrating a focus on high-value political and diplomatic infrastructure. In several cases, we traced the threat actor’s actions from initial infection to the deployment of post-exploitation frameworks.
These attacks highlight a notable shift in Tomiris’s tactics, namely the increased use of implants that leverage public services (e.g., Telegram and Discord) as command-and-control (C2) servers. This approach likely aims to blend malicious traffic with legitimate service activity to evade detection by security tools.
Most infections begin with the deployment of reverse shell tools written in various programming languages, including Go, Rust, C/C#/C++, and Python. Some of them then deliver an open-source C2 framework: Havoc or AdaptixC2.
This report in a nutshell:
New implants developed in multiple programming languages were discovered;
Some of the implants use Telegram and Discord to communicate with a C2;
Operators employed Havoc and AdaptixC2 frameworks in subsequent stages of the attack lifecycle.
The infection begins with a phishing email containing a malicious archive. The archive is often password-protected, and the password is typically included in the text of the email. Inside the archive is an executable file. In some cases, the executable’s icon is disguised as an office document icon, and the file name includes a double extension such as .doc<dozen_spaces>.exe. However, malicious executable files without icons or double extensions are also frequently encountered in archives. These files often have very long names that are not displayed in full when viewing the archive, so their extensions remain hidden from the user.
Example of a phishing email containing a malicious archive
Translation:
Subject: The Office of the Government of the Russian Federation on the issue of classification of goods sold in the territory of the Siberian Federal District Body:
Dear colleagues!
In preparation for the meeting of the Executive Office of the Government of the Russian Federation on the classification of projects implemented in the Siberian Federal District as having a significant impact on the
socioeconomic development of the Siberian District, we request your position on the projects listed in the attached file. The Executive Office of the Government of Russian Federation on the classification of
projects implemented in the Siberian Federal District. Password: min@2025
Example of an archive with a malicious executable
When the file is executed, the system becomes infected. However, different implants were often present under the same file names in the archives, and the attackers’ actions varied from case to case.
The implants
Tomiris C/C++ ReverseShell
Tomiris C/C++ ReverseShell infection schema
This implant is a reverse shell that waits for commands from the operator (in most cases that we observed, the infection was human-operated). After a quick environment check, the attacker typically issues a command to download another backdoor – AdaptixC2. AdaptixC2 is a modular framework for post-exploitation, with source code available on GitHub. Attackers use built-in OS utilities like bitsadmin, curl, PowerShell, and certutil to download AdaptixC2. The typical scenario for using the Tomiris C/C++ reverse shell is outlined below.
Environment reconnaissance. The attackers collect various system information, including information about the current user, network configuration, etc.
echo 4fUPU7tGOJBlT6D1wZTUk
whoami
ipconfig /all
systeminfo
hostname
net user /dom
dir
dir C:\users\[username]
Download of the next-stage implant. The attackers try to download AdaptixC2 from several URLs.
Verification of download success. Once the download is complete, the attackers check that AdaptixC2 is present in the target folder and has not been deleted by security solutions.
dir $temp
dir $public\libraries
Establishing persistence for the downloaded payload. The downloaded implant is added to the Run registry key.
This year, we observed three variants of the C/C++ reverse shell whose functionality ultimately provided access to a remote console. All three variants have minimal functionality – they neither replicate themselves nor persist in the system. In essence, if the running process is terminated before the operators download and add the next-stage implant to the registry, the infection ends immediately.
The first variant is likely based on the Tomiris Downloader source code discovered in 2021. This is evident from the use of the same function to hide the application window.
Code of window-hiding function in Tomiris C/C++ ReverseShell and Tomiris Downloader
Below are examples of the key routines for each of the detected variants.
Tomiris C/C++ ReverseShell main routine
Tomiris Rust Downloader
Tomiris Rust Downloader is a previously undocumented implant written in Rust. Although the file size is relatively large, its functionality is minimal.
Tomiris Rust Downloader infection schema
Upon execution, the Trojan first collects system information by running a series of console commands sequentially.
Then it searches for files and compiles a list of their paths. The Trojan is interested in files with the following extensions: .jpg, .jpeg, .png, .txt, .rtf, .pdf, .xlsx, and .docx. These files must be located on drives C:/, D:/, E:/, F:/, G:/, H:/, I:/, or J:/. At the same time, it ignores paths containing the following strings: “.wrangler”, “.git”, “node_modules”, “Program Files”, “Program Files (x86)”, “Windows”, “Program Data”, and “AppData”.
A multipart POST request is used to send the collected system information and the list of discovered file paths to Discord via the URL:
It is worth noting that only the paths to the discovered files are sent to Discord; the Trojan does not transmit the actual files.
The structure of the multipart request is shown below:
Contents of the Content-Disposition header
Description
form-data; name=”payload_json”
System information collected from the infected system via console commands and converted to JSON.
form-data; name=”file”; filename=”files.txt”
A list of files discovered on the drives.
form-data; name=”file2″; filename=”ipconfig.txt”
Results of executing console commands like “ipconfig /all”.
Example of “payload_json”
After sending the request, the Trojan creates two scripts, script.vbs and script.ps1, in the temporary directory. Before dropping script.ps1 to the disk, Rust Downloader creates a URL from hardcoded pieces and adds it to the script. It then executes script.vbs using the cscript utility, which in turn runs script.ps1 via PowerShell. The script.ps1 script runs in an infinite loop with a one-minute delay. It attempts to download a ZIP archive from the URL provided by the downloader, extract it to %TEMP%\rfolder, and execute all unpacked files with the .exe extension. The placeholder <PC_NAME> in script.ps1 is replaced with the name of the infected computer.
It’s worth noting that in at least one case, the downloaded archive contained an executable file associated with Havoc, another open-source post-exploitation framework.
Tomiris Python Discord ReverseShell
The Trojan is written in Python and compiled into an executable using PyInstaller. The main script is also obfuscated with PyArmor. We were able to remove the obfuscation and recover the original script code. The Trojan serves as the initial stage of infection and is primarily used for reconnaissance and downloading subsequent implants. We observed it downloading the AdaptixC2 framework and the Tomiris Python FileGrabber.
The Trojan is based on the “discord” Python package, which implements communication via Discord, and uses the messenger as the C2 channel. Its code contains a URL to communicate with the Discord C2 server and an authentication token. Functionally, the Trojan acts as a reverse shell, receiving text commands from the C2, executing them on the infected system, and sending the execution results back to the C2.
Python Discord ReverseShell
Tomiris Python FileGrabber
As mentioned earlier, this Trojan is installed in the system via the Tomiris Python Discord ReverseShell. The attackers do this by executing the following console command.
The Trojan is written in Python and compiled into an executable using PyInstaller. It collects files with the following extensions into a ZIP archive: .jpg, .png, .pdf, .txt, .docx, and .doc. The resulting archive is sent to the C2 server via an HTTP POST request. During the file collection process, the following folder names are ignored: “AppData”, “Program Files”, “Windows”, “Temp”, “System Volume Information”, “$RECYCLE.BIN”, and “bin”.
Python FileGrabber
Distopia backdoor
Distopia Backdoor infection schema
The backdoor is based entirely on the GitHub repository project “dystopia-c2” and is written in Python. The executable file was created using PyInstaller. The backdoor enables the execution of console commands on the infected system, the downloading and uploading of files, and the termination of processes. In one case, we were able to trace a command used to download another Trojan – Tomiris Python Telegram ReverseShell.
Distopia backdoor
Sequence of console commands executed by attackers on the infected system:
The Trojan is written in Python and compiled into an executable using PyInstaller. The main script is also obfuscated with PyArmor. We managed to remove the obfuscation and recover the original script code. The Trojan uses Telegram to communicate with the C2 server, with code containing an authentication token and a “chat_id” to connect to the bot and receive commands for execution. Functionally, it is a reverse shell, capable of receiving text commands from the C2, executing them on the infected system, and sending the execution results back to the C2.
Initially, we assumed this was an updated version of the Telemiris bot previously used by the group. However, after comparing the original scripts of both Trojans, we concluded that they are distinct malicious tools.
Python Telegram ReverseShell (to the right) and Telemiris (to the left)
Other implants used as first-stage infectors
Below, we list several implants that were also distributed in phishing archives. Unfortunately, we were unable to track further actions involving these implants, so we can only provide their descriptions.
Tomiris C# Telegram ReverseShell
Another reverse shell that uses Telegram to receive commands. This time, it is written in C# and operates using the following credentials:
One of the oldest implants used by malicious actors has undergone virtually no changes since it was first identified in 2022. It is capable of taking screenshots, executing console commands, and uploading files from the infected system to the C2. The current version of the Trojan lacks only the download command.
Tomiris Rust ReverseShell
This Trojan is a simple reverse shell written in the Rust programming language. Unlike other reverse shells used by attackers, it uses PowerShell as the shell rather than cmd.exe.
Strings used by main routine of Tomiris Rust ReverseShell
Tomiris Go ReverseShell
The Trojan is a simple reverse shell written in Go. We were able to restore the source code. It establishes a TCP connection to 62.113.114.209 on port 443, runs cmd.exe and redirects standard command line input and output to the established connection.
Restored code of Tomiris Go ReverseShell
Tomiris PowerShell Telegram Backdoor
The original executable is a simple packer written in C++. It extracts a Base64-encoded PowerShell script from itself and executes it using the following command line:
The extracted script is a backdoor written in PowerShell that uses Telegram to communicate with the C2 server. It has only two key commands:
/upload: Download a file from Telegram using a file_Id identifier provided as a parameter and save it to “C:\Users\Public\Libraries\” with the name specified in the parameter file_name.
/go: Execute a provided command in the console and return the results as a Telegram message.
The script uses the following credentials for communication:
Strings used by main routine of Tomiris PowerShell Telegram Backdoor
Tomiris C# ReverseShell
A simple reverse shell written in C#. It doesn’t support any additional commands beyond console commands.
Tomiris C# ReverseShell main routine
Other implants
During the investigation, we also discovered several reverse SOCKS proxy implants on the servers from which subsequent implants were downloaded. These samples were also found on infected systems. Unfortunately, we were unable to determine which implant was specifically used to download them. We believe these implants are likely used to proxy traffic from vulnerability scanners and enable lateral movement within the network.
Tomiris C++ ReverseSocks (based on GitHub Neosama/Reverse-SOCKS5)
The implant is a reverse SOCKS proxy written in C++, with code that is almost entirely copied from the GitHub project Neosama/Reverse-SOCKS5. Debugging messages from the original project have been removed, and functionality to hide the console window has been added.
Main routine of Tomiris C++ ReverseSocks
Tomiris Go ReverseSocks (based on GitHub Acebond/ReverseSocks5)
The Trojan is a reverse SOCKS proxy written in Golang, with code that is almost entirely copied from the GitHub project Acebond/ReverseSocks5. Debugging messages from the original project have been removed, and functionality to hide the console window has been added.
Difference between the restored main function of the Trojan code and the original code from the GitHub project
Victims
Over 50% of the spear-phishing emails and decoy files in this campaign used Russian names and contained Russian text, suggesting a primary focus on Russian-speaking users or entities. The remaining emails were tailored to users in Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and included content in their respective national languages.
Attribution
In our previous report, we described the JLORAT tool used by the Tomiris APT group. By analyzing numerous JLORAT samples, we were able to identify several distinct propagation patterns commonly employed by the attackers. These patterns include the use of long and highly specific filenames, as well as the distribution of these tools in password-protected archives with passwords in the format “xyz@2025” (for example, “min@2025” or “sib@2025”). These same patterns were also observed with reverse shells and other tools described in this article. Moreover, different malware samples were often distributed under the same file name, indicating their connection. Below is a brief list of overlaps among tools with similar file names:
Filename (for convenience, we used the asterisk character to substitute numerous space symbols before file extension)
Tool
аппарат правительства российской федерации по вопросу отнесения реализуемых на территории сибирского федерального округа*.exe
(translated: Federal Government Agency of the Russian Federation regarding the issue of designating objects located in the Siberian Federal District*.exe)
We also analyzed the group’s activities and found other tools associated with them that may have been stored on the same servers or used the same servers as a C2 infrastructure. We are highly confident that these tools all belong to the Tomiris group.
Conclusions
The Tomiris 2025 campaign leverages multi-language malware modules to enhance operational flexibility and evade detection by appearing less suspicious. The primary objective is to establish remote access to target systems and use them as a foothold to deploy additional tools, including AdaptixC2 and Havoc, for further exploitation and persistence.
The evolution in tactics underscores the threat actor’s focus on stealth, long-term persistence, and the strategic targeting of government and intergovernmental organizations. The use of public services for C2 communications and multi-language implants highlights the need for advanced detection strategies, such as behavioral analysis and network traffic inspection, to effectively identify and mitigate such threats.
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