Small business owners should be sure to fix these three non-technical risks that require little cybersecurity expertise.
The post 3 easy-to-miss cybersecurity risks for small businesses appeared first on Security Boulevard.
There’s a lot to security that isn’t necessarily “cyber.” It’s not all hackers or complex network attacks.
Alongside traditional cyberattacks that deploy malware or exploit known software vulnerabilities, there are also less technical—yet equally devastating—forms of theft.
This doesn’t mean that well-known cybersecurity best practices don’t apply. Every small business owner should still use unique passwords for every account, turn on multi-factor authentication, keep their software and operating systems updated, and run always-on cybersecurity software.
But for the everyday small business owner juggling dozens of accounts, networks, devices, and the reams of data being created, stored, and shared across text messages, emails, and online portals, this advice is for you.
For National Small Business Week in the US, here are three ways to protect your business that require little technical prowess.
In the US, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) allows small business owners to use their personal Social Security Number (SSN) as the Federal Tax ID. It’s a small grace meant to simplify annual record-keeping for sole proprietors and owner-employees, but for cybercriminals, it’s a basic oversight they’d like every small business to make.
Using your Social Security Number as your Federal Tax ID means putting your Social Security Number in an ever-increasing number of hands. That’s because small business taxes are different from taxes for everyday salaried employees.
Whenever a small business takes on a new client or a contractor who pays for services costing at least $600, that small business has to share and receive what is called a W-9 form. This exact form isn’t filed with the IRS, but it is used to track payments for later filings.
What’s more important, though, is that this form asks for an owner’s name, address, and tax ID number.
This means that as a small business grows, its vulnerability to identity theft increases in tandem. Every W-9 filed that uses an owner’s SSN as their tax ID number is another opportunity for that SSN to be stolen. After just one year of operation, a small business owner’s SSN could end up in the inboxes, filing cabinets, and cloud drives of a dozen different people and companies.
This is exactly what cybercriminals want.
Equipped with a W-9 form about your business, a cybercriminal could impersonate you or your business. They could open a business credit line, file fraudulent returns that claim your small business income, or scam your clients.
How to stay safe:
Apply for a free Employer Identification Number (EIN) at IRS.gov. It’s quick to do and it separates your business tax identity from your personal tax identity. After that, put the EIN on W-9s, 1099s, and all other business paperwork instead of your SSN.
The most popular cloud storage for most small business owners is the cloud storage they already have—their personal Google Drive or iCloud.
Built to make memory archival as easy as possible, these tools can automatically back up and secure nearly every single moment that happens through your device, from the vacation photos you snapped last summer, to your kid’s first steps recorded on video, to the texts you sent, the notes you made, and the calendar appointments you managed.
But this type of automatic archival poses a threat to any non-personal information that you view, send, markup, or sign when using your personal smartphone. Suddenly, and often without thinking about it, your cloud storage has backups of signed contracts, tax returns, client intake forms, invoices, business financial statements, and photos of physical paperwork.
Above, we warned about using your SSN as your tax ID because it creates a risk if anyone in your business network is breached. But storing client information in your personal cloud storage creates a different problem: it puts that risk directly on you.
Compounding the threat here is the fact that many personal cloud storage accounts are shared with family members. More people accessing the same account means more exposure and more chances for mistakes, even if everyone has good intentions.
How to stay safe:
Go through the cloud backup settings on both your phone and your computer and manage what data is being synced. Move sensitive business files to a dedicated business storage account with proper access controls, sharing permissions, and audit logs—something that can tell you who opened a file and when.
If anything business-related has to live in a personal cloud account, give that account a strong, unique password, turn on multi-factor authentication, and don’t share access with anyone who isn’t you.
Devices have a funny way of moving around. Your smartphone goes into your spouse’s hands as they override your music choices in the car. Your tablet ends most nights in your kid’s bedroom as they watch TV. And your laptop gets tugged around from couch to counter to kitchen table—each time fully opened and logged in, a portal to the web.
You trust everyone in your home to act safely online, but the path to online safety is full of mistakes.
A single errant click on a fake ad, a malicious search result, or a disguised download is all it takes to compromise your device today, along with all your small business records.
Aside from the threat of malware, someone using your device could make purchases, accidentally delete files, and overwrite important documents.
Remember, an “insider threat” doesn’t need to be malicious to cause damage—they just need to be inside your network (which in this, is your home).
How to stay safe:
Treat your devices that you use for work as work devices. That means requiring a passcode or password for device entry, along with multi-factor authentication for important business accounts.
Also, to ensure that any wrong click doesn’t lead to a malicious PDF download or a wayward malware installation, use always-on antimalware protection software, like Malwarebytes for Teams.
It’s easy to get overwhelmed with modern cybersecurity advice. Every week there are new vulnerabilities to patch, emerging scams to avoid, and novel viruses and pieces of malware that can seemingly take over your device, your data, and your business.
Thankfully, there are important steps you can take today that don’t require you to fiddle with internal settings or take a class on network engineering. Some of the most effective protections are simple: Limit how widely you share sensitive information, keep business and personal data separate, and control who can access your devices.
For everything else, try Malwarebytes for Teams to receive 24/7, always-on antimalware protection to shut out viruses, block malware attacks, and keep hackers out of your business.
In the first blog of this series, we explored the Identity Paradox and how attackers exploit valid credentials to operate undetected inside enterprise environments. However, identity compromise rarely happens in isolation.
To understand how these attacks begin, we need to look earlier in the intrusion lifecycle at the place many organizations still assume is secure: the edge.
For years, cybersecurity strategy has been built around defending the perimeter to protect the enterprise. Firewalls, VPNs, and secure gateways were designed as the outer boundary of the organization – hardened systems intended to control access and reduce risk. But that model is breaking down. What was once treated as a defensive layer is now a frequent target of modern attacks.
Rather than acting purely as protection, the perimeter increasingly introduces exposure. This shift reflects what can be described as edge decay, a gradual erosion of trust in boundary-based security as attackers focus on the infrastructure that defines it.
The scale of this shift is hard to ignore. Zero-day vulnerabilities often target edge devices, including firewalls, VPN concentrators, and load balancers, all of which are not fringe systems. They are foundational components of enterprise connectivity, and the infrastructure that organizations built to protect themselves has become the infrastructure attackers exploit first.
Yet, unlike endpoints or servers, many edge devices still sit outside traditional endpoint visibility and control. Because these appliances typically cannot run EDR agents, defenders are often forced to rely on logs and external monitoring instead. However, logging can be inconsistent, patch cycles are often slow, and in many environments, these devices are treated as stable infrastructure rather than active risk. This combination creates a persistent visibility gap.
Attackers have recognized this gap and are exploiting it at scale. Rather than targeting hardened endpoints, adversaries are shifting their focus to unmanaged and legacy edge infrastructure and the systems that sit at the intersection of trust and exposure.
One of the most significant accelerators of edge-focused attacks is the rise of automation and AI-assisted exploitation.
Threat actors are no longer relying on manual discovery. Instead, they use automated tooling to scan global IP space, identify exposed devices, and operationalize vulnerabilities within hours of disclosure. In some cases, exploitation begins within days or even hours of a vulnerability becoming public.
This compression of the attack timeline has important implications for defenders. Traditional patching cycles and risk prioritization models are no longer sufficient when adversaries can move faster than organizations can respond. As a result, edge compromise is increasingly observed as an early step in broader intrusion chains, often preceding identity-based attacks.
Adversaries are increasingly prioritizing edge infrastructure because it represents a structural blind spot. Rather than targeting well-defended endpoints, they focus on unmanaged or legacy systems that fall outside standard visibility. Once compromised, these devices become more than just entry points, they provide a stable foothold for continued operations.
Once attackers gain access to a firewall or VPN appliance, that system effectively becomes an internal pivot point rather than a boundary control. From there, adversaries can monitor traffic, capture credentials, and pivot deeper into the network.
Investigations have repeatedly shown how compromised edge devices are used to:
SentinelOne’s® Annual Threat Report observed a case where attackers leveraged compromised F5 BIG-IP devices to move from the internet-facing edge directly into internal VMware vSphere environments. In another, vulnerabilities in Check Point gateway devices were exploited to gain initial access across dozens of organizations globally.
These incidents reflect a broader pattern where the edge is becoming the attacker’s preferred entry point for lateral movement and identity compromise.
More advanced campaigns take this concept even further by embedding themselves directly into the firmware of edge devices. The ongoing ArcaneDoor campaign, as noted in the Annual Threat Report, illustrates this evolution. Targeting legacy Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) devices, attackers chained multiple zero-day vulnerabilities to deploy a firmware-level bootkit known as RayInitiator.
This implant is particularly dangerous because it operates below the operating system, allowing it to survive reboots and software updates. Alongside it, attackers deployed LINE VIPER, an in-memory payload capable of capturing authentication traffic and suppressing logging activity to evade detection. In effect, the device itself becomes both the attack platform and the concealment mechanism. When logging is suppressed and monitoring is absent, defenders lose visibility into the intrusion entirely.
Compromised edge devices are not just used for internal access, they are also being repurposed as part of global attack infrastructure. State-sponsored actors have begun building Operational Relay Box (ORB) networks from compromised routers and firewalls. These networks allow attackers to route malicious traffic through legitimate but hijacked infrastructure, obscuring the true origin of their operations.
Clusters such as PurpleHaze and activity linked to groups like APT15 and Hafnium demonstrate how these relay networks are used to dynamically rotate attack paths, making attribution more difficult. As a result, malicious traffic can appear to originate from trusted enterprise systems, complicating both detection and response.
This dual use of edge devices as both entry points and relay infrastructure highlights a shift in how adversaries operationalize compromised systems.
A major contributor to edge decay is the persistence of legacy systems. Many organizations continue to rely on outdated appliances that lack modern security features such as Secure Boot or robust integrity verification. These systems are often considered “patchable,” but in practice, they represent long-term operational risk that is difficult to fully mitigate.
Firmware updates can be disruptive and vendor support may be inconsistent. In many cases, organizations are hesitant to modify systems that underpin critical connectivity. The result is a growing population of edge devices that remain exposed long after vulnerabilities are discovered. In some environments, this problem is compounded by visibility gaps. Devices running unsupported operating systems or incompatible software cannot host modern security tooling, leaving them effectively unmonitored. These “legacy ghosts” become ideal targets for attackers for being stable, trusted, and largely invisible.
Edge compromise does not exist in isolation. It is deeply connected to identity-based attacks. Once an attacker controls a gateway or VPN appliance, they gain access to authentication flows, session data, and credential material. This allows them to pivot directly into identity infrastructure, bypassing traditional defenses.
In many intrusions, edge compromise becomes the first step toward identity abuse. This creates a direct connection between edge exposure and the challenges described in the Identity Paradox. Attackers do not need to break authentication if they can intercept it. By observing or capturing identity data in transit, they can operate using valid artifacts without triggering traditional controls.
The perimeter isn’t failing, it’s already failed. Every unpatched VPN, every legacy firewall running decade-old firmware, every edge device outside your visibility is a door left open and forgot about. The question isn’t whether attackers will find it. It’s whether you’ll see them when they walk through. Once attackers establish a foothold at the edge, they move quickly to compromise identities, escalate privileges, and expand their reach across the environment. This progression from edge access to identity abuse to full-scale intrusion is becoming the dominant pattern in modern attacks.
In this context, defending the edge means both protecting infrastructure and disrupting the earliest stages of the attack lifecycle. Given how dynamic and often unmanaged edge environments have become, they can no longer be treated as a reliable line of defense on their own.
To defend against adversaries who specialize in exploiting these blind spots, the path forward requires a shift in perspective from device-level alerts to attack lifecycle visibility, and from assumed integrity to continuous validation.
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Researchers at Group-IB warn about criminals using virtual Android devices to bypass modern security solutions.
Cloud phones are virtual Android devices that can fully mimic real device fingerprints (model, hardware, IP, timezone, sensor data, behavior). This allows them to undermine banks’ device‑based fraud detection.
Originally, phone farms were made up of physical devices and were set up for testing. They grew in number when companies found out they could rent virtual phones and artificially raise engagement stats like follower counts, likes, shares, and so on. Further growth was driven by moving the infrastructure from physical phone farms to cloud phones.
At some point, cybercriminals figured out how to use these “rent-a-phones” to trick people into sharing access to banking accounts and crypto wallets, which were then emptied.
Banks caught on to these tactics and started building mobile apps that rely on device fingerprinting. This helped them detect and block fake devices taking over people’s accounts.
But as with any arms race, criminals found a way around that too. They now “pre‑warm” devices by adding banking apps, registering credentials, and running small transactions so accounts and device telemetry look low‑risk.
The researchers note that:
“They moved to cloud phones—remote-access Android devices running in data centers. For all intents and purposes, these are real phones, running genuine firmware, exhibiting natural sensor behavior, and presenting valid hardware attestation.”
And it’s not a big investment for the criminals. Major cloud phone platforms offer device rentals for as little as $0.10-0.50 per hour, making fraud infrastructure accessible to almost anyone.
One place these devices are used is in mobile games with real-money economies. These games have long struggled with a specific problem: bot farming of in-game currency and resources. In many cases, automated accounts can generate in-game items that have real-world value.
Banks face a different problem: account take-over (ATO) attacks. As banking shifted from web browsers to mobile apps, they needed more reliable and comprehensive ways to identify trusted devices. Many banks now bind accounts to specific devices and flag transfers that don’t come from that device.
The start of an attack is still social engineering. Criminals try to trick users into sharing one-time passwords (OTPs), approve a login, or make a transfer “to a safe account.”
Behind the scenes, the criminal logs into a cloud phone instance that already looks like the victim’s device to their bank, thanks to matching or plausible fingerprints and pre‑warmed behavior.
Once the criminals are in, they carry out authorized push payment (APP) transfers (often to money‑mule accounts), that the bank’s systems may treat as low‑risk because nothing about the device seems obviously wrong.
At that point the criminals can start emptying your account or sell the virtual phones to other criminals. According to the researchers:
“Darknet markets actively trade pre-verified dropper accounts created on cloud phones, with Revolut and Wise accounts priced at $50-200 each, often including continued access to the cloud phone instance.”
The Group-IB researchers advise end users to:
We’d like to add:
We don’t just report on phone security—we provide it
Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your mobile devices by downloading Malwarebytes for iOS, and Malwarebytes for Android today.
Can a remote software attack send a power wheelchair tumbling down a staircase? Sadly: the answer is “yes.” Check out our latest podcast interview with Billy Rios and Brandon Rothel of QED Secure Solutions. Billy and Brandon discuss their research into security flaws in power wheelchairs by the Japanese firm WHILL.
The post When Cybersecurity Breaks Mobility: The Hidden Risks of Software-Powered Wheelchairs appeared first on The Security Ledger with Paul F. Roberts.
This week on the Lock and Code podcast…
It’s often said online that if a product is free, you’re the product, but what if that bargain was no longer true? What if, depending on the device you paid hard-earned money for, you still became a product yourself, to be measured, anonymized, collated, shared, or sold, often away from view?
In 2024, a consumer rights group out of the UK teased this new reality when it published research into whether people’s air fryers—seriously–might be spying on them.
By analyzing the associated Android apps for three separate air fryer models from three different companies, researchers learned that these kitchen devices didn’t just promise to make crispier mozzarella sticks, crunchier chicken wings, and flakier reheated pastries—they also wanted a lot of user data, from precise location to voice recordings from a user’s phone.
As the researchers wrote:
“In the air fryer category, as well as knowing customers’ precise location, all three products wanted permission to record audio on the user’s phone, for no specified reason.”
Bizarrely, these types of data requests are far from rare.
Today, on the Lock and Code podcast, we revisit a 2024 episode in which host David Ruiz tells three separate stories about consumer devices that somewhat invisibly collected user data and then spread it in unexpected ways. This includes kitchen utilities that sent data to China, a smart ring maker that published de-identified, aggregate data about the stress levels of its users, and a smart vacuum that recorded a sensitive image of a woman that was later shared on Facebook.
These stories aren’t about mass government surveillance, and they’re not about spying, or the targeting of political dissidents. Their intrigue is elsewhere, in how common it is for what we say, where we go, and how we feel, to be collected and analyzed in ways we never anticipated.
Tune in today to listen to the full conversation.
Show notes and credits:
Intro Music: “Spellbound” by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Outro Music: “Good God” by Wowa (unminus.com)
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