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Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails

  • Cisco Talos has recently started to collect and gather intelligence around phone numbers within emails as an additional indicator of compromise (IOC). In this blog, we discuss new insights into in-the-wild phone number reuse in scam emails.  
  • According to Talos’ observations, the ease of API-driven provisioning makes a few VoIP providers the preferred tool for attackers, allowing for high-volume, cost-effective scam operations that are difficult to trace. 
  • Attackers maintain operational continuity by rotating through sequential blocks of phone numbers and utilizing strategic cool-down periods, with a median phone number lifespan of 14 days, to effectively evade reputation-based security filters. 
  • Threat actors try to maximize their reach by recycling the same phone numbers across diverse, seemingly unrelated lures - including varied subject lines and different attachment formats like HEIC and PDF - to impersonate multiple brands simultaneously. 
  • Security researchers can expose the hidden infrastructure of organized scam call centers by shifting focus from ephemeral email addresses to phone numbers, using clustering techniques to connect disparate campaigns and strengthen overall defensive postures.

Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails

Telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD) continues to be a prevalent tactic in modern email threats. By shifting the communication channel from email to a real-time conversation, attackers manipulate victims into disclosing sensitive information or installing malicious software. 

Cisco Talos has expanded its threat intelligence capabilities to include phone numbers as a critical IOC. Our analysis covers a wide spectrum of line types, including wireless (cellular), landline, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). While scammers leverage all three, VoIP numbers are particularly prevalent due to their ease of acquisition and the difficulty of tracing them back to their origin. In fact, six of the ten largest campaigns we detected between February 26 and March 31, 2026 relied on VoIP infrastructure.

To better understand how these numbers are weaponized, this blog first explains the technical structure of VoIP numbers and the role of service providers in this ecosystem. We then broaden the scope to analyze reuse patterns, lifespan, and campaign characteristics across all line types. By sharing these insights, Talos aims to strengthen our collective defensive posture against these evolving threats.

The structure of VoIP phone numbers 

Most VoIP numbers follow the E.164 international public telecommunication numbering plan. This format ensures that every number is globally unique and can be routed correctly across the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). 

An E.164 number is limited to 15 digits and consists of: 

  1. International Prefix (+): Indicates the number is in international format 
  2. Country Code (CC): 1 to 3 digits (e.g., 1 for the US/Canada, 44 for the UK) 
  3. Area Code/National Destination Code (NDC): Often referred to as the area code 
  4. Subscriber Number (SN): The specific number assigned to the user or device 

The above components are shown in the example phone number below:

Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails
Figure 1. The structure of an example VoIP phone number.

The VoIP ecosystem 

Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has become the primary medium for scam campaigns due to its cost effectiveness, ease of deployment, and API-driven automation. Within this ecosystem, we identify two primary operational models: wholesalers and retailers. VoIP wholesalers (e.g., Virtue, Twilio, and Bandwidth) operate in a business-to-business (B2B) capacity, sitting between Tier 1 carriers (e.g., AT&T, Verizon) and smaller service providers, selling high volumes of numbers in bulk. Conversely, VoIP retailers (e.g., RingCentral) sell finished business calling and collaboration solutions directly to organizations and end users. 

VoIP providers are further categorized into communications platform as a service (CPaaS) and unified communications as a service (UCaaS). CPaaS providers offer programmable APIs that allow developers to integrate voice and messaging directly into applications. Because these platforms are designed for automation and high-volume traffic, they are frequently exploited by threat actors for rapid, API-driven number provisioning. In contrast, UCaaS providers offer comprehensive, end-user-facing communication suites. UCaaS platforms are typically designed for legitimate enterprise collaboration, and that makes them less attractive for scam email campaigns. Talos has found Sinch (primarily a leader in CPaaS) as the most commonly abused VoIP provider, and Verizon and NUSO as the least abused providers in the studied time window.

Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails
Figure 2. The distribution of phone line types in scam emails.

While VoIP line types dominate the scam landscape (see Figure 2), Talos has observed that threat actors utilize wireless (cellular) and landline numbers as well. Cellular numbers are harder to provision at scale, as they typically require physical SIM cards and stricter customer verification, making them more expensive and less disposable than VoIP numbers. Nevertheless, they are still widely adopted by scammers. Figure 3 shows the distribution of wireless carriers that are used byscammers in the studied time window. Landline numbers, on the other hand, are used to project a sense of local presence or established business legitimacy. By using a landline with a specific local area code, scammers can effectively impersonate local businesses (e.g., banks, utility companies, or government offices).

Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails
Figure 3. The distribution of carrier names in wireless phone numbers found in scam emails.

Phone number reuse and lifespan in scam campaigns 

In this section, we provide insights into the lifecycle of phone numbers used in scam emails, examining how often they are reused, their typical lifespan, and how they appear across seemingly unrelated lures. Our analysis focuses on scam campaigns impersonating popular brands, including PayPal, Geek Squad (Best Buy), McAfee, and Norton LifeLock. 

Phone number reuse patterns 

Talos identified 1,652 unique phone numbers across these campaigns during the studied time window (February 26 to March 31). Of these, 57 numbers (approximately 3.4%) were reused across multiple consecutive days. The longest period of reuse observed for a single phone number was four consecutive days. 

As discussed in a previous blog post, phone numbers are reused for several strategic reasons. First, intelligence regarding phone numbers is often distributed more slowly than that of URLs or file hashes; many numbers remain under the radar of third-party reputation services for several days. Second, reuse offers logistical advantages for scam call centers, allowing them to maintain a consistent brand presence for multi-stage social engineering, callback scheduling, and persistent victim engagement. Finally, reuse minimizes operational costs, particularly for paid VoIP services. While we observed some phone numbers reused for up to four consecutive days, the most common reuse period was two consecutive days.

Lifespan analysis and cool-down periods 

Scammers do not always reuse phone numbers on consecutive days. Often, they implement a cool-down period — pausing the use of a number for a few days to evade detection — before reintroducing it into a campaign. 

Our investigation into the lifespan of these numbers revealed that 108 phone numbers (~6.5%) remained active for more than one day. As shown in Figure 4, most phone numbers have a lifespan of two to six days, though a handful remained active for nearly a month. During the study window, the median lifespan was approximately 14 days. Notably, infrastructure longevity often correlates with the impersonated brand; as illustrated in Figure 5, PayPal-themed scam campaigns utilized significantly more persistent phone numbers than those impersonating Norton LifeLock.

Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails
Figure 4. The distribution of phone number lifespans (in days) in scam emails impersonating the above four brands.
Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails
Figure 5. The lifespan of phone numbers in scam emails for the top two impersonated brands.

Phone numbers across unrelated lures 

A scam or phishing lure is typically a combination of a business context, a psychological trigger, a call-to-action, and an impersonated brand (see Table 1 for a few examples). These lures appear across various email layers, including subject lines, body content, and attachments.

Claimed business context

Psychological trigger

Call-to-action

Impersonated brand

Subscription renewal

Invoice or billing statement

Account security alert

Order confirmation/shipping issue

Technical support case

Refund or overpayment notice

Service cancelation confirmation

Financial transaction verification

Urgency

Fear/Loss aversion

Confusion

Relief opportunity

Curiosity

Call a phone number

Click a link

Reply with personal details 

Download/open attachment 

Provide payment/banking information

PayPal 

Geek Squad (Best Buy) 

McAfee 

Norton LifeLock

 

Table 1. Examples of lures that most commonly appear in scam or phishing emails.

We observed phone numbers being recycled across diverse, seemingly unrelated lures: 

  • Using the same phone number across multiple lures in the subject line: In one campaign, a single phone number appeared across multiple business contexts, such as "order confirmation" and "financial transaction verification." Figure 6 demonstrates how these subject lines differ, despite the emails containing the same phone number and impersonating the same brand.
Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails
Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails
Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails
Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails

Figure 6. Four scam emails with completely different subject lines that contain the same phone number.

  • Using the same phone number across multiple document-based lures: In a second campaign, a single phone number was embedded in PDF attachments used for both “subscription renewal” and “financial transaction verification.”Interestingly, this campaign utilized two different brands — PayPal and Norton LifeLock — to redirect recipients to the same call center, leveraging urgency as a psychological trigger.
Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails
Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails

Figure 7. Two scam emails with different body contents that contain the same phone number while impersonating different brands.

  • Using the same phone number across multiple attachment file formats: In a third campaign, a single phone number was embedded in two different attachment formats: HEIC and JPEG. The use of HEIC (High Efficiency Image Container) — a format often used for iPhone/iPad photos — demonstrates the attackers' efforts to bypass traditional file-based detection while maintaining high image quality. Talos has observed campaigns utilizing even more attachment types, confirming that threat actors frequently distribute a single phone number across multiple attack vectors to maximize their reach.
Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails
Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails

Figure 8. Two scam emails with different attachment file types that contain the same phone number while impersonating the same brand.

Phone block-level clustering 

In the context of scam emails and related smishing or callback scams, attackers utilize specific VoIP grouping and clustering techniques to bypass security filters, appear legitimate, and maintain high-volume operations. One of the most common tactics is sequential number grouping. Scammers often obtain large ranges of sequential phone numbers by purchasing Direct Inward Dialing (DID) blocks. Consequently, if a specific number is flagged as spam and blocked by a carrier, the attackers simply rotate to the next number in the block. 

The figure below shows how a block of numbers — differing only in the last four digits — is used in various scam emails impersonating PayPal between March 3 and March 6, 2026. It is also clear that certain numbers are used in larger campaigns than others; for instance, “+1 804[-]713[-]4598” was used in 117 scam emails in a single day.

Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails
Figure 9. Example of sequential phone numbers used in scam emails impersonating one specific brand.

In large-scale scam campaigns, phone numbers within a single sequential block are reused across multiple brand lures. The figure below shows how a range of numbers in a sequential block is deployed across three different brand lures. As with the previous case, some phone numbers are utilized in significantly larger campaign volumes than others.

Insights into the clustering and reuse of phone numbers in scam emails
Figure 10. Example of sequential phone numbers used in scam emails impersonating multiple brands.

Conclusion and protection 

When tracking scam campaigns, it is essential to look beyond individual sender email addresses, which are often ephemeral. Instead, it is more strategic to focus on phone numbers, which serve as the true anchors of the operation. By clustering scam lures based on shared phone numbers, security researchers can effectively map connections between seemingly unrelated campaigns, ultimately exposing the infrastructure of organized criminal call centers. 

Service providers and security teams should prioritize the implementation of real-time reputation monitoring for different communication channels to proactively mitigate these threats. For example, establishing centralized databases that track and flag high-risk phone numbers across multiple platforms allows for rapid cross-campaign correlation. Collaboration between telecommunications and VoIP providers is also vital, as sharing threat intelligence regarding malicious telephony infrastructure enables an industry-wide defense against the persistent threat of social engineering and fraud. 

Cisco Secure Email Threat Defense 

Protecting against these sophisticated and devious threats requires a comprehensive email security solution that harnesses AI-powered detections. Cisco Secure Email Threat Defense utilizes unique deep and machine learning models, including Natural Language Processing, in its advanced threat detection systems that leverage multiple engines. These simultaneously evaluate different portions of an incoming email to uncover known, emerging, and targeted threats.

Secure Email Threat Defense identifies malicious techniques used in attacks targeting your organization, derives unparalleled context for specific business risks, provides searchable threat telemetry, and categorizes threats to understand which parts of your organization are most vulnerable to attack. You can sign up for a free trial of Email Threat Defense today. 

Do not get high(jacked) off your own supply (chain)

Do not get high(jacked) off your own supply (chain)

In the span of just a few weeks, we have observed a dizzying array of major supply chain attacks. Prominent examples include the malicious modification of Axios, a popular HTTP client library for JavaScript, as well as cascading compromises from TeamPCP, a “chaos-as-a-service” group that injected malicious code into hijacked GitHub repositories for open-source projects, including Trivy, an open-source security scanner.

The impact of these supply chain attacks can be vast. Axios receives 100 million downloads weekly and innumerable organizations rely on the frameworks and libraries compromised by TeamPCP. The headache they pose to organizations and their security personnel is considerable as well; affected utilities can be integrated so deeply that it may be difficult to fully catalog, let alone remediate.

Although the timing, scale, and severity of these attacks can be shocking, this is not a new phenomenon. The supply chain has remained an attractive target for some time because of its fragility and the fact that a successful compromise can lead to countless additional downstream victims.

Findings from the recently published Talos 2025 Year in Review illustrate these long-standing trends. Nearly 25% of the top 100 targeted vulnerabilities we observed in 2025 affect widely used frameworks and libraries. Digging deeper into the list reveals additional insights. The React2Shell vulnerability affecting React Server Components became the top-targeted vulnerability of 2025 despite being disclosed in December, reflecting the speed at which these supply chain attacks can reach massive scale. The presence of Log4j vulnerabilities shows how deeply embedded these utilities can be and therefore how difficult it can be to reduce the attack surface. Although these particular examples represent extant vulnerabilities that can be weaponized by numerous adversaries versus a deliberate attack carried out by a single adversary, they show how impactful and disruptive threats to the supply chain can be. Follow-on attacks can range from ransomware to espionage, which is reflective of the broad swath of adversaries that carry them out — from sophisticated state-sponsored groups to teenage cyber criminals.

If we are all building on such shaky foundation, what can we do to keep safe? After all, it certainly seems dire when a tool such as Trivy that we could normally use to scan for supply chain vulnerabilities becomes compromised itself. But there are concrete steps we can take to improve our security posture.

As highlighted in the Year in Review, protecting identity is key. This includes securing CI/CD pipelines to prevent these types of compromises from occurring in the first place, as well as limiting the impact and lateral movement of an adversary should they obtain access to a downstream victim.

In addition, organizations must try to the best of their abilities to inventory the software libraries and frameworks they employ, stay informed of security incidents, and respond rapidly to implement patching and other mitigations.

Just as supply chain attacks are evergreen, so too is the efficacy of security fundamentals, such as segmentation, robust logging, multi-factor authentication (MFA), and the implementation of emergency response plans.

As trust continues to break down, the only viable solution may be to double down on vigilance. Since this recent spate of attacks represents a trend that will likely only grow in intensity and breadth, the time for action and planning is now.

Coverage

Below, find a sample of the some of the recent coverage we offer to protect against these threats:

ClamAV:
Txt.Trojan.TeamPCP-10059839-0

Txt.Trojan.TeamPCP-10059839-0

Behavioral Protections:
LiteLLM Supply Chain Compromise – alerts during installation of compromised packages

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