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ToxicPanda 2.0 Banking Trojan Attacks Escalate Globally

The new ToxicPanda 2.0 banking Trojan attacks target hundreds of financial apps globally. Learn how this ToxicPanda 2.0 banking Trojan steals credentials.

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The post ToxicPanda 2.0 Banking Trojan Attacks Escalate Globally appeared first on Daily CyberSecurity.

ClickFix Attacks Drive UAC-0145 Cyber Campaigns, CERT-UA Warns

ClickFix Attacks

The ClickFix attacks technique has become a key initial access method for the UAC-0145 cyber threat cluster, according to a new report from Ukraine's Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA). The agency said the threat group, also tracked as Sandworm, APT44, Seashell Blizzard, and a subcluster of UAC-0002, has shifted its tactics during 2026, increasingly relying on fake CAPTCHA prompts and social engineering to compromise systems.

CERT-UA said it has worked with Ukrainian cybersecurity agencies for several years to investigate the activities of UAC-0145. While the group previously relied on infected software installers distributed through torrent websites, recent campaigns have increasingly used ClickFix to trick users into executing malicious PowerShell commands.

ClickFix Attacks Emerging as Primary Initial Access Vector

According to CERT-UA, infections recorded during the spring and summer of 2026 frequently began when victims visited compromised websites displaying fake CAPTCHA pages. Users were instructed to copy and execute PowerShell commands in their terminal, a phishing technique commonly referred to as ClickFix.

The downloaded commands were designed to retrieve malicious files such as GHETTOVIBE, a Visual Basic Script (VBS) that establishes persistence by placing itself in the Windows Startup directory.

Once executed, attackers could deploy SCOUTCURL, a PowerShell reconnaissance tool capable of collecting information about the compromised system, including device specifications, installed software, browser data, and local files before exfiltrating the information.

CERT-UA also observed malware loaders including FLUIDLEECH, disguised as antivirus software, and LOADLOOP being used during these campaigns.

Backdoors and Data Theft Tools Widely Deployed

The report noted that attackers continue using malware families such as KALAMBUR, SUMBUR, and TAMBUR after gaining access to victim systems.

To maintain remote access, the group relied on legitimate utilities including OpenSSH and Tor, forwarding local network ports such as 445, 3389, and 22 to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

CERT-UA also found malware designed to steal messaging data from Signal and WhatsApp, with stolen information reportedly exfiltrated using RSYNC.

On infected systems examined during cyber defense operations, investigators additionally identified FREAKYPOLL, a Python-based backdoor distributed as compiled bytecode (.pyc), providing attackers with persistent unauthorized access.

Compromised Websites Used to Deliver Fake CAPTCHA Pages

During June and July 2026, CERT-UA analyzed more than ten compromised websites involved in ClickFix attacks.

Investigators found attackers using both the Cloaking.House service and custom malware called SMARTAXE to dynamically modify legitimate webpages. SMARTAXE retrieves remote domains from blockchain smart contracts through Ethereum's eth_call function before displaying fake CAPTCHA pages or redirecting visitors to malicious content.

CERT-UA warned that any website used in these attacks should be considered compromised, potentially through vulnerable content management systems (CMS), stolen credentials, web shells, malicious plugins, modified website scripts, or server-side backdoors.

The agency urged website administrators and hosting providers to strengthen website security and respond quickly to incident reports.

Android Malware Also Part of UAC-0145 Operations

The report also highlighted growing use of Android malware distributed through messaging applications.

Attackers were observed sharing APK files disguised as security or antivirus tools. One such malware family, tracked as COWARDDUCK, functions as a full-featured Android backdoor capable of collecting device information, contacts, files, and real-time geolocation.

The malware targets files from directories including DCIM, Documents, Downloads, Pictures, and Alarms while searching for formats such as DOCX, XLSX, PPTX, ZIP, RAR, JSON, and OVPN files.

According to CERT-UA, COWARDDUCK uploads stolen files through the Dropbox API while receiving commands from legitimate services including Steam Community and StockMemory domains through proxy infrastructure.

Microsoft Sees Global Rise in ClickFix Campaigns

Microsoft Threat Intelligence and Microsoft Defender Experts also reported that ClickFix campaigns have increased significantly since early 2024, targeting thousands of enterprise and consumer devices globally each day.

Microsoft said the technique commonly delivers malware such as Lumma Stealer by persuading users to copy and execute commands through Windows Run, Windows Terminal, or Windows PowerShell. The campaigns are often combined with phishing, malvertising, and drive-by compromise techniques that imitate trusted brands.

Because ClickFix attacks rely on user interaction rather than exploiting software vulnerabilities directly, Microsoft recommends organizations strengthen user awareness and apply security policies that restrict unnecessary use of command execution tools.

MiningDropper Turns Android Apps Into Multi-Stage Malware Delivery Systems

MiningDropper

Researchers have uncovered an Android malware framework dubbed the MiningDropper. Security researchers at Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) have identified a sharp increase in campaigns using MiningDropper, a modular platform capable of distributing multiple types of malicious payloads, including cryptocurrency miners, infostealers, Remote Access Trojans (RATs), and banking malware.   A notable aspect of this campaign is its abuse of the open-source Lumolight application, which has been repurposed as a trojanized entry point. 

A Modular Android Malware Framework at Scale

MiningDropper is not a conventional malware strain. Instead, it operates as a multi-stage delivery framework designed to evade detection and dynamically deploy payloads. Its architecture integrates XOR-based obfuscation, AES-encrypted payload staging, dynamic DEX loading, and anti-emulation techniques. These layers collectively delay analysis and reduce the likelihood of detection by traditional antivirus solutions.  Over 1,500 MiningDropper samples have been observed in the wild within a single month, with more than 50% showing minimal antivirus detection. Notably, around 668 samples registered only three antivirus detections, indicating widespread distribution with low visibility. 

Lumolight as the Initial Infection Vector 

A recent variant of MiningDropper uses a trojanized version of Lumolight as its initial payload. Victims unknowingly install this compromised application through phishing links, fraudulent websites, or social media campaigns. Once installed, the malicious application triggers a native library, “librequisitionerastomous.so”, which begins the execution chain. This native layer decrypts XOR-obfuscated strings at runtime and checks whether the app is running in an emulator or rooted environment. If such conditions are detected, the malware halts execution to avoid analysis. Otherwise, it proceeds to decrypt and load the first-stage payload from the app’s assets. 

Multi-Stage Payload Delivery Mechanism 

[caption id="" align="aligncenter" width="909"]MiningDropper attack chain MiningDropper attack chain (Source: Cyble)[/caption] MiningDropper’s infection chain unfolds across multiple stages: 
  • Initial Stage: The native code decrypts an embedded asset using a hardcoded XOR key, producing a DEX file. This file is dynamically loaded using DexClassLoader and executes a bootstrap component. 
  • First Stage: The bootstrap loader decrypts a second-stage payload using AES encryption. The AES key is derived from the SHA-1 hash of the file name, making it harder for analysts to extract static keys. 
  • Second Stage: This stage presents a fake Google Play update interface, a social engineering tactic designed to maintain user trust. Behind the scenes, it decrypts additional payloads and configuration files. The malware can operate in two modes: a cryptocurrency miner or a user-defined malicious payload. 
Configuration files such as “norweyanlinkediting” (miner path) and “udela” (user payload path) dictate the behavior. These configurations include parameters like remote control capabilities, payload splits, and subscription timelines. 
  • Third Stage: The malware extracts a ZIP archive containing further DEX files and native libraries. Acting as a split-APK installer, it reconstructs and installs the final payload based on the configuration. 

Campaigns Targeting Multiple Regions 

CRIL identified two primary campaign clusters leveraging MiningDropper: 
  • Infostealer Campaign (India): This campaign targets Indian users by impersonating trusted entities such as Regional Transport Office (RTO) services, banks, telecom providers, and popular apps. In October 2025, a campaign using RTO-themed lures distributed malicious APK files that ultimately deployed infostealers to harvest sensitive financial and personal data. 
  • BTMOB RAT Campaign (Global): Another campaign distributes MiningDropper across Europe, Latin America, and Asia. In this case, the final payload is BTMOB RAT, a powerful Android trojan first identified in February 2024 as a variant of SpySolr malware. It supports credential theft, real-time remote control, device takeover, and financial fraud operations. 
Interestingly, while BTMOB RAT was initially distributed without obfuscation and detected by multiple antivirus engines, its integration with MiningDropper has reduced detection rates to as low as one to three engines. 

Final Payload Capabilities 

The final payload delivered by MiningDropper depends on the configuration: 
  • Infostealers: Extract sensitive data such as login credentials and financial information.
  • RATs (e.g., BTMOB RAT): Enable full device compromise, including screen monitoring, file access, audio recording, and command execution via WebSocket-based communication.
  • Banking Trojans: Facilitate financial fraud through credential harvesting and transaction manipulation. 
  • Cryptocurrency Miners: Utilize device resources for unauthorized mining operations.
The malware also abuses Android Accessibility Services to gain extensive control over infected devices, allowing it to simulate user interactions and grant additional permissions. 

A Scalable Malware-as-a-Framework Model 

MiningDropper demonstrates a shift toward malware frameworks that prioritize scalability and adaptability. Its ability to switch between payloads using configuration changes, without altering the core architecture, makes it highly reusable across campaigns. This modularity enables threat actors to rapidly expand operations while maintaining low detection rates.  MiningDropper is more than just another Android malware strain. By combining advanced obfuscation, multi-stage execution, and the exploitation of legitimate projects like Lumolight, it represents a threat model capable of sustaining large-scale, global campaigns.
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