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True data sovereignty isn’t where it’s kept, but who has access to it

Regulated industries have been dealing with the equivalent of sovereign data for a long time. And as the geopolitical situation makes it more broadly relevant, it doesn’t make it any easier to deal with.

From concerns about the reach of the US CLOUD Act and what telemetry or sensitive business data gen AI models might collect, to implications of the US government taking part ownership of a range of technology companies and the impact of EU regulations, the state of the world means more organizations need to think about where data is located.

The result is a flood of announcements from hyperscalers about new EU cloud regions, as well as pitches from regional and private cloud providers. The promised sovereignty may be anything from a local availability zone to more sophisticated approaches to ownership structure, compliance frameworks, where logs are stored, or where support staff work.

Actual data sovereignty involves legal, technical, contractual, governance, and infrastructure questions, but all too often, what’s on offer is what IDC research director Rahiel Nasir calls sovereignty washing. “When you look under the lid, all they’re really offering is a solution for data residency and data localization, keeping data in country,” he says. “That’s part of sovereignty, but not all of sovereignty.”

In his experience, in-country data centers are the first thing organizations ask for to support data localization and data residency, but they also require enhanced controls over identity and access management. That’s critical because data sovereignty is as much about who has access to the data and why, as where it lives.

“It’s really important the only people who touch my data in what is supposedly a sovereign cloud environment are those I give permission to,” he adds. “Because it’s my data, and I’m the only one who can give the authority to grant access to it. That also applies to support and admin staff.”

Companies want control through where they store data but also to restrict how users can interact with it that might expose that information outside an approved environment or jurisdiction, adds Acceldata SVP Ali Afsar.

Access and control

Don’t confuse the regulatory requirements of data residency with data sovereignty, Scality CMO Paul Speciale warns. “Residency is about geography,” he says. “Sovereignty is about control, jurisdiction, and who ultimately has the legal authority to access data.”

For CIOs, the question is no longer simply where the data is but who can access it, who controls the encryption keys, under which legal framework it operates, and can that control be proven. That includes being able to show who accesses data, from where, and for what purpose, which requires verifiable controls like jurisdiction-aware data placement, immutable backups, tightly governed admin access, and clear audit trails.

The UK government’s recent call for evidence on the impact of international data flows on sovereignty makes this explicit, referring to transfer by access where personal data remains in the UK but is accessed from overseas, including by a user located in another country. Access transfers include administrative access, backups, disaster recovery, support incidents and sometimes — depending on the specific regulations — processing the data.

GDPR doesn’t mean data has to stay in the EU but it does require data to be protected to EU standards wherever it goes. Data transfer obligations for other jurisdictions can be far more restrictive, so multinational organizations may need access controls limiting who can see what regulated data from different locations.

RBI-regulated payment-system data, for instance, must be stored in India, but can be processed outside India, Afsar explains, as long as it’s deleted from overseas systems within 24 hours. And with limited exceptions, personal data in Saudi Arabia must be processed within the Kingdom, and China treats overseas access to some categories of data stored in China as a cross-border data activity. Russian laws require similar strict data localization, and personal data of Russian citizens has to be stored, processed, and kept within the country’s borders at all times, which is why LinkedIn was blocked there.

Elsewhere, regulations are most restrictive for specific markets like healthcare, financial, and public services. Not everything needs to be transferred to a sovereign cloud, Nasir points out, as use of that data is subject to regulatory compliance, and the increasing need for AI training.

“This is the data that’s going to have catastrophic business impacts if leaked,” he says. “To give enhanced controls and security for that data, you’d consider wrapping sovereign controls around it. Everything else not subject to compliance nor sensitive data can be accessed by whomever you want and from wherever.”

Sovereignty and safety

Organizations typically know data sovereignty rules well but still experience incidents like data breaches, government data access requests, and unauthorized cross-border transfers caused by, for example, traveling employees or excessive admin access, according to Kiteworks’ 2026 Data Security and Compliance Risk report.

“Location only tells a regulator where the data rests, not who can still reach it,” says Kiteworks’ EMEA GM Dario Perfettibile. “Every real exposure we’ve seen so far happens through access not geography.”

Thinking data needs to stay in region because then it’s safe gives a false sense of security if practiced as a substitute for proper data management. Access, data labelling, and retention polices take more work but are what can prevent incidents. “If you have a data policy in place, it can force a reapproval of the access,” he adds. “It can restrict access to you only, or it can block you out immediately.”

Location isn’t everything

Using a service closer to home doesn’t automatically make any of that easier. “Many organizations still assume sovereignty can be achieved by moving data from one cloud provider to another, or by replacing one hyperscaler with another,” says Keepit Group CISO Kim Larsen. “That misses the bigger picture.” CIOs should treat sovereignty as an operational capability not a compliance exercise, he adds, since sovereignty isn’t about scale or ownership of infrastructure for its own sake, but maintaining control.

“If an organization doesn’t know who can access its data, which legal frameworks govern that access, or whether it can recover its data independently, simply changing where the servers are located does little to reduce risk,” he says.

Just because something is based in your region doesn’t automatically make it a good choice. The EC, for instance, has set up accounts on W Social, an independent social media platform based on the AT protocol designed for data mobility and user migration, which Bluesky uses but is hosted in Europe.

The Commission’s own open source strategy suggests open source promises more control over digital infrastructure by avoiding vendor lock in, and a recent policy brief positions digital sovereignty as a form of digital independence. But having servers in the EU isn’t the same as freedom of digital movement since unlike Eurosky, based in Europe and using the same protocol, W limits interoperability so it can require identity verification, and has closed its source code after security researchers pointed out vulnerabilities.

Most organizations will continue to use both global and local providers, though they might prioritize what Nasir called glocal options built on partnerships between the two. “Organizations want to use a mixture of local and global providers,” he says. “They want all the innovation capabilities that the Microsofts, AWSs, and Googles of the world give us, that they consider local providers can’t match.”

IDC figures suggest only 4% of European organizations plan to switch to purely local options. “We can’t live without US technology today and there’s no appetite to do that,” says Nasir. Availability matters and local providers may not have the same level of infrastructure as global options. They can offer low hanging fruit like video conferencing solutions, but not more complicated directory and database services, or productivity software that’s intertwined with those US-provided services.

Choices about where to store data, and the technical controls to enforce that, have their own operational implications.

“Redundancy and resiliency are key tenets of sovereignty,” he adds. “You want to make sure your operations are always available. In order to enable that, you want to spread the risk.”

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Google Fined €403 Million Over Location Data Practices

Ireland’s DPC fined Google €403 million over GDPR violations involving location data, transparency, retention and user control.

Ireland’s Data Protection Commission (DPC) just fined Google €403 million, and the case behind it goes back six years, to a set of complaints that never really went away.

The DPC launched the investigation in February 2020 after receiving complaints from several European consumer groups, including BEUC, about how Google handled location data. The investigation covered the period from 25 May 2018, when the GDPR came into force, to 4 February 2020.

“The scope of the Inquiry concerned Google’s processing of location data in three specific features – “Web & App Activity”, “Location History” and “Location Accuracy” between the date of application of the GDPR, 25 May 2018 to 4 February 2020.” reads the DPC’s press release.

Three specific features sat at the center of it: Web & App Activity, Location History, and Location Accuracy. Web & App Activity tracks what a signed-in user does across Google’s own services, sites and apps included, and location data is part of that mix. Location History goes further, following a device’s movements over time and building a private Timeline map of everywhere that phone has been, even when the person isn’t actively using any Google service.

Location Accuracy works differently from the other two. It’s a feature baked into Android itself, sharpening location beyond what raw GPS alone provides, and it applies to anyone running the OS regardless of whether they’ve ever signed into a Google account. That last point matters, because it means the reach of this feature extends past Google’s own user base entirely.

The Commissioners, Dr Des Hogan, Mr Dale Sunderland and Ms Niamh Sweeney, found several problems with how Google handled location data. They said the processing behind Web & App Activity and Location History did not meet the GDPR requirements for lawfulness and fairness. They also found that Google could not show that its Location Accuracy feature complied with the rules on lawfulness, fairness and transparency. Transparency was a problem across all three features, and the company also kept location data for longer than allowed.

That’s four separate violations stacked on the same underlying data. Not one narrow technical slip, but a pattern spanning collection, retention and disclosure all at once.

“Location data is a type of personal data which is processed by way of location tracking, and includes data collected or processed by Google, which by itself or in conjunction with other information an individual’s location can be inferred.”said Deputy Commissioner Graham Doyle. “Location data can bring both benefits and harms to individuals. It can greatly enhance the utility of online services, but it can also reveal a significant amount of information about an individual, including information that is inherently private.”

Knowing where someone is makes plenty of ordinary services genuinely more useful, better maps, better local search, faster delivery estimates. But the same data point, tracked continuously, tells you where someone works, who they see, what they believe, and what they might be hiding. There’s no version of location tracking that’s neutral by default.

The GDPR provides strong protection for personal data across the EEA and requires companies to process this data in a lawful, fair and transparent way.

According to the DPC, Google’s failures meant that users may not have known their location data was being used to target them with ads or build profiles about their interests. This could have reduced their control over their own data. The fact that Google kept location data for longer than necessary made the problem worse.

That’s the practical harm regulators actually care about. Not abstract privacy philosophy, but a real information gap: people not knowing their movements were being converted into ad targeting or interest profiles they never agreed to. If you don’t know it’s happening, you can’t opt out, correct it, or challenge it. The consent mechanism only works if the person on the other end actually understands what they’re consenting to.

Ireland’s Data Protection Commission (DPC) gave Google six months to bring its data processing practices in line with the GDPR. This is not Google’s first dispute with the Irish regulator, and the company is likely to face further scrutiny as location and behavioral data remain important to its advertising business. The investigation also took six years from the initial complaint to the final decision, showing how long GDPR enforcement cases can take.

The €403 million penalty ranks as the fourth-largest EU privacy fine issued by Ireland’s data protection regulator. The DPC has previously imposed even larger penalties on companies including TikTok and Meta, with Meta receiving a record €1.3 billion fine over the transfer of European users’ data to the US.

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, GDPR)

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