A escassez de mesas e a alta procura transformam cada reserva em uma operação estratégica.
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The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) warns that AI is rapidly accelerating the discovery of software vulnerabilities, increasing the risk of large-scale exploitation.
CTO Ollie Whitehouse says skilled attackers using AI can uncover hidden flaws faster than before, forcing organizations to respond with a wave of urgent security updates. Governments and companies will need to patch systems quickly as more vulnerabilities are exposed in a short time, creating pressure on global cybersecurity defenses.
“Artificial Intelligence, when used by sufficiently-skilled and knowledgeable individuals, is showing the ability to exploit this technical debt at scale and at pace across the technology ecosystem. As a result, the NCSC expect there will be a ‘forced correction’ to address this technical debt across all types of software, including open source, commercial, proprietary and software as a service.” states NCSC.
“This is why we are encouraging all organisations to prepare now for when a ‘patch wave’ arrives; a rush of software updates that will need to be applied across the technology stack to address the disclosure of new vulnerabilities.”
Organizations should reduce their internet-facing and externally exposed attack surfaces as quickly as possible. They should first secure perimeter technologies, then move inward to cloud and on-premise systems to limit exposure from newly discovered vulnerabilities.
If full patching isn’t possible, priority should go to external systems and critical security infrastructure. However, patching alone is not enough. Legacy or end-of-life systems that no longer receive updates create ongoing risk. In these cases, organizations must replace outdated technologies or restore vendor support, especially when they are exposed to the internet.
“It is also important for organisations to realise that patching alone will not always suffice; some technical debt may be present in ‘end of life’ or legacy technology that is out of support, and so can’t receive updates.” continues the blog post published by the UK agency. “In such instances, organisations will need to replace technologies, or bring them back within support, especially where it presents an external attack surface.”
Organizations are urged to apply security updates faster, more often, and across supply chains due to a rise in vulnerabilities, including critical ones. The NCSC advises enabling automatic “hot patching” and automatic updates where possible to reduce workload and speed response.
When automation isn’t available, organizations should use risk-based prioritization (e.g. Stakeholder Specific Vulnerability Categorisation (SSVC)) to manage updates safely. If a critical flaw is actively exploited, especially on internet-facing systems, patches must be applied immediately. The guidance promotes an “update by default” approach, with exceptions for safety-critical systems.
The UK agency pointed out that patching alone isn’t enough to solve deeper security issues. Vendors should reduce risk by adopting safer designs like memory safety and containment technologies such as CHERI.
Organizations must also strengthen basic cyber hygiene using frameworks like Cyber Essentials or the Cyber Assessment Framework for critical sectors.
For higher-risk environments, NCSC recommends privileged access workstations, stronger cross-domain architecture, and better threat detection through observability and threat hunting.
“In conclusion, the NCSC advise all organisations, irrespective of size, to plan and prepare for the vulnerability patch wave.” concludes the agency. “A good place to start is by reading the NCSC’s updated Vulnerability Management guidance.”
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The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has launched SilentGlass, a new device to protect one of the most overlooked parts of modern IT systems: the physical links between screens and computers. It is a small plug-in security device designed to monitor and block suspicious activity on HDMI and DisplayPort connections.
Developed through research led by the NCSC and now licensed for production to Goldilock Labs in partnership with Sony UK Technology Centre, SilentGlass represents a shift in how hardware interfaces are treated in cybersecurity. Instead of focusing only on software threats, it addresses risks that arise when physical connections themselves are exploited.
“First commercially available product licensed to use NCSC branding granted to Goldilock Labs in manufacturing partnership with Sony UK Technology Centre.” reads the announcement. “UK government and businesses to be protected at scale by the affordable plug-in cyber security device”
The device works in a simple but powerful way. It sits between a computer and a display and inspects everything passing through the connection. If anything unexpected, unauthorized, or potentially malicious is detected, it immediately blocks the transmission. This prevents attackers from using display channels as an entry point or surveillance path.
According to the NCSC, monitors and screens are increasingly attractive targets for attackers because they often display sensitive information and are widely deployed across organizations. In some cases, they can even be used as an indirect pathway into larger systems, especially in environments where physical access or supply chain exposure is possible. As more advanced adapters and intermediary devices have been introduced over time, the attack surface has grown without many organizations realizing it.
SilentGlass was created to close this gap. It is designed as a plug-and-play solution that does not require complex configuration, making it suitable for large-scale deployment in both government and private-sector environments. It is also intended to be affordable, allowing wider adoption beyond highly specialized security operations.
“Display screens and monitors are everywhere in modern business environments, and the SilentGlass device will help protect previously vulnerable IT infrastructure with unprecedented ease.
Its development and commercialisation shows the impact that the NCSC can have, alongside industry partners, with an affordable and effective product now globally available.” said Ollie Whitehouse, NCSC Chief Technology Officer.
“By helping to launch a UK company onto the global market with this world-class innovation, we are breaking new ground and helping to strengthen national prosperity.
The technology has already been tested in high-security government settings and is now being introduced to the broader market at CYBERUK, the UK government’s main cybersecurity conference. Its commercial release marks a significant step in bringing national-security-grade innovation into everyday business environments.
From the industry side, Goldilock Labs highlights that hardware interfaces have historically been treated as trusted components rather than security boundaries. However, these interfaces can be exposed to risks from supply chains, third-party maintenance, or direct physical manipulation. SilentGlass reframes this assumption by enforcing security checks directly at the point of connection.
The device is also part of a broader shift in cybersecurity thinking: instead of reacting to software vulnerabilities alone, it introduces control mechanisms at the hardware level before data even enters a system. This proactive approach aims to reduce entire categories of attacks that have traditionally been difficult to detect or mitigate.
By combining government-led research with commercial manufacturing and global distribution, SilentGlass is positioned as a practical example of how public-sector innovation can be transformed into widely deployable security solutions. It reflects a growing recognition that cybersecurity must extend beyond networks and applications to include the physical pathways that connect them.
With its global release, SilentGlass is expected to be adopted by governments, critical infrastructure operators, and security-conscious organizations seeking stronger protection against increasingly sophisticated physical and hardware-based threats.
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UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and global partners warn that China-linked threat actors now rely on large proxy networks built of hacked consumer devices. Groups control routers, cameras, video recorders, and NAS systems to route attacks and mask their identity. This shift replaces smaller, dedicated infrastructure with vast botnets that help them blend into normal traffic and avoid detection.
China-nexus cyber actors use these botnets across the full Cyber Kill Chain, from reconnaissance to data theft. This model gives them a low-cost, flexible, and deniable setup that they can quickly reshape, making static IP blocklists far less effective.
“Covert networks enable China-nexus actors to launch cyber attacks against UK organisations, stealing sensitive data and potentially disrupting critical services.
Because the covert networks are constantly refreshed and share nodes across multiple threat groups, defenders face “IOC extinction” – indicators of compromise disappear as quickly as they are discovered.” reads the advisory. “Consequently, organisations that rely solely on static defences risk being bypassed, while those that adopt adaptive, intelligence driven measures can better mitigate the risk.”
National Cyber Security Centre and partners, including the Cyber League, released guidance to counter covert network threats. They advise organisations of all sizes to map and baseline traffic from edge devices, especially VPN and remote access connections. They also recommend using dynamic threat feed filtering that includes indicators of compromised infrastructure to improve detection and reduce exposure to hidden attack networks.
“Potential victims should implement two-factor authentication for remote access and, where possible, apply zero trust controls, IP allow lists, and machine certificate verification.” continues the advisory. “Larger or high-risk entities should consider active hunting of suspicious SOHO/IOT traffic, geographic profiling, and machine learning based anomaly detection.”
National Cyber Security Centre explains that China-linked covert networks keep evolving, with new and updated infrastructures appearing regularly due to countermeasures, exploits, and technical changes.
“The number of covert networks used by China-nexus cyber actors is large, with new networks regularly developed and deployed.” reads the joint advisory. “The existing covert networks change too, either because of defensive or legal action, or simply as a result of software updates and new exploits being used to target different technologies for incorporation into the network.”
Because these networks change so often, full technical descriptions quickly become outdated and offer limited value for defenders. Still, most share a common structure: an operator enters through an on-ramp or entry node, then routes traffic across multiple compromised devices acting as traversal nodes, before exiting through an exit node that often sits near the target’s region. Understanding this basic flow helps defenders identify where they sit in the chain and improve detection and response strategies against these dynamic proxy-based networks.
NCSC provides tailored guidance to defend against covert networks built from compromised devices. It explains that defending these attacks requires layered strategies based on an organisation’s size and risk level, and it does not eliminate all risk.
All organisations should map internet-facing assets, baseline normal traffic, especially VPN and remote connections, and use dynamic threat feeds that include covert infrastructure indicators. They should also deploy multi-factor authentication and consider tools like the Cyber Action Toolkit and Cyber Essentials.
Higher-risk organisations should strengthen controls with IP allow lists, geographic and behavioural filtering, zero trust models, SSL machine certificates, and reduced internet exposure. They should also explore anomaly detection using machine learning.
The largest or most exposed organisations should actively hunt for signs of covert networks, track known infrastructure using threat intelligence, analyse NetFlow data, and integrate dynamic blocklists and alerts. For critical sectors, the Cyber Assessment Framework supports advanced defensive maturity.
Federal Bureau of Investigation reports describe large China-linked botnets, such as Raptor Train, used for state-aligned cyber activity. In September 2024, researchers from Lumen’s Black Lotus Labs discovered the Raptor Train botnet, composed of small office/home office (SOHO) and IoT devices. The experts believe the botnet is controlled by the China-linked APT group Flax Typhoon (also called Ethereal Panda or RedJuliett). The botnet has been active since at least May 2020, reaching its peak with 60,000 compromised devices in June 2023.
Since May 2020, over 200,000 devices, including SOHO routers, NVR/DVR devices, NAS servers, and IP cameras, have been compromised and added to the Raptor Train botnet, making it one of the largest China-linked IoT botnets discovered.
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The UK Cyber Security & Resilience Bill is progressing through Parliament Royal Assent expected later in 2026.
The UK's Cyber Security and Resilience Bill is working its way through Parliament, and if you haven't started paying serious attention yet, now is the time. Introduced to the House of Commons in November 2025, the Bill represents the most significant overhaul of UK cyber regulation since the NIS Regulations in 2018, and its implications for security practitioners are immediate and practical.
One of the most significant shifts for practitioners working in or alongside managed services is the creation of a new regulated entity category: the Relevant Managed Service Provider (RMSP). For the first time, MSPs providing services to in-scope sectors face direct regulatory obligations. If your organisation is an MSP, or relies heavily on one, your compliance exposure has materially changed.
Maximum Penalty Structure
These are not hypothetical. Regulators will also gain cost recovery powers, able to levy periodic fees to fund their oversight activities. Expect more active enforcement, not passive monitoring.
Practitioners managing cross-border environments will need jurisdiction-specific runbooks. A single process attempting to satisfy both simultaneously risks failing both under pressure.
Supply Chain Risk Is Now Statutory
The Bill introduces the concept of designated "critical suppliers" organisations whose compromise could cause major disruption to the economy or wider society, even if they are not themselves regulated entities. These suppliers will receive formal written notice and will have the right to make representations or appeal.
Secondary legislation will likely impose specific supply chain security obligations on regulated entities potentially including contractual requirements, security assessments, and continuity planning mandates. The era of passing a questionnaire and considering supply chain risk managed is ending.
The regulatory environment for UK cyber security is shifting substantially. The organisations best placed when the Bill receives Royal Assent will be those treating this as a live operational project, not a future compliance task.
Track the Bill's progress via the UK Parliament Bills tracker and the House of Commons Library briefing.
The post What the UK Cyber Security & Resilience Bill Means for Security Practitioners appeared first on Security Boulevard.


When Australia's cyber watchdog issued a fresh advisory on INC Ransom, security teams worldwide are bound to take note — not because INC is new, but because the group's business model has quietly made it one of 2025's most relentless forces targeting the very networks societies depend on to survive.
Australia's Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), part of the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), published the advisory warning that INC Ransom's affiliate model now enables a broad range of threat actors to target critical infrastructure — from healthcare systems to government networks — with minimal technical skill of their own.
INC Ransom operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group. It is a criminal franchise model where core developers build and maintain the ransomware platform, then lease it to "affiliates" who carry out the actual attacks in exchange for a cut of the ransom. Think of it as a dark-web franchise. The brand, tools, and infrastructure belong to INC; the break-ins happen through hired hands.
As of mid-2025, more than 200 victims appeared on INC's data leak site, and in July 2025, INC ranked as the most deployed ransomware based on victim postings. That scale does not happen by accident. It reflects a deliberate expansion through affiliates who carry existing access and expertise from other groups.
Healthcare organizations bore the brunt of INC's activity between January and August 2025, with education, technology, and government entities also ranking among the top victim sectors.
"Since January 2025, the ACSC has observed INC Ransom affiliates target Australian Health Care sector entities using compromised accounts. Upon initial access, affiliates have conducted privilege escalation by creating admin level accounts and moving laterally within victim networks," the advisory said. In June, the Tongan Ministry of Health (MoH) ICT environment was attacked by a ransomware that impacted core services and disrupted the national health care network. ACSC said, this was also the work of INC ransomware group as was an attack on a healthcare sector entity further down south in New Zealand. "Many of the organisation’s servers and endpoint devices had been encrypted, and a large amount of data was stolen. INC Ransom claimed responsibility for this incident, and published the dataset on its DLS (data leak site)," ACSC confirmed.INC affiliates do not reinvent the wheel. They exploit known, unpatched vulnerabilities in widely deployed enterprise software. Documented entry points include CVE-2023-3519 in Citrix NetScaler — a remote code execution flaw patched in July 2023 — CVE-2023-48788, a SQL injection vulnerability in Fortinet Endpoint Management Server, and CVE-2024-57727, a SimpleHelp RMM path traversal flaw added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog in February 2025.
INC Ransom also used CitrixBleed (CVE-2023-4966), a vulnerability in Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway appliances that lets threat actors bypass multifactor authentication and hijack legitimate user sessions. In practical terms, an attacker does not need stolen credentials. They can walk through the front door using a session that already has authorization.
Once inside, INC affiliates follow a disciplined playbook. They archive data with 7-Zip before exfiltrating it via MegaSync, use AES encryption, and drop ransom notes printed directly to network printers. The group then applies double extortion — encrypting systems while threatening to publish stolen data publicly unless the victim pays.
In one high-profile case, INC Ransom claimed a breach of the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General in August 2025, stating it removed more than 5 terabytes of data and hinted at access to federal networks. The office refused to pay.
The group's reach does not stop at U.S. borders. INC Ransom targeted Alder Hey Children's NHS Foundation Trust in the U.K., claiming to have obtained large-scale patient records, donor reports, and procurement data. This pattern of targeting public-sector healthcare — institutions with constrained security budgets and life-critical dependencies — reflects a calculated predatory strategy.
Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracks significant INC affiliate activity through a group it calls Vanilla Tempest, which adopted INC Ransom as its primary payload in August 2024 after previously using BlackCat, Quantum Locker, Zeppelin, and Rhysida. The fluidity between groups showcases a core feature of the RaaS model where affiliates shop for the most effective tools and swap them out when law enforcement pressure mounts.
Australia now mandates that organizations with annual turnover above $3 million, as well as critical infrastructure operators, report ransomware or extortion payments within 72 hours — a regulatory shift designed to erode the financial incentives that sustain groups like INC.
The ACSC advisory recommends network defenders prioritize patching of internet-facing systems, implement phishing-resistant multifactor authentication, segment networks to limit lateral movement, and monitor for unusual use of legitimate administrative tools such as PowerShell and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).
Given that INC ransomware elements have also been linked to the development of Lynx ransomware — a derivative group — the threat footprint extends well beyond INC's own branding. Defenders who neutralize INC today may face the same code under a different name tomorrow.
The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has warned organizations of a potential increase in Iranian cyber threats amid the escalating Middle East conflict. While it sees no immediate shift in the direct threat to Britain, officials stress the situation could change rapidly. The advisory targets companies with operations or supply chains in the region, urging them to remain alert and strengthen defenses.
“As a result of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, there is likely no current significant change in the direct cyber threat from Iran to the UK, however due to the fast-evolving nature of the conflict, this assessment may be subject to change.” reads the advisory published by UK NCSC. “There is almost certainly a heightened risk of indirect cyber threat for those organisations and entities who have a presence, or supply chains, in the Middle East.
The NCSC advises UK organisations to prepare for possible spillover effects from Iran-linked hacktivists by reviewing existing guidance on DDoS attacks, phishing activity and ICS Targeting.
Businesses with offices or supply chains in the Middle East should strengthen their security posture, increase monitoring, and reassess their external attack surface in line with heightened-threat guidance. The agency also recommends enrolling in its Early Warning service for timely alerts.
Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) operators are encouraged to review preparedness guidance for severe cyber scenarios, while physical and personnel risks should be addressed using National Protective Security Authority sabotage guidance.
“In light of rapidly evolving events in the Middle East, it is critical that all UK organisations remain alert to the potential risk of cyber compromise, particularly those with assets or supply chains that are in areas of regional tensions,” Jonathon Ellison, the NCSC’s director for national resilience said.
CrowdStrike says Iran-linked hackers are already initiating DDoS and reconnaissance activity, signaling potential escalation, The Guardian reported.
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Cisco Talos disclosed that a highly sophisticated threat actor exploited a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in Cisco SD-WAN infrastructure for at least three years before security researchers discovered the zero-day attacks.
The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-20127 with a maximum CVSS severity score of 10.0, allowed unauthenticated remote attackers to gain administrative privileges and add malicious rogue peers to enterprise networks.
Cisco Talos tracks the exploitation activity to UAT-8616, assessing with high confidence that a sophisticated cyber threat actor conducted the campaign targeting network edge devices to establish persistent footholds into high-value organizations including critical infrastructure sectors. Evidence shows malicious activity dates back to at least 2023, with the vulnerability actively exploited as a zero-day throughout that period.
The flaw affects Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, formerly known as vSmart, and Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, formerly vManage, in both on-premises and cloud-hosted deployments. The vulnerability stems from broken peering authentication mechanisms that fail to properly validate trust relationships when SD-WAN components establish connections.
Attackers exploited the authentication bypass by sending crafted requests that vulnerable systems accepted as trusted, allowing them to log in as internal, high-privileged, non-root user accounts. This access enabled manipulation of NETCONF configurations, granting control over the entire SD-WAN fabric's network settings including routing policies and device authentication.
The attack chain demonstrated exceptional sophistication. After achieving initial access through CVE-2026-20127, intelligence partners identified that UAT-8616 likely escalated to root privileges by downgrading SD-WAN software to older versions vulnerable to CVE-2022-20775, a path traversal privilege escalation flaw patched in 2022. The attackers then exploited that vulnerability to gain root access before restoring the original software version, effectively covering their tracks while maintaining elevated privileges.
This downgrade-exploit-restore technique evaded detection mechanisms that would flag outdated software or unusual privilege escalations. By reverting to the original version after exploitation, attackers obtained root access while appearing to run current, patched software in routine security audits.
The Australian Signals Directorate's Australian Cyber Security Centre credited with discovering and reporting the vulnerability to Cisco. ACSC published a joint hunt guide warning that malicious actors are targeting Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN deployments globally to add rogue peers, then conduct follow-on actions achieving root access and maintaining persistent control.
CISA issued Emergency Directive 26-03 on Wednesday, requiring Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies to inventory Cisco SD-WAN systems, collect forensic artifacts, ensure external log storage, apply updates and investigate potential compromise by 5:00 PM ET on Friday. The directive stated exploitation poses an imminent threat to federal networks.
CISA added both CVE-2026-20127 and CVE-2022-20775 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The UK's National Cyber Security Centre issued parallel warnings urging organizations to urgently investigate exposure and hunt for malicious activity using international partner guidance.
Cisco released patches for all affected software versions. The company said upgrading to fixed releases represents the only complete remediation, as no workarounds exist. Versions 20.11, 20.13, 20.14, 20.16 and versions prior to 20.9 have reached end-of-life and will not receive patches, requiring organizations to upgrade to supported releases.
Talos identified high-fidelity indicators of UAT-8616 compromise including creation, usage and deletion of malicious user accounts with absent bash and CLI history, interactive root sessions on production systems with unaccounted SSH keys and known hosts, unauthorized SSH keys for the vmanage-admin account, abnormally small or empty logs, evidence of log clearing or truncation, and presence of CLI history files for users without corresponding bash history.
Organizations using Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN should immediately check for control connection peering events in logs, as this may indicate attempted exploitation. The most critical indicator is any unexpected peering event, particularly from unknown or unverified sources attempting to join the SD-WAN control plane.
This latest campaign follows a pattern of threat actors targeting network infrastructure devices that provide strategic access to enterprise environments. Compromising SD-WAN controllers offers exceptional operational leverage because these systems manage routing, policy enforcement and device authentication across distributed networks.
Talos stated SD-WAN management interfaces must never be exposed to the internet, yet organizations with internet-facing management planes face the greatest compromise risk. The targeting demonstrates continuing trends where advanced threat actors prioritize control-plane technologies over endpoints, recognizing that infrastructure compromise yields broader network access.
The three-year exploitation window before discovery also shows the detection challenges for infrastructure vulnerabilities. Unlike endpoint malware generating behavioral signatures, authentication bypasses in management systems may produce minimal forensic evidence, especially when attackers employ techniques like software version manipulation to evade monitoring.
Organizations should follow Cisco's hardening guidance, implement robust logging with external storage, regularly audit SD-WAN peering configurations, restrict management interface access, and conduct thorough compromise assessments using indicators provided in the joint hunt guide from CISA, NCSC and Australian authorities.
Prompt injection is shaping up to be one of the most stubborn problems in AI security, and the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has warned that it may never be “fixed” in the way SQL injection was.
Two years ago, the NCSC said prompt injection might turn out to be the “SQL injection of the future.” Apparently, they have come to realize it’s even worse.
Prompt injection works because AI models can’t tell the difference between the app’s instructions and the attacker’s instructions, so they sometimes obey the wrong one.
To avoid this, AI providers set up their models with guardrails: tools that help developers stop agents from doing things they shouldn’t, either intentionally or unintentionally. For example, if you tried to tell an agent to explain how to produce anthrax spores at scale, guardrails would ideally detect that request as undesirable and refuse to acknowledge it.
Getting an AI to go outside those boundaries is often referred to as jailbreaking. Guardrails are the safety systems that try to keep AI models from saying or doing harmful things. Jailbreaking is when someone crafts one or more prompts to get around those safety systems and make the model do what it’s not supposed to do. Prompt injection is a specific way of doing that: An attacker hides their own instructions inside user input or external content, so the model follows those hidden instructions instead of the original guardrails.
The danger grows when Large Language Models (LLMs), like ChatGPT, Claude or Gemini, stop being chatbots in a box and start acting as “autonomous agents” that can move money, read email, or change settings. If a model is wired into a bank’s internal tools, HR systems, or developer pipelines, a successful prompt injection stops being an embarrassing answer and becomes a potential data breach or fraud incident.
We’ve already seen several methods of prompt injection emerge. For example, researchers found that posting embedded instructions on Reddit could potentially get agentic browsers to drain the user’s bank account. Or attackers could use specially crafted dodgy documents to corrupt an AI. Even seemingly harmless images can be weaponized in prompt injection attacks.
The temptation to frame prompt injection as “SQL injection for AI” is understandable. Both are injection attacks that smuggle harmful instructions into something that should have been safe. But the NCSC stresses that this comparison is dangerous if it leads teams to assume that a similar one‑shot fix is around the corner.
The comparison to SQL injection attacks alone was enough to make me nervous. The first documented SQL injection exploit was in 1998 by cybersecurity researcher Jeff Forristal, and we still see them today, 27 years later.
SQL injection became manageable because developers could draw a firm line between commands and untrusted input, and then enforce that line with libraries and frameworks. With LLMs, that line simply does not exist inside the model: Every token is fair game for interpretation as an instruction. That is why the NCSC believes prompt injection may never be totally mitigated and could drive a wave of data breaches as more systems plug LLMs into sensitive back‑ends.
Does this mean we have set up our AI models wrong? Maybe. Under the hood of an LLM, there’s no distinction made between data or instructions; it simply predicts the most likely next token from the text so far. This can lead to “confused deputy attacks.”
The NCSC warns that as more organizations bolt generative AI onto existing applications without designing for prompt injection from the start, the industry could see a surge of incidents similar to the SQL injection‑driven breaches of 10—15 years ago. Possibly even worse, because the possible failure modes are uncharted territory for now.
The NCSC provides advice for developers to reduce the risks of prompt injection. But how can we, as users, stay safe?
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